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Abstract: This dissertation examines the effects of the Great Recession on the provision 
of fire prevention services by local government fire departments in the United States.  
Fire prevention is integral to community fire protection and equally important as 
emergency response.  Anecdotal evidence at the time indicated that fire prevention 
program cuts were among the first made by fire departments.  This exploratory study 
utilizes data from a nonrepresentative convenience sample of fire prevention providers 
who responded to the Vision 20/20 Fire Prevention Cuts Survey in 2012 regarding the 
effects of the Great Recession.  Recurrent economic downturns keep this topic relevant 
given the pervasive financial stress faced by local government.  The study first developed 
a common method of comparing fire prevention programs across communities.  This 
method is informed by the literature on public cutback budgeting and uses an ordinal 
index based on the locus of budgetary control.  It was applied to score different 
community-based provision schemes for plan review, new construction inspection, 
existing building inspection, public education and fire-arson investigation services.  
Higher index scores are associated with these services being consolidated under the fire 
department.  Lower scores are associated with fewer services provided by multiple 
entities.  Analysis showed that larger communities protected by career-oriented fire 
departments tend to concentrate provision of all five services under the local fire 
department, while smaller communities protected by volunteer-oriented departments tend 
to spread out provision among different entities or not provide some services.  Analysis 
in the second part of the research found that departments in these larger communities 
were also the most likely to make budget cuts to fire prevention.  This implies that larger 
populations proportions will face increased fire risk during retrenchment.  The last part of 
this study examined cutback strategies.  Results indicated that across the board cuts 
predominate at the department level, but that there are clear preferences within fire 
prevention to cut existing building inspections before other services.  Short-term budget 
balancing approaches in the form of personnel cuts are universal regardless of cut depth.   
However, many departments also apply longer-term strategies to lessen the impact on 
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The challenge of justifying and maintaining expenditures toward fire prevention 
occurs within the larger context of external budget pressures on federal, state, and local 
governments.  Given the vertical structure of funding streams, department management 
choices are grounded within the reverberating effects of global events.  Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that fire prevention programs are among the first items to be cut when 
fire departments face financial hardship.  My dissertation examines the topic of cutback 
management that took place during the Great Recession of 2008 and its protracted 
recovery.  My primary focus is upon the 3Es of fire prevention - Education, Engineering, 
and Enforcement.  Utilizing original survey research responses of fire officials, I 
investigate the different structures through which 3E services are provided, which 
structures appear more vulnerable to budget constraints, and the strategies used when 
implementing constraint driven budget cuts. 
While my examination of cutback management’s effects on fire prevention 
services is rooted in the Great Recession, its applicability extends to future economic 
downturns, which recur with some frequency (Chien and Morris 2016).  There have been 
11 such events since the end of World War II occurring, on average, every 58.4 months. 
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Furthermore, market downturns are not the only events that create economic hardship for 
local government.  Public pressure, policy decisions, and international geopolitical events can 
have similar contraction effects on the government business cycle (Amadeo 2017).   
For example, California’s Proposition 13, which was enacted in 1978, provides a 
prime example of a non-market event leading to local government financial distress.  
Proposition 13 resulted in a 60% drop in property taxes collected, a 22% decrease in 
budgeted expenditures for local government, and an increased reliance on state support 
(Castellano 2013, Chu and Uhler 2016, Greenblatt 2018).  Proposition 13 led a wave of 
similar taxpayer initiatives that swept across the United States during the late 1970’s and 
1980’s.  Many local government-provided services were reduced or shuttered as a result.  
More recently, the Tea Party movement has advanced anti-tax and small government efforts 
that have resulted in deep cuts to government spending at all levels (Goldfarb 2013, 
Westermeyer 2017).  Clearly, fiscal tightening is a repeated theme for local government 
leaders. 
The Global Financial Crisis and Great Recession Environment 
In December 2007, the greatest financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 
1930s officially hit the United States (Love and Mattern 2011).  At the global level, one-third 
to one-half of all assets on the global stock exchange disappeared and anywhere between 
eight and eleven trillion dollars of wealth evaporated (Sakbani 2010, Love and Mattern 2011, 
The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011).  Within the United States, 465 financial 
institutions failed during the crisis (Sakbani 2010, Love and Mattern 2011, Tatom 2013), 
including several major ones, such as Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, and 
Countrywide Financial. 
 3 
U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) declined by roughly 6.0%, median family 
incomes declined by about 8.0%, and aggregate household worth dropped by 15% when 
measured in constant dollars (Danziger 2013, Jagannathan, Kapoor, and Schaumburg 2013).  
One-quarter of all households lost 75%, or more, of their net worth and more than half lost at 
least 25% (Pfeffer, Danziger, and Schoeni 2013).  The number of jobs in the United States 
dropped by 6.0% and the unemployment rate topped 10% by October 2009.  The Great 
Recession officially ended in 2009 with a return to market growth, albeit at a sluggish rate 
that was stubbornly consistent.  For instance, in 2013, housing prices were still 30 percent 
below their peak of 2006.  Since then, unemployment numbers have dramatically improved 
and income returned to pre-recession levels.  However, family wealth, mostly found in home 
ownership, continues to be weakened and stratified (DePillis 2017).   
In this protracted recovery environment, state and local government austerity policies 
continued to act as a drag on long-term recovery.  Indeed, four years after the Great 
Recession officially ended, those conditions, coupled with European economic uncertainty 
pointed to a lengthy period of stagnated recovery (Danziger 2013, Jagannathan, Kapoor, and 
Schaumburg 2013, Dominguez and Shapiro 2013, Magdoff and Foster 2014).  The Great 
Recession’s effects and subsequent economic stagnation lasted longer than any previous 
economic downturn since World War II (Dominguez and Shapiro 2013, Magdoff and Foster 
2014).  And today, debate continues as to whether complete recovery has occurred 
(Cynamon and Fazzari 2016, Brophy and Goldstein 2017, DePillis 2017, Bennett, Yuen, and 
Blanco-Silva 2018, Duque, Pilkauskas, and Garfinkel 2018, Maciag 2018). 
The subprime mortgage market collapse clearly is the initiating event of the Great 
Recession (Sakbani 2010, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2011, Love and Mattern 
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2011, Katkov 2012, Tatom 2013).  Yet, its root cause is hotly debated and typically focuses 
upon a number of interrelated factors, including: 1) the 1980s macroeconomic policy change 
to the supply-side economics, 2) liberal trade agreements, and 3) the shifting of social safety 
net spending to the states during President Reagan’s New Federalism (Nathan and Doolittle 
1984, Cahill 2011, Palley 2011, Katkov 2012).  Along this line of reasoning, a suddenly 
globalized workforce (Jagannathan, Kapoor, and Schaumburg 2013), and inadequate 
government regulation of financial instruments (Sakbani 2010, Tatom 2013) contributed to a 
huge speculative bubble in fixed income markets. 
Regardless of existing disagreements as to cause, the meltdown process followed an 
easily identified path.  It is axiomatic that business improves profitability by improving 
productivity.  Along this line, wage control improves productivity by keeping production 
costs down.  Globalized markets offered firms the opportunity to move production offshore 
to cheaper labor pools thereby improving productivity (Palley 2011, Katkov 2012, 
Jagannathan, Kapoor, and Schaumburg 2013).  Reduced production costs acted to decrease 
domestic aggregate purchasing power and growth.  The national government’s policy 
response was to ease credit and lower taxes to maintain growth, creating an illusion of 
wealth. 
In short, excessive liquidity led to debt-fueled wealth, the exportation to foreign labor 
resulted in domestic wage contraction, which artificially depressed interest rates and enabled 
subprime home buying among lower income groups.  The unregulated marketing of 
subprime loans to unwary investors set the stage for a global credit default. 
When the speculative loans came due, over-extended buyers defaulted, investment 
values plummeted, property values tanked, and the economy crashed (Smith et al. 2011).  
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Surviving financial institutions reacted by tightening lending to both consumers and 
businesses, which constrained goods consumption and investment.  With consumption and 
investments down, production decreased and layoffs followed.  A self-reinforcing downward 
cycle pushed the economy into recession (Love and Mattern 2011, Smith et al. 2011). 
Resulting Effects on Federal, State and Local Governments 
Federal government attempts to revive the struggling economy included massive 
financial bailouts and an expensive economic stimulus plan that included over $900 billion in 
public spending programs, tax cuts, and business write-offs (Pollin 2012).  Unlike previous 
stimulus efforts, however, these federal efforts were not fully successful in restoring the 
economy.  Consumer spending habits, implementation delays, insufficient stimulus, and state 
resistance presented substantial obstacles to renewed growth and restabilization (Pollin 2012, 
Blinder 2013, Parker et al. 2013).  The stimulus package acted to prevent a slide into a 
depression, but it also increased public debt and created an additional long term drag on the 
economy (Hall 2010, Leeper, Walker, and Yang 2010).  Moreover, federal and state level 
political obsession with public debt reduction and an enmity for bailouts and intervention 
stymied a full robust recovery (Love and Mattern 2011, Bartels 2013, Chowdhury, Islam, and 
Lee 2013). 
States obviously play a crucial role in economic stimulus.  At best, they operate in 
concert with the federal government through increased spending, public safety net 
expenditures, and the pass-through of federal stimulus efforts.  In the particular case of the 
Great Recession, states did not tend to follow through on federal stimulus efforts due to a 
range of policies adopted during the 1970s and 1980s (Hall 2010).  Under President Reagan’s 
New Federalism, federal spending in social programs was severely curtailed and delegated to 
 6 
the states. Grant-in-aid spending to the states fell off sharply leaving states to pick up the 
costs of numerous social programs. Coupled with the taxpayer revolt exemplified by 
California’ Proposition 13, states lost their ability to react to economic downturns, while 
simultaneously gaining a larger share of responsibility for managing any economic recovery 
(Nathan and Doolittle 1984). Federal stimulus spending from the Great Recession further 
curtailed available funds for local recovery. 
Every state but one has codified balanced budget requirements that restricted these 
types of policy actions.  States generally rely on a mixed strategy of property, income, and 
sales taxes to generate income.  Drops in personal income, housing values, and consumer 
spending thus severely hampered state revenue sources (Campbell and Sances 2013).  In 
2010 and 2011 combined, states faced budget shortfalls of $380 billion (Johnson, Oliff, and 
Williams 2011). 
To make up this shortfall, states mostly turned to budget cuts. Widespread state-level 
cuts that focused on health, education, and social services further ate into household wealth 
and spending capacity, which tended to prolong the recovery from the financial crisis (Pollin 
2012). 
State aid to local governments essentially dried up.  Hall (2010) observed that state 
and local government expenditures decreased by almost 35%, most of which came through 
the pruning of over 400,000 positions.  These jobs cuts acted to further diminish market 
demand, leading to more severe downturns and longer recovery times (Scorsone and 
Plerhoples 2010).  Deep cuts to state budgets thus quickly flowed downstream to local 
governments. 
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Of course, economic stress on local government did not begin with the Great 
Recession.  As Cooper (1996) notes, the research places the advent of local government 
fiscal stress in the early 1970’s.  Federal tax cuts, increased deficit spending, and the growth 
of unfunded mandates already substantially affected the prevailing levels of state revenue 
streams.  The Great Recession exacerbated already difficult local government financial 
conditions and has been viewed as a “break point” defining a new normal (Martin, Levey, 
and Cawley 2012, 17S, Perlman and Benton 2012).  The National League of Cities (2013) 
reports that weak financial health is the biggest concern of local governments. Martin, Levey, 
and Cawley (2012), as well as Ammons, Smith, and Stenberg (2012) posit that the “new 
normal” local government environment consists of perpetually restricted resources. 
The New Normal 
Local government cannot expect to return to the conditions that existed prior to the 
crisis.  Constrained resources are now the norm.  The National League of Cities reports that 
the 2015 revenue base for cities was only 91.6% of the 2006 revenue base.  With annual 
growth in the 0.31% to 1.3% range, full revenue recovery is still many years away 
(McFarland and Pagano 2015).  Indeed, the GAO (2015) reported that local government had 
experienced the loss of $225 billion out of their budgets and that the fiscal gap for local 
governments will continue through 2047.  Further, in an example of federal policy affecting 
local government revenues, the 2017 federal tax code changes are expected to depress home 
prices between 4% and 10%.  With roughly half of local government revenue coming from 
property taxes, local budgets will face additional shortfalls (Charles 2018).  Likewise, the 
increased debt associated with the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 is expected to create a drag 
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on the economy similar to President Reagan’s supply side tax cuts (Nathan and Doolittle 
1984, Shkliarevsky 2018). 
Another facet of tight local government finances is centered around structural 
imbalances (Patton 2015).  Revenue generation simply is not keeping pace with ongoing 
budgetary demands.  Legacy sales-tax systems tend to lag within a growing service economy 
and the loopholes associated with on-line retail cut into available revenue streams.  Cities 
with less than 100,000 population have not fared well when compared to larger 
municipalities.  Many are routinely dipping into reserves to make ends meet.  Two looming 
issues further exacerbate the financial picture for local government: failing infrastructure and 
pension liabilities.  Addressing these issues will consume large percentages of local 
government budgets and force service decisions. 
This new-normal environment limits local government service delivery strategies.  
Size, duration, and severity of the cut-back environment dictate available options to manage 
budgetary gaps (Baker 2011).  If the new normal environment is already constrained then 
local governments have even fewer options available to manage the next economic slide.  
Perlman and Benton (2012) indicate that local governments typically start their response by 
choosing to reduce labor costs rather than examining long-term solutions that reduce demand 
for services.  As the fiscal crisis deepens, the local government then turns to cutting 
particular services (Baker 2011) and a process of targeted program elimination.  Neither 
strategy affects demand.  Beyond this incremental approach, local governments seldom 
employ a cutback strategy that considers service demand impacts.  A survey of 74 California 
and Georgia counties (Afonso 2013) supports this concept, finding that 80 percent of the 
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counties made cuts in personnel and capital projects with some respondents making specific 
note of cuts to public safety departments.   
Fire Department Service Provision in the Context of Budget Crisis 
The International City/County Management Association (ICMA) observes that fire 
services have faced decreased budgets since the onset of the taxpayer revolution of 1978 
(Page 2002, Freeman 2002).  Many fire departments routinely contend with incremental 
budget reductions.  However, the Great Recession was an altogether different level of 
magnitude.  The city of Vallejo, California provides an exemplar of the level of fiscal stress 
faced by local governments within the economic meltdown.  The city faced a 30 and 20 
percent decline in property and sales tax revenues with the onset of the Great Recession 
(Peck 2014). The city subsequently filed for bankruptcy and in the downsizing that followed 
its police and fire departments were halved in size and continue to operate at roughly one-
third original capacity. While Vallejo represents an extreme level of fiscal stress upon fire 
departments, Walters (2011) observes that other departments across the country contended 
with dramatic budget cuts. Lowell, Massachusetts lost 25 percent of its staffing.  Muskegon, 
Michigan opted to use part-time personnel.  Baltimore City imposed furloughs rather than 
lose 100 positions.  Newark, New Jersey lost two dozen firefighter positions and San Diego 
implemented rolling brown-outs. These fire departments are just a few examples of the 
constraints that fire departments faced during the Great Recession and they may portend 
behaviors of the next downturn. A recent study of the Great Recession’s effect on career fire 
departments (England and Brown 2014) found that almost one-third of career fire 
departments represented by the International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF) reported 
losing positions. 
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The services provided by a fire department frequently are established by state statute 
or local code, as well as political and citizen expectations (Callahan and Bahme 1987, Page 
2002). Coulter (1979) observes that fire department effectiveness is the extent to which a fire 
department avoids or minimizes fire loss in a community.  This metric incorporates both 
emergency response (e.g., fire suppression)1 activity as well as fire prevention actions (e.g., 
code enforcement and education).  While provided under the umbrella of fire safety, these 
two services approach the fire problem from distinctly different directions.  Response is 
reactive.  Prevention is proactive.  The mix of these two services determines the total cost of 
fire to a community with fire response capacity constituting the great majority of those costs 
(Schaenman and Swartz 1974, Donahue 2004a, 2004b, Jaldell 2005, Hall 2012).  In larger 
departments, the emergency response and prevention functions, as well as other supporting 
functions, may be separate budget categories.  In smaller departments, they may simply be 
found within a line item or within program budgets that are grouped under larger budget 
elements (Stephens, Gannon, and Clark 2002).  In some jurisdictions, prevention services 
may be provided by a different government agency. 
For most of the history of the fire service, fire departments have largely focused upon 
fire suppression or a reactive approach to their core mission.  America Burning (1973), 
however, ushered in a historical trend of declining losses that can mostly be tied to 
engineering improvements and increased emphasis upon public education. Alongside the 
reductions in fire incidents and losses, fire departments’ missions expanded to address new 
types of community risks.  Internal and external pressures escalated the level of community 
health and safety expectations being placed upon fire departments (Donahue 2004b). 
                                                 
1 Non-emergent services, such as water removal are captured under emergency response since these incidents 
still require the mobilization of resources. 
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Regardless of the benefits a proactive, preventative approach provides, public trust in 
the fire department places a premium on its response capacity.  Consistent, prompt, capable 
response leads communities to view the fire department as the responder of first and last 
resort regardless of the perceived emergency (Freeman 2002, Page 2002).  These responses 
now include emergency medical services, hazardous materials response, technical rescue 
(high-angle, collapse, water), and general service calls such as flooded basements and 
downed trees on houses.  Contemporary fire departments are all-hazards response agencies 
that provide a panoply of emergency response services keeping them in the public eye (Page 
2002, Smoke 2004, National Fire Data Center 2009).  With the emphasis on expanded 
capability, community response demand tripled fire department service calls from 1980 
through 2013, from around 11 million to 32 million incidents per year (National Fire 
Protection Association 2014).  With this heightened level of demand, the process of cutting 
the emergency response budget has become a daunting challenge for local governments. 
Fire departments typically consume 15 to 20 percent of local government budgets 
(Moeller 2012).  From the public and local government perspectives, the emergency response 
function is also more easily quantified and evaluated than prevention efforts.  Results 
(outputs) of a fire department response are predictable, easily observed, and fit within the 
short-time frame of budget cycles.  Fires are extinguished; victims are removed from 
collapsed buildings and vehicle collisions; and patients are packaged and transported to 
hospitals. 
Moreover, effective suppression response is rewarded through the prevailing level of 
insurance premiums.  The Insurance Services Office (ISO) rates community fire departments 
across three response-oriented dimensions that help establish insurance premiums.  These 
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ratings are calculated within a 100 point range and the published local score roughly drives 
insurance rates (Insurance Services Office 2016).  Thus, a strong external financial incentive 
exists to maintain emergency response capabilities and capacity at the cost of all other roles. 
Prevention, on the other hand, addresses fire risks proactively, with a larger scope, 
and more efficient use of resources (Jongejan, Jonkman, and Vrijling 2012).  Prevention 
programs influence multiple incidents by targeting classes of at risk persons or prevailing 
incident types.  Emergency response must wait until an adverse event has begun before 
mobilizing and limits resources to mitigating one event at a time.  Prevention activities by 
definition seek to keep the adverse event from happening in the first place or, failing that, 
mitigating the harm from these events. 
The 3E’s of Fire Prevention 
Fire prevention makes use of three primary approaches to accomplish its objectives: 
education, engineering, and enforcement.  These approaches reflect public health concepts of 
primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention, as well as viewing incidents in pre-event, event, 
and post-event phases (Haddon 1970, Runyan 1998).  Education, Engineering, and 
Enforcement are commonly referred to as the 3E’s.  Public fire safety education (hereafter 
‘public education’) focuses on changing people’s behavior.  Engineering concerns fire 
protection features in the built environment.  Enforcement addresses fire and building code 
enforcement and fire/arson investigation.  In some communities, engineering and 
enforcement may be assigned to other government agencies.  Public education almost always 
is the responsibility of the local fire department.  That said, there is no requirement for 
instituting each of the 3E’s in a department (Crawford 2012).  It is strictly a policy decision 
by the local government. 
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The 3E’s originated with President Truman’s 1947 Conference on Fire Prevention.  
Participants outlined a comprehensive approach to fire prevention that stressed voluntary 
action through public education and systems of passive and active protection through 
engineering and code requirements.  Enforcement focuses on ensuring compliance with the 
engineering requirements.  Typical fire risk scenarios are conceptualized as causal chains 
(Weller et al. 2017), but also linked to multiple contributing causes (Corcoran, Higgs, and 
Higginson 2011, Jennings 2013). Viewing fire risk from this perspective permits broad-based 
preventive interventions that utilize each of the 3E’s. 
Education 
Public education is considered the cornerstone of effective fire prevention.  The 
objective is to change individual behavior to avoid activities that may lead to a fire event, as 
well as teaching effective reactions when those events do occur.  Public education is 
considered a primary prevention approach that fire departments generally conduct through 
short one-time contacts.  Organized curricula, when used, are generally done in cooperation 
with local school systems.  Public education’s main push is the pre-incident phase and it 
attempts to avoid fire ignition altogether.  However, when concerned with reactions post-
ignition, it blurs into secondary prevention and focuses on mitigating damage. 
Public education takes on additional importance in our contemporary environment, 
since fire risk generally has transferred from commercial/industrial settings to private 
dwellings.  The home environment now presents the bulk of the fire problem within the 
United States (National Fire Data Center 2009).  Once a dwelling is occupied, the fire 
department lacks authority to inspect and ensure safe conditions (Callahan and Bahme 1987), 
making residences a growing risk of fire over time.  The National Fire Data Center (2016) 
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finds most fires in the United States are behaviorally linked to unintentional acts.  Experience 
and research show that people have difficulty conceptualizing fire risk (Subramaniam 2004, 
Rohrmann 1995).  Unfortunately, there is a dearth of valid research supporting the cost-
effectiveness of public education programs (Schaenman et al. 1987).  Critically, the lack of 
such evidence makes public education programs especially vulnerable to cuts during hard 
times. 
Engineering 
Engineering primarily is concerned with the built environment at the state and local 
level.  There tends to be at least some spillover into product design, such as coffee makers, 
but those policies mostly emerge at the national level.  Within the built environment, 
engineering applies fire and life safety science to features of design and construction.  These 
features include exiting configuration, automatic suppression systems, and fire alarm 
notification systems.  It also covers items such as interior finishes and building methods and 
materials.  These systems provide secondary aspects of prevention by passively protecting 
building occupants from an unintended fire.  Such systems remain static until a fire event 
ignites.  Upon ignition, systems will activate to suppress the fire, control the byproducts of 
fire, ensure timely and safe evacuation of occupants, or improve the safety and effectiveness 
of emergency response forces.  The objective is to moderate damage.  Accordingly, 
engineered systems fall under secondary prevention and operate within the event phase of an 
incident. 
Engineering has its origins in the insurance industry of the late 19th century.  Today’s 
building and fire safety codes and standards grew out of a concern for controlling the 
financial risk faced by insurance underwriters and communities.  This concern also ushered 
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in a new perspective on managing fire risk (Tebeau 2003, Varone 2012).  Engineered fire 
protection systems have demonstrated effectiveness in reducing fire loss provided they are 
installed correctly and maintained (Ford 1997, Ahrens 2009, Hall 2013).  Rather than 
communities focusing solely on the effectiveness and efficiency of response forces, fire 
became a controllable risk that could be countered with technological planning and code 
restrictions.  Today, industry codes and standards are published to guide design professionals 
and create uniform approaches to existing threats.  These codes and standards are crafted so 
that local governments can easily make them obligatory through adoption into law (Varone 
2012). 
Enforcement 
Enforcement has a number of principle tasks: 1) that structures and occupant 
protection systems are designed according to the code; 2) that they are then built according to 
the code; and 3) that structures are maintained according code.  It can also refer to processes 
that supplement compliance (e.g., malicious burning laws).  Within local government, then, 
enforcement typically takes on the form of new plan review, new and existing structure code 
enforcement, and fire/arson investigation (Crawford 2012).   
Local government typically assumes a quality assurance role in plan review and 
inspection for compliance during construction and after occupancy.  In many jurisdictions, 
plan review and compliance inspections are used to generate an industry-tolerated revenue 
stream for local government.  Although these fees seldom cover the actual costs of providing 
these services (U.S. Fire Administration 2012). 
Code enforcement is often received with suspicion, since compliance in new and 
existing structures is coercive and often requires expenditures for compliance on the part of 
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owner/occupants.  Within existing structures, coercive enforcement is considered a 
prevention effort of last resort.  Voluntary or incentivized compliance are preferred.  
Furthermore, the effectiveness of code enforcement activities is very difficult to observe and 
assess for local voters and governmental decision-makers.  It yields benefits that extend past 
the current budget cycle, making current line item justification very difficult (Hall, Flynn, 
and Grant 2008). 
The Resulting Research Questions 
As with the rest of local government, local fire departments tend to emphasize 
immediate outputs within the annual budget cycle.  Fire departments provide two distinct 
intervention services within a constrained resource environment.  Most of the allocated 
resources are devoted to direct provision of services in the communities they protect.  Eighty-
five percent or more of their budgets go into personnel costs (Moeller 2012).  Budget cuts of 
any consequence mean personnel are lost, which immediately affects the scope and quality of 
service delivery (Lipsky 2008).  When these personnel come out of the emergency response 
forces, their loss has an immediate demonstrable negative affect on the service provided 
(Averill et al. 2010). 
Conversely, resource cuts to fire prevention have limited near-term demonstrable 
effects.  Prevention efforts suffer from both weak relationships and significant delays 
between action and benefit (Wasem 2007).  First, benefits are measured in discounted future 
dollars making budget cut comparisons difficult.  Second, realized benefits frequently accrue 
outside of the fire department’s emergency services realm.  Thus, without a standard means 
of operationalizing measures of effectiveness, enforcement efforts often do not survive 
strategic cutback decisions. 
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The balancing act faced by fire department decision-makers is finding the point of 
equilibrium between emergency response and prevention.  Too few resources allocated to 
emergency response leads to immediate reductions in service scope and quality.  Too few 
resources allocated to prevention risks increasing future service demands and fire losses.  It is 
often assumed that financial resources will be restored by those future years even if overall 
budgets remain stagnant.  Unfortunately, in the new normal this may no longer be the case 
and the effects of short-term reactions can be magnified over time. 
Strategic cutback decisions regarding the emergency service-prevention mix must 
now consider a multitude of factors, including community characteristics, citizen service 
expectations, political responsiveness, and potential trade-offs between efficiency, equity, 
and effectiveness (Honadle 1984, West and Davis 1988).  In general, cutback strategies can 
be grouped into three broad categories consisting of fiscal approaches, structural approaches, 
and community engagement approaches (Angelica and Hyman 1997).  This dissertation 
primarily is concerned with the structural approaches to cutback management found in the 
fire prevention function of fire departments. 
At the organizational level, structural approaches modify department mission, 
organization structure, and organization culture.  At the program level, different structural 
approaches connote the unique levels and types of services provided to organizational clients, 
variance in system productivity, and efforts to shift or transfer service responsibilities 
(McMurtry, Netting, and Kettner 1991).  Those programs not seen as mission critical, or 
those associated with weaker constituencies, tend to be sacrificed first (Jick and Murray 
1982, Plant and White 1982, Berne and Stiefel 1993). 
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Thus, the organizational arrangement of fire prevention services within local 
government logically foretells the effect of budget cuts.  From a strategic level, when 
services are concentrated, they become more visible.  When they are dispersed, they 
disappear into the background of overall service provision.  The same can be said for which 
services are emphasized by the providing organization.  Therefore, the obvious starting point 
for my analysis is determining how the 3E services are delivered across the range of fire 
departments and other fire prevention service providers.  This study first examines the 
question: 
1) How are 3E fire prevention services provided across different communities? 
The results of this query will elicit rudimentary approaches to 3E service delivery, 
which does not exist elsewhere.  Carper and Snizek (1980) state that such a schematic 
provides the necessary foundation for further inquiry.  In this case, the resulting schematic 
illustrates different organizational strategies for fire prevention service delivery.  Those 
strategies are heavily influenced by internal organizational factors such as culture and 
structure, and external factors such as political climate and social beliefs.   
Culture and structure are subject to defined mission, resource needs, and historical 
precedent.  Defined mission is predicated on political and community expectations, as well as 
willingness to provide resources.  In short, there is continual process of adjustment between 
the organization, political decision-makers, and the community.  The result is that public 
organizations face a paradox not faced by the private sector.  While their service goals and 
objectives receive general public support, mission goals and objectives are subject to political 
conflict and compromise between constituencies and are likely ill-defined (Pandey 2010).  
Since 3E services can be arranged on a continuum from voluntary to coercive, their delivery 
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generates different reactions from those receiving the service.  Further, each service also has 
distinct primary audiences or constituencies of different strengths, although the lines between 
audiences are somewhat blurred.  The resultant conflicts and compromises are ultimately 
embedded into the strategies used by the organization to deliver the service. They can be 
glossed over when resources are plentiful, but during lean times, these conflicts and 
compromises rise to the surface.   
This ultimately leads to differences in 3E services priorities both in opinion and 
practice.  Clientele on the coercive end of the service spectrum will generate political 
pushback and force a renegotiation of the status quo.  In a cutback environment, different 
strategic approaches to service delivery are expected to have different levels of vulnerability 
(Plant and White 1982, May and Wood 2003).  Identifying the strategic vulnerabilities in this 
readjustment leads to the second question: 
2) Which departmental provision schemes were affected by the Great Recession 
cutback? 
The fire prevention services of plan review, new construction inspections, and 
existing building inspections create the most conflict and compromise. Opposition generally 
comes from persons and entities that have considerable political influence.  Klingner and 
Nalbandian (1983) wrote that cutback management covers organizational reaction to the 
tensions between fundamental values of political responsiveness, administrative efficiency, 
social equity, and individual rights.  West and Davis (1988) expanded on their concept to 
posit that each of these values portends different reactions.  Political responsiveness invites 
activities that are conducted in a manner not to anger those clients with political influence.  
Short-term political priorities will take precedence over long-term gains.  Administrative 
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efficiency will drive long-term productivity improvements and organizational redesign 
efforts.  Social equity leads to uniform service delivery for all clients regardless of position in 
society.  While the authors originally focused internally on individual worker rights, such 
rights easily extend externally to customers. 
The equilibrium between these values is fluid.  During economic downturns, political 
responsiveness takes on even greater importance and fire prevention services that are viewed 
as interfering with personal rights and tax revenues become vulnerable.  For the department 
delivering services, strategic cutback decisions often involve trade-offs in services and 
service levels (McTighe 1979).  The short-term politically driven budget concessions are 
made against the backdrop of legislative mandates, community service demands, and drive 
for organizational continuity.  This leads to the third question, which investigates:  
3) How did departments with different provision schemes strategically approach 
cuts to 3E services? 
The first question about service provision provides a common reference for 
comparing different 3E fire prevention programs.  This enables the next two questions.  
Question 2 looks at which schemes suffered from the effects of the Great Recession and the 
last question examines how departments went about making the requisite cuts to budget.  
History tells us that economic downturns are a given.  While this study has roots in the Great 
Recession, the observations reasonably apply to future economic slumps.    
This study also adds to the literature of cutback management in public organizations 
by looking at the narrow field of fire prevention.  It represents the first attempt to analyze the 






No Technical Solution Problems 
From mankind’s early societies to modern urban settings, losses associated with 
fire have been a central community concern.  Thus, community fire response capacity has 
been developing from early dates as far back as the Roman Empire.  Due to combustible 
construction, close building proximity, and unsafe practices, even small fires easily and 
quickly became community-wide destructive events.  For example, the first documented 
catastrophic fire on the North American continent dates to the Jamestown settlement in 
1608.  Between 1861 and 1918, major American cities experienced conflagration events 
roughly every three and one-quarter years (Smoke 2004).  While the outbreak of 
destructive fires is not as severe as it once was, such events can and do take place.  As 
recently as 2016, fires in Gatlinburg, Tennessee damaged or destroyed close to 1700 
structures, injured over 130 persons and caused the death of 14 others (Gabbert 2016).  
Finally, large life-loss fires still occur with annual regularity.  Twenty-one such events 
were recorded in 2016 alone (Badger 2017). 
Fire remains a significant community threat with over 3000 fatal and 15,000 non-
fatal injuries, over 1.3 million fires, and direct losses exceeding $14 billion each year 
(National Fire Data Center 2016).  The magnitude of this threat has been associated with
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independent variables such as poverty level, education, language diversity, the quality of 
housing stock, and other characteristics (Shai 2006, Corcoran et al. 2011, Jennings 2013).  
Reducing the community fire threat requires more than simply responding to events when 
they occur.  Maintaining response capacity is an expensive community proposition that is 
increasingly difficult in the face of decreased resources. 
Olson (1965, 1971) theorized that organizations form to address collective action 
problems and provide public goods.  Fire departments are firmly located within this sphere.  
They were established to address the community-wide fire threat both in terms of frequency 
and potential to affect the entire community.  Beginning as community bucket brigades, 
citizens mustered together whenever a fire event occurred and attempted extinguishment.  
Fire suppression in a packed, highly combustible environment required the participation of 
hundreds of persons working in concert (Smoke 2004).  The fire problem clearly represents a 
type of collective action problem and it was one where significant numbers of the population 
voluntarily came together to ensure the safety of homes, livelihood, and communities (Olson 
1965, 1971).  As fire events became more frequent and serious, communities began 
organizing with an emphasis on task specialization that resulted in establishing fire 
departments for community protection.   
 Early organized fire departments were all volunteer and response-oriented.  
Population volume and density have a clear link to fire department service demand (Brunet, 
DeBoer, and McNamara 2001, Smoke 2004).  This demand grew in pace with community 
growth.  Population driven demand, compounded by technological advances, led to career 
fire departments making their debut in the middle 1800’s.  However, like the preceding 
volunteer departments, they were still focused on response.  It was not until fire losses were 
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recognized as unsustainable that fire insurance companies began exploring prevention and 
engaging fire departments for risk reduction / prevention purposes (Tebeau 2003, Smoke 
2004). 
Today, most fire departments are all-hazard agencies and response to emergencies 
remains their core mission.  Almost every town, borough, city or county in the United States 
is protected by a local fire department, be it volunteer, career, or combination.  Regardless of 
who calls, a request for help generally receives a response (Page 2002).  The 32 million 
annual responses made by fire departments in the United States indicate that these 
organizations provide a valuable service within their communities. Given the public good 
aspects of this service (i.e., it is both nonrival and nonexcludable), it stands to reason that 
overuse is a real possibility. 
Fire Department Goods 
Samuelson (1954) identifies two general types of goods or services provided in 
societies.  Private goods are those are allocated among competing consumers (rivalrous).  
Goods consumption is regulated or constrained according to the desires of the owner of that 
good.  In other words, it is excludable.  Public goods, on the other hand, are those allocated 
among all consumers without competition (non-rivalrous) in that consumption of the public 
good does not diminish the availability of that good for others (Samuelson 1954).  Following 
on Samuelson, Hardin (1968) theorized in the tragedy of the commons that overconsumption 
of finite public resources follows from each person acting in their own self-interest at the 
expense of the community welfare.  In the absence of a coercive mechanism that prevents 
individuals from maximizing their economic self-interest, individuals conduct themselves in 
series of strategic movements that consume the entire asset.  The point is that individuals 
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pursuing their self-interest in an unconstrained environment will lead to the peril of all.  
Levine (1986) extended “the commons” reference to any shared community resource, such as 
public libraries, health, police, and emergency services.  In this sense, the fire department 
constitutes a public good. 
However, not all private goods are eminently excludable and not all public goods are 
of such unlimited supply that all consumers enjoy unlimited access.  These observations gave 
rise a theory of club goods which are distinguishable by excludability and limited rivalry 
(Buchanan 1965), as well as theories of common-pool goods or resources (Ostrom 1990, 
Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994).  A prime example of club goods is subscription cable 
television.  Consumers must pay to receive service, yet the number of potential simultaneous 
consumers is practically unrestricted.  Common pool goods, however, are distinguishable by 
non-excludability, yet rivalrous consumption in that they are finite.  At some limit, 
consumption by one entity restricts availability to other consumers of that good or resource 
(Randall 1983). 
Fire departments straddle to line between public goods and common pool goods.  
Those where service demand is low and slack remains in capacity fall into the category of 
public goods.  However, for those fire departments where service demand is high, they fall 
into the category of common pool goods (or resources).  They have a finite service capacity 
based on available resources.  Drawing on Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker (1994), the 
openness of fire department service potentially creates a supply-side service provision 
dilemma when there simply is not enough of the service to meet demand.   
Public perception of the fire department as the responder of first and last resort (Page 
2002), which the fire department encourages with its expansion of services, leads to overuse 
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and the inherent free-rider problem.  Citizens are encouraged to call the fire department for 
almost any perceived emergency.  The quintessential example being a cat stuck in a tree.  It 
is exceptionally difficult to exclude requests for service from the protected community, even 
in the face of abuse.  Furthermore, organizations which treat free-riding as inevitable or 
desirable may reinforce such behavior (Kelman 1981).   
This perverse incentive exists within the fire service.  For example, Firehouse.com 
has published a listing of the busiest fire departments in the country for over 30 years.  
Making this list is a source of pride, regardless of whether the responses are based in actual 
emergencies or faulty policy.  This incentive also extends to budget preparation, when busy 
can be conflated with efficiency and effectiveness.  Thus, there is an innate incentive for fire 
departments to unwittingly pursue transition from public goods to common pool resources. 
Solving the free-riding dilemma is difficult in a system where abuse is difficult to 
track and, to some extent, either tolerated or forgiven.  Hardin (1968) described no technical 
solution problems in the sense that market exchange and maximization of self-interest could 
not readily solve them.  The choice is between public policies with varying degrees of sub-
optimal outcomes.  Resolution of no technical solution problems depends upon systems of 
mutual coercion that force individuals not to pursue their complete economic self-interest.  It 
then becomes a social and political issue requiring compromise that is inherently value-laden. 
Hardin (1968) exposed the divergence between self- and community interests.  
Benefit accrues to the individual, while risk is spread amongst the population.  The crux of 
the commons (or common pool resource) problem is that the prevailing rewards scheme 
favors short-term individual gain and punishes persons who act for the community good 
(Hardin 1968, Feeny et al. 1990, Stroup 1991, Shultz and Holbrook 1999).  For the fire 
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department, unnecessary calls for service seldom result in the sanctioning of the caller.  In 
addition, the primary beneficiaries of fire services frequently are individuals who do not 
shoulder the full costs of the service.  Individuals who shirk fire safe behaviors gain a net 
benefit.  Costs are absorbed by the entire community.   
For example, building fire alarm and notification systems have an associated cost to 
install and maintain.  When false alarms occur due to lack of system maintenance, the 
building owner avoids the cost of maintenance, whereas the community absorbs the cost of 
the unnecessary response.  The magnitude of unnecessary calls is exemplified by the fact that 
fire departments within the United States responded to 2.2 million false alarms in 2012 
(Karter 2013).  Costs associated with each false alarm response minimally includes 
personnel, vehicle wear and tear, and fuel, as well as the opportunity costs associated with 
being unavailable for other calls.  False alarms are just one type of unnecessary call for 
service. 
When the service capacity of a fire department is approached or exceeded, the service 
becomes congested and some form of regulation must be applied to maintain distribution 
efficiency (Oakland 1972, Brueckner 1981).  Fire prevention fills this role by tamping down 
unnecessary calls for service or intervening early in an event to lessen the resources required 
to control an event.  Fire prevention establishes rules of expected behavior in the form of the 
3E’s which help reduce calls for service and help maintain the local fire department as a 
public good.  Without these rules, fire departments are subject to the same degradation of 
public benefits as are other renewable resources (Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994). 
Fire response is a collective action problem that must be supported by the entire 
community, whether in the form of taxes, non-tax contributions, or direct participation.  It is 
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labor intense and expensive (Schaenman and Swartz 1974, Moeller 2012).  Critically, fire 
response cannot provide the optimal solution to the collective action problem.  Response is 
always reactionary and loss control is inherently time dependent (Challands 2010, Kerber 
2012).  Kerber (2012) notes that fire department incident intervention is a function of fire 
initiation through time of discovery, notification, dispatch, turnout, travel time, set up time, 
and time to control as seen in Figure 2.1.  The time function from discovery to incident 
control can be extended to any event requiring fire department emergency response.  Kerber 
(2012) places the average response time in the United States at roughly 6.5 minutes, which 
includes only time from fire department notification to arrival on scene.  Damage continues 
unabated until the fire department gains control of the event. 
Figure 2.1: Fire Service Timeline 
 
 
Note: Source: Kerber (2012, 885). 
 
Fire prevention on the other hand, attempts to shift responsibility for a fire event from 
the collective community to individual persons.  Public fire safety education tries to instill 
behaviors that avoid the fire event in the first place and, failing that, how to react properly to 
minimize fire loss.  Engineering shifts costs from the community to the owners or occupants 
of buildings in the form of safety systems that react quickly to fire events.  Enforcement is 
focused most directly on addressing the free rider issue by ensuring that owners and 
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occupants do not shirk fire safety responsibilities and sanctioning persons who engage in 
unsafe behaviors that risk others. 
Cutback Management 
In his influential work The Science of Muddling Through, Lindblom (1959) observed 
that the complex nature of social problems results in incremental decision making in public 
institutions.  Such institutions are found at the levels of “the macro or constitutional level; the 
collective choice or policy decision level; and the operational level” (Kay 2005, 555).  
Change takes place only at the margins of policy to maximize the value of past knowledge 
and minimize the potential cost of future mistakes.  Incrementalism provides for policy 
stability over time, but it also reinforces existing behaviors and stymies the emergence of 
newer, more efficient behaviors (Bednar and Page 2018).  For social problems requiring 
collective action to resolve, this practice reinforces suboptimal performance since options 
that stray far from established paths are not considered (Robinson and Meier 2006).  Both 
actors and the social network must be moved.  These observations describe current fire 
service practices embedded in the expectations of local communities. 
A more in-depth examination of incrementalism leads to path dependency theory.  In 
essence, path dependency is a three-phase process in which present and future behaviors are 
increasingly locked into past behaviors (Robinson and Meier 2006, Sydow, Schreyogg, and 
Koch 2009, Wilson 2013).  Path dependency develops due to issues associated with learning 
new behaviors over engrained ones, challenging established complex social institutions, 
unplanned social and financial expenditures, and institutionalization of self-amplified small 
changes over time (Kay 2005, Robinson and Meier 2006, Wilson 2013).  Furthermore, path 
dependence affects the interactions between the environment (community) and organization, 
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which then influences organizational decisions.  For example, within the fire service, public 
expectations of emergency response service may lead the organization to favor emergency 
response over vigorous prevention services.  Much like the Tragedy of the Commons, the 
reward system favors established suboptimal behavior over more efficient strategic 
alternatives. 
Path dependency arises from and reinforces a stable policy and operating 
environment.  However, natural and man-made events frequently disrupt human systems.  
Among these man-made disruptions lie economic depression and recession (Wilson 2013).  
The loss of resources destabilizes government institutions, causes permanent change, and 
calls for new approaches to social problems.  How social institutions weather the disruption 
depends on the store of economic capital, social capital, and cultural capital available within 
the community (Bourdieu 1987). 
During severe financial downturns, economic capital dries up.  Institutional resilience 
therefore depends on social and cultural capital.  Social capital includes non-monetized 
aspects of social networks, particularly characteristics of the cultural and institutional belief 
and behavioral systems that hold communities together and provide for collective action 
(Bodin and Crona 2008).  Culture affects institutional performance but also serves as a 
cushion that helps preserve organizational identity during disruptions.  It maintains the 
familiar set of behaviors within the context of the social network.  Further, culture influences 
the potential range of reactions to the emergence of newer social institutions in response to 
the disruption (Ravasi and Schultz 2006). 
Unfortunately, those same social networks and cultural beliefs restrict strategic 
decisions to only favor those options that lie close to the already established path.  Fire 
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departments have strong cultural identities that highly value emergency response capabilities 
(Tebeau 2003).  At the same time, the community’s social network also favors emergency 
response (Schaenman et al. 1987, Page 2002).  And, fire departments tend to have strong ties 
to the community creating a community-fire department feedback loop as described above.  
Thus, fire departments may find that alternative methods of providing community protection 
will not be likely to gain traction. 
 Robinson and Meier (2006) note that organizations facing resource scarcity and 
unmeetable service demands must engage in suboptimal sorting of tasks.  The authors 
suggest that hard decisions must be made in a swift manner – “one process for allocating 
resources is triage whereby the organization decides which problems can fix themselves, 
which problems the organization can solve, and which problems are beyond hope” (2006, 
250).  This triage process encapsulates cutback management, which refers to public 
organization adaptations when faced with declining resources and decreased activity. 
Cutback management theory can be traced to Levine (1978) when he proposed that 
cutback management is not merely a process of reversing organizational growth.  When 
organizations grow, their essential qualities change.  Culture, beliefs, and processes adapt to 
increased resource availability.  In some cases, entirely new missions emerge and in times-
of-plenty error tolerance.  Because the emergent culture, beliefs, and behaviors become 
increasingly engrained over time and limit future options, they are quite difficult to change 
(Kay 2005, Robinson and Meier 2006). 
Levine (1978) proposed a four-cell typology to explain the causes of public 
organization decline.  The first axis concerns internal or external organizational influences.  
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The second axis concerns whether political or economic/technical conditions drive the 
decline.  The four basic causes are identified in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1: Typology of Public Organization Decline Cause 
Factors Internal External 
Political Political Vulnerability Problem Depletion 
Economic/Technical Organizational Atrophy Environmental Entropy 
Note: Drawn from Levine’s (1978) proposed four-cell typology explaining the causes of public organization 
decline.  Factors refer to the causes of decline, while internal and external refer to the locus of the cause. 
 
Looking at internal causes first, according to Levine (1978), political vulnerability 
refers to systemic organizational instability rising from intrinsic characteristics that limit 
adaptability and compromise resistance to budget shocks.  Organizational atrophy concerns 
falling performance brought about by mismanagement and internal feedback systems 
failures, leading to a weakened institution that has difficulty responding to cutbacks. 
As for external causes of decline, problem depletion refers to a circumstance when 
the social problem addressed by the organization no longer a popular or political concern.  
Levine (1978, 318) makes particular note of “demographic shifts, problem redefinition, and 
policy termination” that lie outside of the organization’s control yet effect its viability.  
Finally, environmental atrophy refers to the ability of the environment to support the 
organization at its current service level, if at all.  This is the case during economic downturns.  
In short, public organizations, such as fire departments, are subject to a host of internal and 
external challenges that determine their form, functions, and life cycle. 
Fire departments tend to have very strong paramilitary cultures that emphasize taking 
pride in one’s work (Daniels 2012).  It is also a profession with high community standing 
(Miller and Miller 1991) relative to other public services and it tends to have prolonged 
community history with deep bonds to the public (Tebeau 2003).  Furthermore, outside 
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standards of performance, such as accreditation and the National Fire Protection Association, 
focus management activities on core competencies.  These characteristics tend to provide 
cover from internally-oriented threats of decline.   
Nevertheless, fire departments are not immune to environmental entropy or problem 
depletion.  During economic crisis, funds are not available to finance the fire department’s 
full suite of tasks that emerge during growth spells.  Management must then determine which 
services will be provided and which will be cutback.  Given the documented trend of 
increases in service demand (National Fire Protection Association 2014), problem depletion 
is generally not much of an issue for fire departments.  While the fire problem in this country 
is improving, the expansion of the fire department mission into other community risks 
maintains their relevancy.  However, this type of mission creep creates additional challenges 
for institutions under growing budget constraints. 
 At some point of resource decline, public organizations must make a choice to cut or 
have the choice made for them (Levine 1978, Williamson 2014). Management’s reactions to 
cutback conditions are grouped into two categories of resisting or smoothing.  The choice of 
cutback strategies and tactics depends on whether the cause of the decline is internal or 
external (Levine 1978), as well as the length and depth of the crisis.  Under the resisting 
strategy, organizations apply tactics that cut high demand programs, improve resource 
streams, or improve productivity.  The fire service, as a whole, has successfully applied the 
tactic of diversifying programs in the face of the declining fire problem.  Smoothing 
strategies use tactics that attempt to reduce the impact of cuts.  For the fire department, this 
would include actions such as reduced unit staffing, or combining services (e.g., fire code 
inspections with fire investigations). 
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Revenue is the essential resource that facilitates all government services.  For public 
services, the source, control, and level of revenue lies with the polity.  Political compromise, 
law, and public choice frequently define the public organization’s mission, organizational 
goals, and objectives within funding parameters (Pandey 2010).  Missions, goals, and 
objectives, however, are characterized by ambiguity.  Public organizations do not follow 
product life cycles and as a result do not act by cutting unprofitable business lines.  Instead, 
the fire programs with weaker constituencies are sacrificed first.  Further, annual budget 
cycles drive cuts to those programs relying on long time frames to demonstrate success 
versus those with short-term measurables (Pandey 2010). 
Public management cutback strategies can be found in strategies such as shifting 
burdens and responsibilities, prioritization of tasks, alliance building, output innovation and 
overall capacity building.  McTighe (1979) identifies seven variables, which affect the 
strategic and tactical choices for managing cutbacks.  These include political attitudes, 
organizational mission, the cause of resource decline, personnel systems, centralization, 
clientele, and past levels of stability.  The choice of final management response is either 
internalized or externalized.  Actions such as layoffs, and reduced employee benefits, fall 
under internalized responses.  Actions such as reduced community service fall under 
externalized responses (McGowan and Stevens 1983). 
Cutback Management in Local Government 
Public budgets reflect policy choices over the services governments should provide, 
the relative priority of those services, who will benefit / pay, and who will prove to be the 
focus of public attention (Rubin 2010).  There is intense competition for limited resources 
among local government agencies.  Political actors and systems of rules define the allocative 
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decision-making process.  Overall community health and the quality of life is reflected in the 
eventual choice of priorities (Rubin 2010).  The selection of a particular policy choice 
involves tradeoffs.  Tradeoffs come with costs (Natchez and Bupp 1973).  These costs 
include cost-effectiveness, cost-efficiency, and equity, as well as overarching political 
transaction costs (Rubin 2010). 
In the cutback environment, political costs will tend to increase.  North (1990) 
observes that in democratic governments, the exchange between competing interest groups is 
fundamental to policy formulation.  Cutback budget decisions will create winners and losers 
among program constituents.  Political actors make the choice of which programs to fund in 
an effort maximize the likelihood of reelection.  However, in a reflection of Hardin (1968) 
Tragedy there is a high degree of uncertainty since constituents base their votes on personal 
cost-benefit calculations rather than the costs and consequences to the entire community.  
Political actors consequently delegate the hard work to administrators, who in-turn must 
weigh the costs of implementation of cuts while maximizing their own career choices (Kwon, 
Lee, and Feiock 2010). 
Local governments, arrive at two important decisions in the face of budget shortages.  
First, what are the essential services that have to be provided?  Second, which short-term 
adjustments fit within the annual budget cycle?  Short-term policy choices generally include 
revenue increases, reserve fund usage, intergovernmental aid, and, most importantly, cutback 
management.  More often than not, local governments employ the easy path of decreasing 
personnel expenditures through the elimination of employee positions, which comprise the 
largest portion of local government expenditures (Pandey 2010, Perlman and Benton 2012, 
Williamson 2014). 
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Local Government Cutback Strategies 
Political cutback policy often falls into two basic camps: 1) across-the-board cuts, or 
2) rational cuts (Levine 1978, Raudla, Savi, and Randma-Liiv 2015).  Across-the-board 
strategies cut equal amounts or proportions from all governmental entities so that sacrifice is 
shared.  Targeted cuts, on the other hand, impose selective budget cuts and concentrate the 
level of sacrifice.  Unlike the private sector, however, the public sector faces long-term 
consequences on those citizen services scaled back during cutback management.  The 
resulting consequences that appear small may end up being quite consequential should a 
highly salient event take place (i.e., the deadly fire). 
Either strategy can be applied at the macro level or the organizational level.  Macro 
level cuts involve political prioritization or a lack thereof between the various units of 
government.  Cuts at the organizational level imply distributional decisions among programs.  
At the organizational level, cuts are made strategically, reflecting mission-oriented priorities, 
or managerially, reflecting mandates.  The reality is that neither strategy is solely relevant 
(Raudla, Savi, and Randma-Liiv 2015).  Research indicates that executive budgeting is 
heavily influenced by political desires.  This effectively limits the choice of department level 
executives.  Such lack of choice precludes department level executives from making the most 
effective or efficient choice in the allocation of resources (Thurmaier 1995). 
Stipak and O'Toole (1993) examined fiscal stress at the local level and proposed four 
basic strategic reactions: reduce services, raise revenues, improve productivity, or shift 
services.  Available strategies are influenced by political factors, organizational mission, 
cause of the resource decline, clientele, city versus county government, government size, 
frequency and degree of fiscal stress, employee participation, and the use of more 
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sophisticated budget tools (McTighe 1979, Levine, Rubin, and Wolohojian 1981, McGowan 
and Stevens 1983, O'Toole and Stipak 1988).  In a survey of California and Georgia counties, 
Afonso (2013) found that the most likely course of action in the face of fiscal stress is to cut 
both capital budgets and personnel.   
The Dilemma of Response-Prevention Trade-Offs 
Public safety is a clear responsibility of government that garners a lot of public 
attention (Callahan and Bahme 1987, Page 2002).  This makes the fire department a political 
concern regardless of whether the organization is fully career, fully volunteer, or somewhere 
in between.  The manner in which local governments choose to fulfill this responsibility is a 
matter of public choice (i.e., collective action).  Mission, service mix, and staffing 
preferences consequently fall under political influence.  As the agency head, the fire chief is 
a political actor in every sense of the word.  He or she influences political leaders’ decisions 
and then exercises discretion within politically acceptable ranges when implementing those 
decisions (Goodnow 1900/2008, Svara 2001, Demir 2009). 
Political officials do not have the same time horizons or interests as private owners, 
the public, or government itself (Feeny et al. 1990).  Kwon, Lee, and Feiock (2010) observe 
that political actors are motivated to make local service decisions based on political 
expediency, while administrators are motivated by career advantages.  It follows that political 
needs rather than effectiveness and efficiency will drive mission, as well as service 
configurations (Wood and Bohte 2004).  However, inherent path dependency at the political 
and organizational level constrains decisions to emphasize current service structure.  
Significant policy shifts will not be considered in the face of resource scarcity.  Programs that 
serve powerful constituencies are less vulnerable than those with weak constituencies (Rubin 
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2010).  Likewise, programs that antagonize power constituencies become more vulnerable.  
Levine (1985, 692) observes that policy-makers prefer “familiar, short-run, incremental, and 
piecemeal problem-solving methods over viewing retrenchment as a strategic, long-term 
problem.” 
Assuming that a fire chief is reasonably well versed in the fire literature, we can take 
for granted that he or she will know the benefits of fire prevention.  The release of America 
Burning in 1973 put considerable attention on fire prevention and national fire loss statistics 
reflect its effectiveness (National Fire Data Center 2016).  Fire prevention provides an 
unseen benefit to communities through reduced losses and improved quality of life, though 
gauging the effect at the local level is difficult.  Retrenchment poses a policy dilemma.  
Citizens and politicians are generally unaware or do not care about prevention benefits 
(Schaenman et al. 1987).  Their expectations focus on emergency response, which is much 
more visible and politically salient. 
Emergency response and fire prevention approach the community fire problem from 
two distinct directions.  Response is reactive.  Prevention is proactive.  Response assumes a 
certain level of loss based on a time-dependent five-step process from fire initiation to 
control as seen in Figure 2.1.  Response cannot influence the loss associated with the time 
frame of ignition to discovery (t1), and has minimal opportunity to influence loss associated 
from receipt of alarm to arrival on scene through increased process efficiencies (t2, t3, t4).  
Maximum loss control occurs during the operational timeframe.  Fire prevention assumes no 
loss from avoided events and limited damage due to the compression of times from initiation 
to control.  Response requires collective action and considerable investment in resources in 
personnel, equipment, and supplies.  Prevention requires a fraction of those resources and 
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focuses responsibility on individual building owners and behaviors.  In emergency response, 
free riding is tolerated, if not accepted.  Prevention attempts to shift responsibility and costs 
back to individual actors, rather being borne by the community. Prevention takes measures to 
minimize free riding by demanding the installation of fire protective measures and the 
practice of fire safe behaviors.  
The choice of overall cutback strategy employed by the fire department, then, is a 
function legal mandates, maintenance of mission and organizational integrity, and political 
preferences.  It is a collective action problem with no clear technical solution that emerges at 
the transition of a fire department from a public good to a common pool good.  Cutback 
decisions must preserve the efficiency and effectiveness of fire prevention against the 
political practicality of preserving emergency response capabilities.  The essence of this 
dilemma comes down to two questions.  What can be cut?  What should be cut?  Several 
factors influence the answers to these questions.  These include the internal and external 
resources available to the community and local government/department, which services are 
already provided, and the extent of budget cutbacks. 
Formal Hypotheses  
The FPC survey asked respondents to provide information on three department 
demographic variables that the survey work group believed would exert considerable 
influence on the provision of 3E services and cuts made to those services.  These variables 
were size of the community protected, department size, and type of fire department.  These 
variables also provide the basis for my first two hypotheses. 
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Explaining Cutbacks in 3E Services – Department Scale 
The first two variables are inextricably related, though the particular circumstances 
driving the relationship change from community to community.  The size of the community 
protected in terms of population is a primary driver of department size.  Fire department 
service demand is a function of population and service demand greatly influences the size, 
structure, and management of the local fire department.  Service demand is raised or lowered 
by certain characteristics of the protected population.  From another viewpoint, community 
size and characteristics influence the level of services provided by a public good, but also 
increase the likelihood of resource overutilization. 
Population characteristics of density, poverty rate, existing building stock condition, 
and presence of industrial properties have been shown to increase firefighting demand 
(Brudney and Duncombe 1992, Duncombe 1992, Southwick Jr and Butler 1985).  Further, 
economic growth, as seen prior to the Great Recession, fuels demand for fire protection 
services.  New residents look for more services, as well as faster response, but are not tied to 
existing community collective action paradigms (e.g. volunteer fire departments).  Instead, 
they will look to spread the cost of additional service demands across the remainder of the 
community in the form of additional firefighting forces.  
New industries following into growing population centers introduce unique hazards 
that require specialized emergency response capabilities, such as hazardous materials.  
Increasing population density also comes with the hazards associated with vertical, tightly 
packed living and working environments.  These taller, sprawling structures are also 
accompanied by their own special emergency response needs (Brunet, DeBoer, and 
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McNamara 2001).  Again, addressing these needs follows the well-worn path of adding 
additional firefighting forces. 
Firefighting is a labor-intensive service.  Higher levels of desired protection generally 
equate to more personnel.  Fire stations and the units they house have a finite capacity for 
response limited by physical, political, and organizational constraints.  Such constraints must 
be considered and negotiated between stakeholders with an eye toward avoiding service unit 
overload and degrading the service provided.  Pirkul and Schilling (1988) point to two 
important considerations.  One is abrupt peak capacity when a call for service arrives.  Units 
assigned to that call are no longer available to service other calls.  Second, is that calls for 
emergency service cannot be queued.  Thus, the allocation of resources must include 
sufficient redundancy to ensure that other nearby units are available to handle overlapping 
service demand.  When service demand overtakes the availability of resources, the fire 
department transitions to a common pool good.  At that point, service access for some users 
will suffer. 
In their study of fire department service demand, Southwick Jr and Butler (1985) 
found that increased loss leads to demand for additional firefighting forces.  Unfortunately, 
as seen in Figure 2.1, emergency firefighting forces are limited to affecting loss only after 
they arrive at an incident.  Prevention services can intercede at the point of ignition.  In other 
words, investing in prevention as an alternative means of decreasing fire department service 
demand and improving productivity has positive budgetary benefits.  Fire prevention, 
delivered by the 3E services can change the cost of a desired level of protection by changing 
service demand.  This fact is not lost on municipal administrators.  Thus, one would expect 
that as communities and fire departments increase in size, they will pursue service delivery 
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and cutback strategies favoring fire prevention as a means of controlling escalating costs and 
shifting the burden of providing fire protection services to those entities increasing service 
demand.  This leads to my first hypothesis: 
H1a – Fire service provision and cutback strategies for Education, Engineering, and 
Enforcement (3E) activities are associated with the relative size of the community and 
its fire department. 
Explaining Cutbacks in 3E Services – Department Type 
The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) identifies four basic types of fire 
departments: all-volunteer, mostly-volunteer, mostly-career, and all-career.  Within these 
categories, the public configuration may change (Young 2012) (e.g., public versus private / 
non-profit versus local government).  Regardless, however, the basic services of emergency 
response and prevention will remain intact and reflect a desired level of fire protection.  Once 
a community has settled on a desired level of fire protection, they will then seek to provide it 
at the lowest cost.  For instance, (Brunet, DeBoer, and McNamara 2001) demonstrate that 
where the level of desired fire protection is low, volunteer forces are less expensive and 
popular.  However, where the level desired is higher, career forces are relatively less costly 
and more desirable.  The actual level of service will then be defined by a combined measure 
of relative quality and needed quantity.   
Two macro-level trends currently are influencing community desired levels of fire 
protection.  Census data shows that baby boomers (those born between 1946 and 1964) are 
moving to rural and small-town settings in record numbers driven by quality of life concerns 
that center on amenities and housing costs (Cromartie, Nelson, and Barkey 2010).  
Furthermore, the ongoing change in economic markets from local industries to centralized 
multi-national corporations and greater worker mobility (i.e., commuting) has strongly 
influenced suburban growth patterns (Simpson 1996).   
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Central urban areas, on the other hand, have become hubs of growth and commerce 
with adjacent suburban communities absorbing the influx of new residents and workers.  
These changing demographics are causing significant social and economic change for these 
destination residencies (Cromartie, Nelson, and Barkey 2010).  Income and employment 
outlooks are improving, but infrastructure and health care costs for local governments are 
being driven up as well.  Balancing such growth and increasing costs becomes a policy 
choice with no clear answer. 
At one end of the spectrum, all-volunteer fire departments are often central pillars of 
community social life, ranking alongside the local church, as well as protecting life and 
property.  Local volunteer fire departments are mostly found in rural America and protect the 
vast majority of land area in the United States (Simpson 1996).  In this sense, volunteer fire 
departments truly represent collective action addressing a local community problem.  
However, as the community demographics change and service demand increases, the form of 
collective action transforms from one of direct contribution to one of indirect contribution in 
the form of taxes.  Fire departments become goods to be exploited. 
All-career fire departments lie at the other end of the continuum and now protect the 
bulk of the U.S. population.  Career firefighters are less often members of the protected 
community and they more rarely lack clear social ties to their protected community.  All-
career departments vary greatly in size, but generally are marked by higher levels of training 
and a wider array of services.  As a rule of thumb, all-career departments protect higher 
population densities, more industrialized communities, and protect against more diverse 
hazards.  Since services are funded through tax dollars, citizen expectations of service are 
also much higher. 
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Between these two poles lie mostly-volunteer and mostly-career fire departments.  
Fire departments will begin to transition from all-volunteer to mostly-volunteer, then to 
mostly-career and all-career in reaction to service demand.  This does not imply that all fire 
departments will eventually become all-career.  Transition stops at any point along the 
spectrum when the community is satisfied with the level of fire protection provided.  I expect 
that service satisfaction is represented by the type of fire department providing protection, as 
well as the extent of 3E services provided.  How service is provided and which services are 
provided will also restrict the cutback strategies available during times of economic hardship.  
This brings me to my second hypothesis: 
H2a – Fire service provision and cutback strategies for Education, Engineering, and 
Enforcement (3E) activities are associated with the institutional structure of the 
department. 
Explaining Cutbacks in 3E Services – Services Provided 
Fire departments are not the only providers of 3E services.   Other entities, such as 
building, permitting, and inspection departments, stand-alone fire marshal offices, and state 
and local police services also provides limited scope 3E services.  Some services may be 
contracted to the private sector or not provided at all.  Local configuration of how 3E 
services are delivered can be traced to political and community beliefs and desires, historic 
development and capabilities of the local fire department, as well as legal mandates.  
Communities will settle on different mixes and configurations of 3E services, depending 
upon prevailing community characteristics.  The services provided will be those demanded 
by the community to realize a desired level of fire protection.  Thus, one would expect that 
the arrangement of 3E services provides an indication of community satisfaction with that 
level.  Once a community has established a desired level of fire protection, it will try to 
 44 
maintain those services that are targeted.  From this perspective, cutbacks would likely be 
made across the board to preserve those services to the extent possible. 
Each of the five 3E services is targeted toward different clientele within the 
community and each affects fire safety in a unique manner.  Plan review and new 
construction inspections primarily serve developers, designers, and builders in the 
construction industry.  These services generally occur out of sight of most of the community, 
but develop keen political interest when requirements are perceived to result in excessive 
costs.  Existing building inspections serve the owners and occupants of buildings.  These 
services can be very visible to the community, though perceived in a different frame.  From a 
building or business owner’s perspective (e.g., a high-rise apartment building or a local 
restaurant), the existing building inspection can be seen as a nuisance and an attempt to 
interfere with owners’ property rights.  These owners tend to have stronger political ties that 
incurs political interest.  Within complaint driven response, the public views this service as 
appropriate government behavior meant to address their concerns.  Complaints only are 
generated from political interests when those complaints are left unresolved. 
The clientele for public education is the entire community.  It tends to have high 
public saliency, since much of the effort is directed at children and the elderly.  It focuses on 
the human behavior aspects of fire safety and it is not limited to the built environment.  Fire-
arson investigation is unique in that the primary clientele is the government and insurance 
industries.  Identifying fire incidence trends to improve resource allocation and pursuing 
criminal activity occurs mostly out of sight of the general community. 
A community’s perception of fire risk is seldom accurate since fires are relatively rare 
events in a given population.  Most community members, particularly those in larger 
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communities, will rarely have a personal experience with fire (Chubb 2005).  Further, most 
fire prevention activities occur out of sight of the public, so most of the public is unaware of 
the interplay of the 3E services in controlling the costs of fire risk.  As rare events, fires are 
certain to make the local news.  Fire prevention services do not.  Thus, public perception of 
fire risk is largely formed by the level of emergency response of the fire department and the 
public is likely to resist any cuts to that emergency response.  From the political perspective, 
the provision and arrangement of 3E services will likely follow the path of least resistance. 
Services that are not directly provided cannot be cut.  Services that the public or 
political actors place high value in will be resistant to cuts.  Services that are provided by 
other levels of government or the private sector limits the scope of political and budgetary 
interference.  Services that generate pushback at the political level and have powerful 
constituencies, but are mostly out of sight of the public will influence service and budget 
priorities.  One can easily conclude that cutback strategies will reflect community desires and 
political desires, as well as how services are delivered, thereby limiting the choice of cutback 
strategies available.  My third hypothesis tests this choice limitation: 
H3a – Fire service cutback strategies for the provision of Education, Engineering, and 
Enforcement (3E) activities are associated with the internal and external sourcing of 
the 3E services.  
These three hypotheses form the basis investigating my research questions.  I begin 
by looking at how the demographic variables of fire departments affect the provision of 3E 
fire prevention services.  Factors such as size of population served, department size, and 
department type are thought to influence the choice of services provided, as well as the 
strategic cutback choices available.  I then turn to the provision of those services themselves.  
The arrangement for the provision of services, grounded in prevailing community and 






The premise of this study is to evaluate fire prevention services within times of 
severe economic stress.  The common wisdom on this topic is that fire prevention is the 
first service sacrificed when fire departments are faced with large budget cuts 
(Schaenman et al. 1987, Scott 1997, Chubb 2005).  Thus, my dissertation begins by 
classifying 3E provision strategies into an ordinal ranking of common configurations to 
better understand how these services are provided across different communities and 
departments.  It then examines which of these service configurations are most vulnerable 
to budget cuts.  Finally, it examines the alternative strategies utilized for cutback 
management.   
Local government provides community services through departments with 
defined missions and they are generally free to configure themselves to maximize 
effectiveness and efficiency.  Cutback implementation decisions are also made at this 
level within the boundaries of resource availability provided by political decision-makers.  
Accordingly, this study utilizes the local government department or organization as the 
unit of analysis
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Vision 20/20 Fire Prevention Cuts Survey 
The data for this analysis stems from the Vision 20/20 Fire Prevention Cuts Project – 
a survey of fire service leaders that took place in the Spring of 2012.  The project began in 
2010 with months of discussion on an electronic information exchange bulletin board shared 
by fire marshals, fire code enforcement officials, and other fire prevention services providers.  
Discussion participants were concerned about the cuts to fire prevention programs affecting 
their various departments stemming from the Great Recession.  In the March 2011, I 
volunteered to lead a working-group to develop a survey with the intent of determining the 
recession influenced status of fire prevention.  The group consisted of eight persons from 
across the United States with extensive career fire prevention experience at the national and 
local level.  One member of the work group sits on the Vision 20/20 Executive Committee 
and secured sponsorship and staff support for the effort.  The project contributes to Vision 
20/20’s Strategy 1 of greater advocacy for fire prevention,2 but no direct funding was 
provided for the survey itself.  The Vision 20/20 project, however, is supported through U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, Assistance to Fire Fighters Fire Prevention and Safety 
Grant program, and the Institution of Fire Engineers US Branch.  Survey work group 
members served voluntarily as part of their normal career duties, so data remains entirely in 
the public realm.  Work was conducted entirely by email or phone. 
Survey Sampling Method 
The FPC Survey used a nonprobability convenience sampling strategy.  As such, it is 
not representative of the population of fire prevention providers or fire departments in 
general.  Results are not generalizable to the population of fire departments (Johnson and 
                                                 
2  Vision 20/20 proposes six strategies for improving fire prevention actions in the United States. Strategy 1 is to 
“Increase advocacy for fire prevention”.  Additional information can be found at http://toolkit.strategicfire.org . 
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Reynolds 2012), but the effort represents an initial step toward better understanding the 
balance between fire response and 3E services in the context of significant budget constraint. 
The sampling method for the survey was based strictly on ready access to contact 
information.  Random sampling was discussed early in the project time line, but a mechanism 
for such an effort was not available.  At the time of the survey, there were approximately 
30,170 fire departments in the United States (USFA 2010).  No comprehensive index of 
departments and contact information existed with which to gather information on the greater 
population for a random sample study.  While results are not generalizable, Johnson and 
Reynolds (2012, 240) note that nonprobability convenience sampling is “most appropriate 
during exploratory research or when the population is too ill-defined to permit probability 
sampling.” 
The working group decided that the most feasible approach to a survey was to utilize 
the existing ePARADE (electronic Prevention Advocacy Resources and Data Exchange) and 
NFLSE (National Fire and Life Safety Educators) electronic bulletin boards.  Membership 
and participation on these bulletin boards takes place on an individual level (not the 
organization / department level). At the time of the survey, ePARADE had a membership of 
937 registered participants and NFLSE had a membership of 451 registered participants, 
providing total distribution of 1388 individuals.  The registered participants include members 
representing fire departments, state fire marshal offices, the International Association of Fire 
Chiefs, United States National Fire Academy, National Fire Protection Association, other 
federal departments, and private sector corporations and consultants.  Participants are 
screened prior to gaining access to either bulletin board site, therefore I am reasonably 
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assured that our responses are associated in some way with the provision of fire prevention 
services. 
Survey Instrument 
Construction of the survey instrument is important to capturing the intended data.  
Open-ended questions may solicit unanticipated, but vital information.  However, they pose 
certain analytic challenges, including interpretation and coding of responses.  Closed 
questions, on the other hand, increase answer reliability, answers are easy to interpret, and 
they lend themselves to easing computer-aided analysis.  Regardless, survey questions should 
be succinct, single topic, and use terminology appropriate for the intended audience (Fowler 
2009).   
Focus groups can play an important role in developing a survey.  They help develop 
and clarify the purpose behind a survey.  In certain cases, they help develop survey questions 
with an eye towards later analysis (Fowler 2009).  The original format of the FPC Survey 
was for a two-part survey.  The first ten questions were used to establish organizational 
control variables.  The remainder of the questions were intended to develop information that 
quantified the level of cutbacks to fire prevention activities, quantified the effect of those cuts 
on program resources and outputs, and identify any strategies undertaken to compensate for 
the program cuts (Donahue 2011).  The second part of the survey was to look at community 
loss impacts and identify jurisdictions for case study.  However, this second part was never 
fully developed or implemented. 
The draft FPC Survey instrument went through four separate iterations during which 
organization and community demographic questions were added.  The survey work group 
selected base-line factors according to perceived resource availability.  Community 
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population should be generally reflective of the available tax base and service demand.  Total 
fire department staffing is likely associated with available departmental resources and service 
demand.  Fire department type was thought to associated with resource levels, particularly in 
the case of all-volunteer and mostly-volunteer who are probably not or minimally supported 
by tax dollars, as well as facing legal and technical restrictions on which 3E services they can 
deliver.  For example, plan review requires deep technical knowledge of code intent and 
requirements that takes years to master.  
The survey instrument draft was tested by the January 2012, Leadership Strategies 
for Community Risk Reduction class at the National Fire Academy.  This resulted in 
additional revisions to the draft instrument to make it more easily understood (Donahue 
2012).  The final survey instrument consisted of 28 questions in a self-administered, closed-
end format.  This length falls within that recommended by Fowler (2009) to avoid survey 
fatigue.  The final survey instrument is found in Appendix A.  The survey was posted 
electronically on Survey Monkey in mid-April, 2012.  Introduction emails were sent on April 
15, 2012, with reminder emails approximately every two weeks to improve the number of 
responses. Copies of the introductory emails are found in Appendix B.  The survey remained 
open through June 15, 2012. 
The first of four sections of the FPC Survey solicited organizational information 
about fire prevention service delivery.  In this section, the first group of questions asked 
which agency within the local government provides each of the 3E fire prevention services.  
The second group of questions sought information on demographic features that were 
thought to influence which agencies provided fire prevention services and the likelihood of 
fire prevention cutbacks, including department size and type, and population served.  The 
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second section of the survey instrument asked whether the budget had been cut and if these 
cuts were the result of tightened budgets.  Questions in the third section of the survey 
instrument focused on identifying the magnitude of any fire prevention budget cuts within 
the context of overall agency budget cuts.  Finally, questions in the last section of the survey 
were aimed at identifying specific programmatic impacts of any budget cuts. 
The survey’s 28 questions generated a considerable amount of data.  However, not all 
the data collected is immediately germane to the topic of this study.  I am investigating the 
basic strategic approaches to cutback management that were used as a result of the Great 
Recession.  Accordingly, I limited my analysis to those survey questions which provided data 
addressing my central theme.  Table 3.1 provides a truncated list containing only those 
survey questions used in this study. 
Survey Results 
Introductory and reminder emails were sent to 1388 individuals.  Of these, 1321 
survey starts were returned for an overall 95.2% response rate.  Fowler (2009) observes that 
response rates for surveys can vary considerably, with lower rates associated with mail and 
internet-based surveys.  That said, there is no established standard for response rates.  The 
federal Office of Management and Budget looks for procedures that will lead to response 
rates of at least 80%, while academic survey institutions occasionally reach 70% rates.  The 
FPC Survey response rate exceeded these rates.  This is probably due to the fact that the 
survey used a convenience sample comprised of known and engaged fire prevention 
practitioners in all the 3E services.  Individual subjects within the target sample represented a 
wide array of community and organizational sizes from across the country.  Respondents also 
represented a host of different organizations in the private and public sectors, with 91% of
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Table 3.1: FPC Survey Response Count by Question 
Survey 
Question No. 












Which governmental agency provides the fire 
prevention service of plan review for new 
construction in your community? 
1321 1200 1 5 0.88 
2 
Which governmental agency provides the fire 
prevention service of inspections for new 
construction in your community?   
1321 1200 1 5 0.81 
3 
Which local governmental agency provides the fire 
prevention service of existing occupancy 
inspections in your community?   
1321 1200 1 4 0.77 
4 
Which local governmental agency provides the fire 
prevention service of public education in your 
community?   
1321 1200 1 4 0.53 
5 
Which local governmental agency provides the fire 
prevention service of fire/arson investigation in 
your community?   
1321 1200 1 4 1.18 
6 What is your organization? 1321 1200 1 4 0.55 
7 
What is the population of the community your 
department serves? 
1321 1200 1 8 1.78 
8 
What is the total staffing of your department 
including civilian and uniformed personnel? 
1321 1200 1 8 1.52 
9 
Is the fire department serving your community (all 
career, mostly career, mostly volunteer, all 
volunteer)? 
1321 1200 1 4 1.12 
10 
Does your department have one or more work units 
dedicated to providing a fire prevention service? 
1321 1200 1 2 0.46 
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Table 3.1: FPC Survey Response Count by Question 
Survey 
Question No. 












What is the total staffing of your combined fire 
prevention work units including civilian and 
uniformed personnel? 
889 823 1 7 1.34 
12 
Has your organization made cuts to fire prevention 
services in last two years? 
893 827 1 2 0.50 
14 
What percent of the overall department budget was 
cut? 
413 381 1 6 1.74 
15 
What percent of the fire prevention work unit(s) 
budget was cut? 
415 383 1 6 1.75 
16 
Which fire prevention services were affected by the 
budget cuts? Check all that apply. 
      
16-A Fire investigations 125 120 1 1 0.00 
16-B Fire/building code inspections 258 242 1 1 0.00 
16-C Fire/building plan review 146 136 1 1 0.00 
16-D Public education 321 295 1 1 0.00 
16-E Other 35 29 1 1 0.00 
17 
Were personnel cut from the fire prevention work 
unit(s)? 
876 812 1 2 0.47 
20 
Did any other work units in the department 
experience budget cuts? 
281 263 1 2 0.44 
25 
Did your department take steps to compensate for 
fire prevention activity cut backs? 
1262 1148 1 2 0.47 
Note: This table contains only counts and descriptive statistics for questions that are directly applicable to this study and not the full range of questions asked 




Table 3.2: What is your organization? 
 Response Count Response Percent Cumulative Percent 
Local fire department 1198 90.7% 90.7% 
Local building department 23 1.7% 92.4% 
State Fire Marshal’s Office 12 1.4% 93.8% 
Other local department 44 3.3% 97.1% 
Other department (Federal, State, or Private) 37 2.8% 99.9% 
Other (please specify) 74 5.60% 105.5% 
Total answered question 1321 105.5%  
Notes: Percent total is greater than 100% due to respondents providing double answers using “Other – please specify” which allowed for duplication of 
responses. These were filtered out when selecting the study sample.  Without this duplication, total responses are less than 100% due to rounding errors. 
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respondents coming from local fire departments (n = 1198), 1.7% coming from local building 
departments (n = 23), and 3.3% coming from other local departments (n = 44).  The 
remaining survey responses came from federal, state, and private entities (n = 56).  Table 3.2 
contains the breakout of organization orientations for all respondents. 
As with all surveys, individual question response rates will vary.  Response rates for 
individual questions were generally acceptable and can be found in Figure 3.1.  Individual 
question response rates varied from 20% to 100%, though over half had response rates 
exceeding 60%.  All the questions concerning department demographic characteristics and 
who provides a particular service were answered at a 100% rate.  Questions that asked  
Figure 3.1: FPC Question Response Rate 
 
Note: FPC Survey question response rates are important for providing some level of credibility in later 
analysis of the study questions.  Missing values are handled by listwise exclusion in calculations.  This 
particularly important in questions 12 (Were cuts made to FP in the last two years?), 17 (Were personnel cut 
from the FP work unit?), 21 (Were FP activities cut back?), 23 (Were FP activity resources cut back?), and 
25 (Did the department take any compensatory action?).  These questions provide the basis for dichotomous 
variables in the second and third study questions.  
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general information about cuts to personnel and services all ran above 60%.  Response rates 
for questions that asked specifics about cuts ranged between 20% and 30%, but those were  
subordinated questions on the basis of those departments experiencing cuts.  In a general 
sense, the survey worked as intended and yielded useful responses.  Most importantly, the 
survey generated a high response rate, contrary to historical email survey results (Johnson 
and Reynolds 2012). 
Bias and Error 
Limitations placed on sample selection create several inherent biases within survey 
results.  Johnson and Reynolds (2012) observe that email or web-based surveys are known 
for low sample-population congruence.  Bias is introduced through the initial selection of 
respondents.  Johnson and Reynolds (2012) also note that web-based surveys suffer from 
incomplete or non-response for reasons of non-contact, refusal or not-able.  Such responses 
are difficult to follow up and complete.  Furthermore, respondents may not know the answer 
and simply choose a random answer.  Weisberg, Krosnick, and Bowen (1996) note other  
potential biases with using bulletin boards to access sample populations.  First, not everyone 
has access to the technology or site.  Local governments place many restrictions on which 
sites are accessible, precluding participation by those who might be interested.  Given that 
the FPC survey was e-mail driven, providers from volunteer departments may not have been 
aware of the survey.  Second, the technological capability of the respondents plays a role in 
response.  For the FPC Survey, participation on the bulletin boards may be limited to 
providers who are more technologically progressive, possess a high interest in the subject 
matter, and have internet access.  Third, these bulletin boards are not extensively advertised.  
Participation follows from word of mouth.  Taken together, these conditions set up a self-
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selection bias and non-representative sampling frame (Weisberg, Krosnick, and Bowen 
1996). 
Bias was introduced into the survey through the use of its targeted audience of fire 
prevention providers, but it also led to the extraordinary response rate.  The overwhelming 
number of survey respondents were from local fire departments (n = 1198, 90.7%).  Though 
steps were taken to identify other 3E service providers, the survey work group assumed that 
the respondent was fully aware of who those other service providers were.  This assumption 
may be acute in the case of respondents from mostly and fully volunteer departments, who 
tend to be response oriented and possess limited capacity or authority to provide other 
services.  This identifies another potential bias among survey respondents.  All career fire 
departments are over represented.  While all-career fire departments represent only 8.5% of 
the fire departments in the United States, they comprise 43% (n = 568) of survey 
respondents.  On the other end of the spectrum, 67% of the fire departments in the United 
States are all volunteer, yet comprise only 17% (n = 224) of my survey respondents. 
Study Sample  
This study is concerned with the local government environment.  Inclusion of federal, 
state, and private actors, while relatively small in number, has the potential to skew results 
since budget pressures and characteristics are different for these organizations.  Accordingly, 
respondents from these organizations were removed from the final sample examined.  In 
addition, this study is concerned with how local fire departments react to economic 
downturns in their delivery of the 3E fire prevention services.    The final study sample was 
derived from survey respondents who answered the first five questions regarding who 
provided each 3E service, as well as question 6, which asked for the respondent’s own 
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organization orientation.  Individual cases were filtered and a count of respondents answering 
the first six of FPC survey questions derived (n = 1321).  The study sample including 
question 6 yield 1200 observations.  This level provides sufficient cases for a large-N study 
and captures 94.9% of the local government survey respondents.  This is shown in columns 
four through six of Table 3.1, along with descriptive statistics.  
Quantitative Approach 
To answer the research questions and hypotheses posed I use a quantitative approach 
to analyze the data gathered in the FPC survey.  I cannot make accurate assumptions about 
the distribution of the true population from which my sample was drawn since I use a 
convenience sample.  Therefore, I use non-parametric techniques for my analysis (Pallant 
2016, Moore, McCabe, and Craig 2012).  A word of caution is appropriate here.  O'Sullivan, 
Rassel, and Taliaferro (2011) observe that the statistical results from nonprobability samples, 
such as the basis for this study can yield unreliable results.   However, that does not mean 
that statistical testing is inappropriate, only that results should be viewed with a measure of 
caution.   
As previously stated, a nonprobability convenience survey forms the basis for this 
study.  The FPC survey consisted of 28 closed end questions, which asked for fact-based data 
rather than opinion-based data.  The structured answers lent themselves to easy development 
of nominal, ordinal, and interval data and quantitative analysis (Fowler 2009).  I recoded 
answers as necessary to allow for statistical analysis.   In the cases of community size and 
total department staffing, I collapsed the highest three and four categories of survey answers, 
respectively, into single categories to provide sufficient observations for analysis.  The larger 
numbers of observations in these two categories make for more robust independent variables.  
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My analysis focuses on identifying relationships between categorical variables and trends 
within those relationships, but does not attempt to identify causation. 
My analysis begins with visual presentation and descriptive statistics.  This provides a 
general overview of the data, but more importantly the number of missing values from that 
particular variable in the study sample.  While normally concerned with random sampling, 
missing values are handled through listwise deletion.  Allison (2002) notes that listwise 
deletion is the preferred method as it does not affect measures of central tendency.  However, 
standard errors are likely to increase since analysis is based on a smaller portion of the study 
sample.  Given that my research is based on a convenience survey, I cannot state how 
representative the study sample is of the 3E fire prevention service providers population.  
However, I treat missing values as if this study is based on a random sample. 
I provide visual presentation of graphs and tables to clarify the relationships 
hypothesized in this study.  Hartwig and Dearing (1979) state that visual representation of 
data is appropriate for exploratory analysis.  It is often more effective than strictly numeric 
data presentation for examining data distribution.  Graphics should reveal several data 
characteristics in an easy to understand format.  While each type of chart has its strengths, 
they should convey central tendency, data dispersion, distribution shape, tails, symmetry, 
outliers, comparison, and relationships (Johnson and Reynolds 2012, 377).  
Clustered error bar charts provide visual representation of point estimates of mean 
values, trends, and confidence intervals indicating the precision of point estimates (Cumming 
and Finch 2005, Pallant 2016).  The data presented by error bars is not resistant to outliers.  
On the other hand, box and whisker plots summarize interval and ratio data distribution, 
including range, median, interquartile range, and outliers.  The data presented is resistant to 
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extreme value influences and supports ready comparison between categories of data (Johnson 
and Reynolds 2012).  Cross tabulation tables identify relationships between categorical 
nominal and ordinal variables, as well as the strength of those relationships (O'Sullivan, 
Rassel, and Taliaferro 2011, Johnson and Reynolds 2012).   
Several survey questions asked for Yes/No answers and these provide dichotomous 
dependent variables for analysis, while answers to other questions provide discrete categories 
appropriate for independent variables.  These are examined via logistic regression to identify 
the probability of each condition existing and how a one unit change in the independent 
variable generates change in the dependent variable (Pampel 2000).  Because I am using a 
nonprobability sample, I base the results of my logit models on maximum likelihood 
estimation (MLE), which returns an iterative approximation of model parameters that best fit 
the data (Pampel 2000).  I test relationship strength and direction, goodness of fit, and 
significance through chi-square and gamma statistics, maximum likelihood value, 
probability, and odds ratios, as appropriate (Freund and Wilson 2003). 
Dependent Variable and Estimation Strategies 
Fire threat has been defined as a local problem since President Truman’s National 
Conference on Fire Prevention (Continuing Committee on Fire Prevention 1947).  This 
conference introduced the concept of the 3E’s in fire prevention.  While making clear that 
prevention is a key element of fire safety, the conference attendees reasoned that different 
communities faced different fire risks.  It follows then, that different communities will 
emphasize different applications of the 3E’s.  Communities are free to decide the level of fire 
risk tolerated and which 3E services to provide as part of their fire safety efforts.  I 
investigate how different communities apply the 3E concepts in my research questions. 
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How Are 3E Fire Prevention Services Provided Across Different Communities? 
My first research question focuses on how 3E services are delivered across various 
communities.  It necessarily consists of two parts: 1) developing a common tool for 
comparison, and 2) applying that tool across the various communities in my sample.  In the 
first part, I derive a common platform for comparison by applying an ordinal scale to 
delivery of each of the 3E services.  Questions one through five of the FPC survey ask which 
entity provides the five fundamental 3E services of plan review, new construction 
inspections, existing building inspections, public education, and fire-arson investigation (if 
these services are provided at all).  These are shown under Research Question 1 of Table 3.3.  
Respondents who answered “Not applicable” or “Other – please specify” were listwise 
deleted during development of the study sample.  I assign each possible categorical answer 
for each of questions one through five a value of one through four depending on who 
provides the service or if the service is not provided.  Categorical answers for each of these 
questions included: 1) local fire department, 2) local building department, 3) other local 
department, 4) service is contracted out, 5) service is not provided. 
My rational for values in the ordinal scale is based on Schaenman and Swartz (1974), 
who observe that prevention services affect the core mission of the fire department and 
should be included in any effectiveness and efficiency evaluation regardless of who provides 
the service.  Assuming budgets are representative of departmental priorities (Rubin 2010), 
the ordinal scale represents where the locus of budgetary control is located relative to the fire 
department and potential to impact the fire department’s mission.  In essence, the higher the 
number, the closer the service is to fire department control.  The ordinal scale provides a 
means of comparing individual 3E services across communities, but not overall community
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Table 3.3: Dependent Variables of Analysis 
Survey 
Question No. 









Research Question 1: How are 3E fire prevention services provided across different communities? 
1 Who provides plan review? 1200 1 5 0.88 
2 Who provides new construction inspections? 1200 1 5 0.81 
3 Who provide existing building inspections? 1200 1 4 0.77 
4 Who provides public education services? 1200 1 4 0.53 
5 Who provides fire/arson investigation? 1200 1 4 1.18 
10 Dedicated fire prevention work unit? 1200 1 2 0.46 
11 What is total staffing of FP work unit? 823 1 7 1.34       
Research Question 2: Which departmental provision schemes were affected by the Great Recession cutback? 
12 Organization made cuts to FP in last two years? 827 1 2 0.50       
Research Question 3: How did departments with different provision schemes strategically approach cuts to 3E services? 
15 What percent of FP work unit budget cut? 383 1 6 1.75 
16 Which FP services were affected by budget cuts? 
    
16-A Fire investigations 120 1 1 0.00 
16-B Code inspections 242 1 1 0.00 
16-C Plan review 136 1 1 0.00 
16-D Public education 295 1 1 0.00 
17 Were personnel cut from the FP work unit? 812 1 2 0.47 
25 Did the department take compensatory action? 1148 1 2 0.47 
Notes: This table contains only counts and descriptive statistics for questions used directly as or to develop dependent variables from the study sample 
(n=1200) and not the full count of survey respondents.  FP = fire prevention. 
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fire prevention programs.  To realize a programmatic comparison tool, I distill a single 
variable by combining the scores from each of the 3E services provided in a community and 
weight each service score equally.  The ordinal scale becomes my 3E score for individual 
services, while the distilled scores become my summation 3E Index. 
The literature is convincing that the operating environment greatly influences the 
service demand placed on a fire department (Jennings 1999, Subramaniam 2004, Shai 2006, 
National Fire Data Center 2016).  While this literature addresses the emergency response 
service of the fire department, this observation can be extended to fire prevention services as 
well (Duncombe and Yinger 1993).  This leads me to my dependent variables for this first 
research question.  These consist of the same five 3E services used to develop the 3E Index.  
These are identified in Table 3.3 in column one, survey questions one through five, in 
addition to the 3E score and 3E Index just discussed.  
In the second part of the first research question, I evaluate the response of these 
dependent variables to the three environmental (demographic) conditions that serve as my 
independent variables.  These variables are community population size, department size, and 
department type, and are found in survey questions seven, eight, and nine (see Table 3.1).  I 
begin my evaluation looking at how the 3E Index is affected by population size, department 
size and department type.  I illustrate my comparisons to the 3E Index through simple box 
and whisker charts, which visualize several descriptive statistics concerning data distribution 
and central tendency.  Importantly, box and whisker charts are not sensitive to outliers and 
ease comparisons between data categories. 
After evaluating the 3E Index response to the independent variables, I look at how the 
individual 3E services are influenced by the independent demographic variables.   For this 
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analysis, I use simple error bars.  While error bars are sensitive to outliers, they are 
appropriate for identifying point estimates of means, trends, and confidence intervals.  In this 
evaluation, I use 95% CI error bars, which corresponds to α = .05 (Cumming and Finch 
2005).  I expect that different size communities and departments, as well as department types 
will have different influences on my dependent variables.  Accordingly, I also cluster my 
error bars by the categories provided for my three independent variables in the FPC survey. 
The last part of answering my first research question centers on a variation of 
delivering 3E services.  In many communities, fire prevention is considered a specialized set 
of tasks with unique knowledge requirements.  The level and complexity of service demand 
drive the implementation of a dedicated fire prevention unit (Crawford 2012).  Thus, I expect 
that dedicated fire prevention units will be associated more with larger communities and 
larger departments supported by career staffs.  To test this supposition, I turn to survey 
question 10 in Table 3.3 (i.e., Dedicated fire prevention unit?) which presents a dichotomous 
dependent variable.  I code the responses according to convention with No = 0 and Yes = 1.  
As previously mentioned, I run an MLE of a logit model against my control variables of 
community size, department size, and department type as predictors on the presence of a 
dedicated fire prevention unit to deliver 3E services.   
If fire departments have dedicated fire prevention units, it is likely that different size 
communities will have different capacity needs from these units.  So, to close out this 
research question, I look at the staffing associated with dedicated fire prevention units.  Here 
again, I rely on visual data presentation for analysis through 95% CI error bar charts.  To 
make my analysis of dedicate fire prevention unit size I compare responses to survey 
question 11 (i.e. What is the total staffing of the FP work unit?) to the various demographic 
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categories in my independent variables.  Not all respondents provided answers to this 
question, so there is a smaller study sample available (n = 823), which can be seen in Table 
3.3 under Research Question 1.  Respondents that did not answer question 11 were listwise 
deleted from the analysis.  Question 11 allowed seven possible choices, ranging from no 
personnel assigned to over 50 personnel assigned.  These variables were not recoded.  These 
values reflect the number of personnel assigned: no personnel = 1, 1-5 personnel = 2, 6-10 
personnel = 3, 11-20 personnel = 4, 21-30 personnel = 5, 31-50 personnel = 6, and >50 
personnel = 7.  Overall, examination of the dependent variables described above and how 
they are influenced by the demographic categories in the independent variables will 
contribute to my understanding of how different communities and departments organize and 
deliver 3E fire prevention services.  Chapter 4 contains the detailed examination of these 
relationships. 
Which Departmental Provision Schemes Were Affected by the Great Recession Cutback? 
My second research question examines which 3E service configurations were affected 
by the Great Recession cutback environment.  FPC question 12 on whether or not fire 
prevention budget cuts were made provides the sole dichotomous dependent variable for this 
question.  Again, I have a smaller study sample (n = 827) due to non-response, which were 
listwise deleted from the analysis.  Question 12 is also found in Table 3.3 under Research 
Question 2.  I recode the answers to question 12 according to convention with No Cuts = 0 
and Budget Cuts = 1.  The recoded variable is labeled Budget Outlook.   
I start my analysis here by looking for relationships between the demographic data 
gleaned from survey question 7, population served, question 8, department size, and question 
9, department type and whether departments made or did not make budget cuts to 3E fire 
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prevention services.  These demographic categories provide the independent variables 
discussed in greater detail under the section on independent variables.  I present this data 
through crosstabulation in the form of percentages rather than counts under each category in 
community population, department staffing, and department type.  Given that each of these 
categories has a different number of cases, percentages make trends easier to identify.   
I then turn to examining the likelihood of budget cuts against the individual 3E 
services and first present this data in the form of 95% CI error bars charts.  As previously 
mentioned, error bars are appropriate for identifying point mean estimates, trends, and 
confidence intervals.  I use the same recoded dichotomous dependent variable of budget 
outlook and cluster the results based on this variable.  I examine and present each recoded 3E 
service separately.  In this analysis, I present only the recoded independent variables of 
department staffing and department type due to the established correlation between 
population size and department size. 
In the last part of answering this second research question, I model the likelihood of 
budget cuts based using an MLE-logit regression.  Again, I use the recoded dichotomous 
variable of budget outlook to test the influence of my independent variables.  As with the last 
section, I drop the demographic variable of population size and examine only department size 
and department type.  However, I also include the 3E Index and the recoded individual 3E 
services.  I run two models.  The first regresses total department staffing, department type, 
and the summary 3E Index against budget outlook.  The second model regresses total 
department staffing, department type, and the five individual 3E services against budget 
outlook.  I expect that the 3E Index will provided more of an overview of likelihood, while 
the individual 3E services will provide some nuance on the likelihood of cuts.  I believe that 
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it is reasonable to expect that individual services will generate different budget cut 
probabilities.  Chapter 5 provides details of these examinations.   
How Did Departments with Different Provision Schemes Strategically Approach Cuts to 3E 
Services? 
My third research question focuses on the strategies employed by departments 
making cuts to fire prevention 3E services.  Stipak and O'Toole (1993) summarize four basic 
reactions available to local government in the face of fiscal stress.  These are reduced 
services, raise revenues, improve productivity, and shift services.  I begin by examining 
whether cuts were strategic or not by comparing department level cuts against cuts to fire 
prevention services.  I present this data in cross tabulation form since I am interested in the 
relationships of ordinal data categories.  Cross tabulation frequently reveals trends in data, by 
showing the number of cases in each cell.  FPC survey question 15 (see Table 3.3) asked 
what percent of the fire prevention work unit was cut.  The survey allowed for six categories 
of answers ranging from <5% to 20-25%, and “other”.  Respondents answering other 
generally indicated cuts greater than 25%.  I recoded and retitled the variable categories <5%, 
5-9%, 10-14%, 15-20%, 20-25%, and 25%+. 
My research for this question also utilizes several models with dichotomous 
dependent variables.  In particular, I examine the likelihood of cuts to individual 3E services, 
likelihood of cuts by 3E index, likelihood of cuts by department size and department type, 
and whether cuts were made to personnel, and whether compensatory action was taken.  I run 
a logit regression for each of these dependent variables, which can be found in Table 3.3 
under Research Question 3.    It is important to note that the FPC Survey in question 16, 
consolidated new construction inspections and existing building inspections under a single 
category code inspections.  I expect that these models will reveal an approximation of 
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priorities according to department size and type, at the organization level, the program level, 
and the service level.  Chapter 6 addresses the details of this investigation. 
Independent Variables for Hypothesized Relationships 
After calculating the 3E Index, the next step in answering the central premise of my 
research questions is to examine the response of the 3E Index to different communities.  The 
FPC survey collected data on four characteristics thought to most likely influence the policy 
choices of 3E service delivery.  These were community population, total department size, fire 
department type, and the presence of a dedicated fire prevention unit.  There are many more 
known variables that influence the fire department’s emergency and prevention services 
delivery, including socio-economic conditions, age, and condition of housing stock (Jennings 
1999, Shai 2006, Schachterle et al. 2012, Jennings 2013).  However, while the survey 
working group was well aware of these factors, they were beyond the scope of the survey’s 
intent. 
Three of the four characteristics community population, department size, and fire 
department type are common to all three research questions, though I drop community 
population during research question two due to high congruence with department size.  In 
addition to the demographic characteristic questions, the survey contains questions that add 
data pertinent to addressing my research questions and underlying hypotheses.  These survey 
questions can be found in Table 3.4.  The 3E Index and 3E scores also provide useful control 
variables in the second and third research questions.  The importance of these independent 
variables and their application is described in the section immediately below, but also carries 
through to hypotheses two and three.  I will describe the other identified independent variable 
questions seen in Table 3.4 in the sections following.
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Table 3.4: Independent Variables for Hypothesized Relationships 
Survey 
Question No. 
Survey Question /Variable Sample n Min. Max Std. Dev 
H1: Provision and cutback strategies for 3E activities are associated with the relative size of the community and its fire department. 
7 What is the population of the community served? 1200 1 8 1.78 
8 What is total department uniformed & civilian staffing? 1200 1 8 1.52       
H2: Provision and cutback strategies for 3E activities are associated with the institutional structure of the fire department. 
1 Who provides plan review? 1200 1 5 0.88 
2 Who provides new construction inspections? 1200 1 5 0.81 
3 Who provide existing building inspections? 1200 1 4 0.77 
4 Who provides public education services? 1200 1 4 0.53 
5 Who provides fire/arson investigation? 1200 1 4 1.18 
9 FD is all-career => all-volunteer? 1200 1 4 1.12 
10 Dedicated fire prevention work unit? 1200 1 2 0.46 
11 What is total staffing of FP work unit? 823 1 7 1.34       
H3: Cutback strategies for the provision of 3E activities are associated with the internal and external sourcing of the 3E Services. 
1 Who provides plan review? 1200 1 5 0.88 
2 Who provides new construction inspections? 1200 1 5 0.81 
3 Who provide existing building inspections? 1200 1 4 0.77 
4 Who provides public education services? 1200 1 4 0.53 
5 Who provides fire/arson investigation? 1200 1 4 1.18 
8 What is total department uniformed & civilian staffing? 1200 1 8 1.52 
9 FD is all-career => all-volunteer? 1200 1 4 1.12 
14 What percent of the department budget was cut? 381 1 6 1.74 
Notes:  FPC survey questions 1 – 5, under H2 and H3 are dependent variables and used to develop the 3E Index under research question 1, “How are 3E fire 
prevention services provided across different communities?”.  This index is also used as an independent variable to evaluate H2 and H3 above. 
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Provision and Cutback Strategies for 3E Activities – Community and Fire Department Size 
This section addresses both research question one and my first hypothesis regarding 
the effect of population and department size.  Data on community size serves as a proxy 
measure for both the external resources available to and service demand placed on local 
government.  In general, available local government revenues are a function of population 
size and associated assets (Lee, Johnson, and Joyce 2013).  Most local governments rely on 
property tax, income tax, and sales tax to fund the services provided (Thompson 2013).  In 
general, the larger the population base, the more revenue the local government likely takes in 
to provide services.  Economic conditions have a significant effect, however.  Fire 
department service demand also increases as a function of population protected.  This applies 
to both emergency response and fire prevention services.  Overall population, as well as 
density and diversity have been linked to increased service demand and complexity (Jennings 
1996, Corcoran, Higgs, and Higginson 2011).  Controlling for population size could reveal 
how service provision is differentiated in different sized communities.  Table 3.5 provides a 
breakout of community sizes within the study sample. 
Table 3.5: Community Populations in Study Sample  
Community Size Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
<10K 208 17.3 17.3 17.3 
10K-25K 257 21.4 21.4 38.8 
25K-50K 233 19.4 19.4 58.2 
50K-100K 209 17.4 17.4 75.6 
100K-250K 149 12.4 12.4 88.0 
250K+ 144 12.0 12.0 100.0 
Total 1200 100.0 100.0  
Note: This table represents total valid survey responses where local government respondents answered all 
five questions regarding the 3E services provided. This table provides the data broken out by community 
size. n = 1200. 
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Department size also serves as a proxy measure, but in this case for the availability of 
internal agency resources.  Larger departments are expected to have greater flexibility in the 
allocation and support of work assignments.  Size effects 3E service delivery in two ways.  
First, funding resources are a function of department size and relative importance to a public 
(Giroux, Mayper, and Daft 1986).  In this respect, the fire department is able to exert 
considerable influence on budget decisions.  They are generally one of the larger line 
departments in local government and provide direct public service.  This makes their 
performance highly salient to politicians and the public.  Second, size also reflects service 
demand.  As communities grow and departments grow to meet new demands, they become 
more complex and the need for service specialization increases to improve effectiveness and 
efficiency (Young 2012).  Table 3.7 provides the distribution of respondents in the study 
sample by total staffing category.  
Table 3.6: FPC Survey Responses by Total Fire Department Staffing 
Total Staffing Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
<24 185 15.4 15.4 15.5 
25-49 326 27.2 27.2 42.6 
50-99 308 25.7 25.7 68.3 
100-250 212 17.7 17.7 85.9 
250+ 169 14.1 14.1 100.0 
Total 1200 100.0 100.0  
Note: This table represents total valid survey responses where local government respondents answered all 
five questions regarding the 3E services provided. This table provides the data broken out by total fire 
department staffing including uniformed and civilian members. n = 1200. 
 
To facilitate analysis using community size as an independent variable, I recoded 
these variables from nominal categorical values to scalar values.  FPC Survey question 7 (see 
Table 3.4), broke community population served into eight categories (<9,999; 10,000-24,999; 
25,000-49,999; 50,000-99,999; 100,000-249,999; 250,000-499,999; 500,000-999,999; and 
>1,000,000). 
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Question 8 broke total department size into eight categories as well (<24, 25-49, 50-99, 100-
249, 250-499, 500-999, 1000-1999, and >2000).  For both these questions, the number of 
respondents fell off sharply in the upper categories, ranging from 1.1% (n=13) to 6.7% 
(n=80) of the total study sample (n=1200).  Johnson and Reynolds (2012) point out that the 
number of indices must balance desire for accuracy versus the risk of over-specification.  The 
number of groups should be determined by providing sufficient observations for statistical 
analysis.   
Accordingly, I collapsed and recoded the upper three categories for population into a 
single category.  This provided me with six categories of population labeled: <10K (n = 208), 
10K-25K (n = 257), 25K-50K (n = 233), 50K-100K (n = 209), 100K-250K (n = 149), and 
250K+ (n = 144).  I also collapsed the top four categories for question 8 into a single 
category.  I then recoded and labeled the resultant five categories: <24 (n = 185), 25-49 (n = 
326), 50-99 (n = 308), 100-250 (n = 212), and 250+ (n = 169).    
Provision and Cutback Strategies for 3E Activities – Fire Department Type 
This section also addresses research question 1 and my second hypothesis.  Here, I 
examine the effect of fire department type.  Data on fire department type is collected in FPC 
Survey question 9 (see Table 3.4.).  Fire department types include all-career, mostly career, 
mostly volunteer, and all-volunteer. These categories were drawn from the ICMA discussion 
of fire department types (Young 2012).  I recoded each of the four available survey choices 
in reverse order of presentation in the FPC Survey: all-volunteer = 1 (n = 182), mostly 
volunteer = 2 (n = 225), mostly career = 3 (n = 251), and all-career = 4 (n = 542).  Table 3.7 
provides this information in tabular form. 
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Table 3.7: FPC Survey Responses by Fire Department Type 
Fire Dept Type Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
All Volunteer 182 15.2 15.2 15.2 
Mostly Volunteer 225 18.8 18.8 33.9 
Mostly Career 251 20.9 20.9 54.8 
All Career 542 45.2 45.2 100.0 
Total 1200 100.0 100.0  
Note: This table represents the totality of valid survey responses where local government respondents 
answered all five questions regarding the 3E services provided. This table provides the data broken out by the 
type of fire department serving the community. n = 1200. 
 
Organizational charters, state and local laws, citizen expectations, and available 
resources dictate the services provided.  For example, the Annotated Code of Maryland limits 
enforcement of the fire code to specific fire officials of a county or municipal corporation 
(Fire Prevention Commission 2004).  This has been interpreted to restrict volunteer 
firefighters from enforcing the state fire prevention code through the 3E services of plan 
review and inspections.  Maryland is not unique in these limitations. 
Department type also reflects the anticipated internal resources available to provide 
services.  I expect that career-oriented departments, even during economic downturns, are 
able to tap into a greater resource pool, largely supported through tax dollars and fees.  
Volunteer-oriented departments rely on alternate funding sources which may shrink during 
economic hard times, though some may be partially supported by tax revenue or fees.  All-in-
all, career-oriented departments should have greater opportunity to dedicate resources to 3E 
fire prevention services and engage alternate cutback strategies.  
Cutback Strategies for 3E Activities – Internal and External Sourcing In this section, I 
briefly discuss the independent variables thought to influence cutback strategies based on 
who is delivering the 3E service and my third hypothesis.  As seen in Table 3.4, FPC Survey 
questions one through five provide these variables.  These questions asked who provides 
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each 3E service and provides for a series of possible choices, as covered in previous sections.  
These questions were dependent variables in research question one, but the recoded variables 
are used as independent variables here.  Whether services are provided internally or 
externally strongly influences the choice of strategies available to a department.  A 
department cannot cut what it does not provide.  Further, there may be external pressures and 
internal opportunities that influence whether to take a short- or long-range perspective.  I 
expect that the analysis of these survey questions, along with the 3E Index will give an 
indication of whether departments approach cutbacks from the basic strategy of across the 
board or targeted cuts, as well as what perspective they have adopted. 
Other Independent Variables 
My exploration of my research questions utilizes FPC survey questions one through 
five initially as dependent variables in the course of developing the 3E Index in research 
question one.  However, the questions also provide independent variables while analyzing 
research questions two and three.  I also use the 3E Index as an independent variable in 
analyzing these questions.  They have been discussed previously, so I will not cover them 
again here.  They are provided in Table 3.8.   
However, there is one additional question, 14, also in Table 3.8, which asks about 
total department budget cuts.  This question is important to understanding strategic 
approaches used by departments when compared to the percentage of the fire prevention 
work unit budget cuts.  This question provided six categories of answer in 2.5% ranges for 
the first four questions, a five percent range in the fifth category (10-15%), and >15% for the 
last category.  I did not recode these questions.
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Table 3.8: Other Independent Variables in Research  
Survey 
Question No. 
Survey Question /Variable Sample n Min. Max Std. Dev 
Research Question 1: 
N/A 3E Index 1200 n/a n/a n/a 
      
Research Questions 2: 
1 Who provides plan review? 1200 1 5 0.88 
2 Who provides new construction inspections? 1200 1 5 0.81 
3 Who provide existing building inspections? 1200 1 4 0.77 
4 Who provides public education services? 1200 1 4 0.53 
5 Who provides fire/arson investigation? 1200 1 4 1.18 
N/A 3E Index 1200 n/a n/a n/a       
Research Question 3: 
14 What percent of the department budget was cut? 381 1 6 1.74 
      
Notes:  FPC survey questions 1 – 5, as well as the 3E Index developed under research question 1, are used as independent variables.  This index is also used as 
an independent variable to answer research question 2 and 3 as are the individual service scores derived from survey questions 1 – 5. 
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Institutional Review Board 
Participation in the FPC Survey was completely voluntary.  Participants were asked to 
voluntarily help the Vision 20/20 organization in an introductory email (Appendix B) by 
participating in the survey.  At the end of the survey, they were also asked to provide contact 
information for follow-up for the second of two survey parts.  The FPC Survey is public work 
product from the author of this study, as well as the other members of the work group.  Further, 
the sample used in this study is directed only at local government organizations.  All the data 
used would be discoverable through FOIA requests at much greater expense.  Use of the fire 
prevention cuts survey data in this study was approved by the Institutional Review Board.  









HOW ARE 3E FIRE PREVENTION SERVICES PROVIDED  
ACROSS DIFFERENT COMMUNITIES? 
 
In Chapter 1 and Chapter 3, I established that there is no single model for the 
provision of 3E fire prevention services across departments within the United States.  
Instead, the legal standards and adopted practices tend to vary across states and localities 
and it is only within the past seven years that a serious attempt has been made to define 
the organization and deployment of these services.  The first standard was published in 
2016 by the National Fire Protection Association and addresses the “strategic and policy 
issues involving organization and deployment.  It does not, however, address specific 
methods for the delivery of services (National Fire Protection Association 2016).  Unlike 
the available research on emergency operations, the relative dearth of guidance and 
standardization on 3E services has acted to hinder the empirical study of this critical 
topic.  Thus, an important first step is to evaluate how various communities choose to 




Ordinal index development 
Development of a classification of phenomena is the “most important and basic step” 
of scientific study (Carper and Snizek 1980, 65).  Classification standardizes terms 
describing and analyzing observable fact into a common platform.  The first question in this 
study, “How are 3E fire prevention services provided across different communities?” 
establishes a framework for discussion.  No classification of fire prevention service provision 
is found within the existing literature.  Thus, the creation of a service provision index may 
prove useful for future study of this topic.  This indexing system is critical to the scope of my 
research.  It serves as an important dependent variable in the second part of this first 
question, and is used as an independent / explanatory variable in the second and third 
questions of this study. 
Delineating the characteristics of 3E services begins with development of an ordinal 
scale of provision of these services.  Weisberg, Krosnick, and Bowen (1996), O'Sullivan, 
Rassel, and Taliaferro (2011) note that ordinal scales rank the values of a variable without 
defining the extent of difference between classifications. For example, low, medium, or high.  
Such scales simply evaluate whether one element has more or less of a particular 
characteristic than another element.  Characteristics selected for evaluation must be 
sequenced and placed upon an ordered continuum.  This study, however, develops and 
evaluates 3E fire prevention services to determine the impact of the Great Recession and to 
extend our understanding to the potential effects of future economic downturns on different 
approaches, not to evaluate which fire prevention schemes are better. 
For the current study, I use the first five questions in the FPC Survey, which apply to 




 These questions asked which agencies provide the particular 3E service in or for the local 
government.   As can be seen in Table 4.1, the first five questions provided a series of  













1 Who provides plan review? 1200 1 5 0.88 
 Local fire department  815    
 Local bldg. department  258    
 Other local department  70    
 Service not provided  34    
 Service is contracted out  23    
       
2 
Who inspects new 
construction?   
1200 1 5 0.81 
 Local fire department  864    
 Local bldg. department  225    
 Other local department  64    
 Service not provided  32    
 Service is contracted out  15    
       
3 
Who inspects existing 
buildings?   
1200 1 4 0.77 
 Local fire department  966    
 Local bldg. department  113    
 Other local department  69    
 Service not provided  52    
       
4 
Who provides public 
education?   
 1200 1 4 0.53 
 Local fire department  1139    
 Local bldg. department  11    
 Other local department  23    
 Service not provided  27    
       
5 
Who provides fire/arson 
investigation?   
 1200 1 4 1.18 
 Local fire department  889    
 Local bldg. department  11    
 Other local department  98    
 Service is contracted out  202    
Note:  Responses by agency providing the service is from the study sample after listwise deleting non-





options regarding who provided the particular 3E service.3  I recoded each option from a 
nominal value to an ordinal value to permit quantitative results in the analysis (Johnson and 
Reynolds 2012).   
Table 4.2 depicts how I recoded and ranked the provision of each particular 3E 
service on a scale between 1 and 4.  Higher scores are indicative of greater fire department 
control over fire prevention budget decisions.  If the local fire department provided the 
service, it was recoded as 4.  If another local department provides the service, it was recoded 
as 3.  Services contracted out, including those provided by another level of government were 
recoded as 2, and services not provided were recoded as 1.  This provided me with a 3E score 
for each fire prevention service. 
The next step in development of the classification index was simply to combine and 
calculate the mean value across these different services to create an aggregate or summary 
service score (3E Index) for each observation. For example, respondent number 11 revealed 
that their community did not provide plan review, new construction inspections, or existing 
building inspections.  The local fire department provides public education and an outside 
entity provides fire-arson investigation.  Thus, their 3E Index is 1.80 ((1+1+1+4+2)/5 = 
1.80).  Respondent number 46, on the other hand, indicated that another local government 
department provides plan review and new construction inspection, while the local fire 
department provides existing building inspections, public education, and fire-arson 
investigation.  Their 3E Index is 3.60 ((3+3+4+4+4)/5 = 3.60). 
 
                                                 






Table 4.2: Calculation of the Ordinal Index of 3E Service Providers 
 FPC Survey Question Response Set Valuation 
    
1) Who provides plan review? Local Fire Department 4 
  Local Building Department 3 
  Other Local Department 3 
  Contracted Out 2 
  Not Provided 1 
2) Who provides new construction inspections? Local Fire Department 4 
  Local Building Department 3 
  Other Local Department 3 
  Contracted Out 2 
  Not Provided 1 
3) Who provides existing building inspections? Local Fire Department 4 
  Local Building Department 3 
  Other Local Department 3 
  Not Provided 1 
4) Who provides public education services? Local Fire Department 4 
  Local Building Department 3 
  Other Local Department 3 
  Not Provided 1 
5) Who provides fire/arson investigation? Local Fire Department 4 
  Local Building Department 3 
  Other Local Department 3 
  Other St. Fed. Private 2 
    
Note: The first five questions of the FPC Survey ask who provides the particular 3E fire 
prevention service. n = 1200. Numeric values were assigned by the author to develop the 
ordinal index. The basis of the ordinal index is the location of budgetary control relative to 
the fire department. It does not presume that delivery of a 3E service by other departments 
or organizations is inherently better than any other. 
 
Indexing the 3E services is critical to this overall study of 3E provision in the midst of 
the Great Recession cutbacks with implications for future cutback environments.  First, the 




question.  I evaluate the effect of the independent demographic variables of community size, 
department size, and department type.  Second, the 3E Index provides an important 
independent variable in the second and third research questions.  On a wider scope, 
understanding which variables affect the index score potentially helps researchers and 
practitioners better understand the policy implications of fire prevention service delivery.   
The 3E Index provides an important interval variable for measuring the level and 
distribution of fire prevention services in various communities.  Lower 3E Index scores 
imply fewer services are provided and are spread out over greater number of service 
providers.  As the scores move up the scale, the 3E Index indicates more services are 
provided with greater levels of consolidation within the fire department.  Lower 3E index 
scores may be indicative of increased vulnerability to budget cuts.  Following from Rubin 
(2010), outside departments may not place the same budgetary priority on fire prevention as 
the fire department.  For example, many building departments operate as self-supporting 
enterprise funds.  3E services that do not generate revenue (e.g., public education) are at a 
much higher risk of being cut during economic downturns. 
Alternatively, fewer services may decrease vulnerability since cuts could be seen as 
not generating sufficient savings.  Furthermore, embedding some services into emergency 
response force responsibilities (e.g., existing building inspections) makes it difficult to 
breakout funding specific to fire prevention.  Departments with higher scores likely have 
greater opportunity to engage in smoothing strategies during times of cutback management, 
such as transfer of 3E service responsibility.   
The distribution of 3E Index scores is found in Figure 4.1, which displays unit of 




service is not provided; 2, service is contracted out; 3, service is provided by other local 
government departments; and 4, service is provided by the local fire department.  This 
appears on the vertical axis, while the independent variables appear on the horizontal axis. 
Figure 4.1: Distribution of 3E Index Across Provider Orientations 
 
 
Note: Results are from a convenience sample of local government respondents answering all five 3E service 
questions.  It displays unit of observation level data.  An index score of 1 = service is not provided, 2 = service 
is contracted out, 3 = service is provided by another local department, and 4 = service is provided by the local 
fire department. n = 1200. 
 
Index scores range from a minimum of 1.20 to a maximum of 4.00, with a mean of 
3.69 and standard deviation of 0.46 and are oriented on the X-axis.  Frequency is found on 




receive all five 3E services and there is a high degree of consolidation under the local fire 
department.  However, an important caveat should be considered when interpreting Figure 
4.1.  The study sample is derived from a convenience survey of fire prevention practitioners, 
so it lacks any external validity.  Results cannot be considered representative of an unknown 
population.  Nonetheless, the information contained here provides a useful perspective of fire 
prevention provision.  The number of fire departments providing all five 3E services may 
seem a bit inflated due to a career fire department bias and underrepresentation of all-
volunteer fire departments in the survey audience.  Despite the bias, it is likely true that a 
plurality of fire departments with career personnel provides the bulk of 3E services in those 
communities.  Further, these department types are more likely found in larger communities.  
The lower end of the scale in Figure 4.1 is probably more reflective of the truth in many 
smaller communities that lack the resource base to provide more than essential services.   
Moreover, the 3E Index appears to work as intended.  It differentiates between levels 
of service as defined by budgetary locus, particularly when applied to a single fire prevention 
service, so I can assert a level of face validity.  Considering also that the FPC survey was 
developed and reviewed by experienced practitioners as appropriate for identifying which 3E 
services are provided and how they might be provided, I will also assume a level of content 
validity in the index (Carmines and Zeller 1979).  When combined into a summary 3E Index, 
it exposes some meaningful data on how different communities approach fire prevention.  
For example, those communities with index scores below 2.00 do not provide one or more of 
the 3E services and those with scores between 2.00 and 3.00 likely do not receive one or 
more of the 3E services or the local government has chosen to forego direct control over 




quality, following from Rubin (2010), the 3E Index may provide some insight into differing 
levels of service quality.   
The 3E Index – Contextual Relationships 
Having developed a means of comparing 3E services across communities, I examine 
how the 3E Index is influenced by the independent variables of community size, department 
size, and department type.  Hartwig and Dearing (1979) state that particular attention should 
be paid to resistant statistics in exploratory research, such as median and midspread, 
lowspread, and highspread ranges.  These values minimize the effect of any unforeseen 
outliers on measures of central tendency.  Box plots provide distribution information in 
visual form, including median, quartiles, spread, and location of outliers (Moore, McCabe, 
and Craig 2012).  They are preferred for the presentation of data that does not assume a 
normal distribution (Hartwig and Dearing 1979) which is clearly illustrated in Figure 4.1.  I 
use simple box and whisker charts to provide visual comparison of 3E Index provision across 
each of the independent variables. 
Further support the effect community population has on service provision differences 
is found in Figure 4.2.  The greatest distribution of 3E Index values falls in the less than ten-
thousand population category.  Fifty percent of the study sample in this population group lies 
between the index values of 3.00 and 3.80, with a median value of 3.50.  Whiskers extend 
from a low value of 1.80 to the maximum 4.00 value.  The distribution also shows two 
outliers at values of 1.20 and 1.60.  The next category of communities, 10-25 thousand 
population finds that the interquartile index values fall between 3.40 and 4.00, with a median 
value of 3.70.  There is no upper whisker and the lower whisker extends to an index value of 








Note: Results are from a convenience sample of local government survey respondents answering all five 3E 
service questions.  A score of 1 = service is not provided, 2 = service is contracted out, 3 = service is provided 
by other local department, and 4 = service is provided by local fire department. n = 1200. Confidence interval = 
95%. 
 
This trend of increasing 3E Index values continues through the next four categories of 
larger population groups.  In each case, the median lies at the index value of 4.00, so there 
are no third or fourth quartiles shown.  For the 25-50 thousand population category, the lower 
whisker extends to the 3.00 value, with outliers at 2.80 and 2.60, and extreme values at 2.40 




services are provided and the local fire department is less involved in fire prevention.  
However, there are relatively few of these cases.  In the three largest population groups, the 
lower boundary of the interquartile range falls at the index value of 3.80 and the bottom 
quartile index value falls at 3.60.  In each category, there are outliers at 3.40 and 3.20 values, 
and extreme values at 3.00 and 2.80.  For the largest population group, those above 250 
thousand population there is an additional extreme value at 1.80.   
Communities below the median value, in the second quartile, likely receive all five 
3E services and the local fire department provides at least two and the others are provided 
either by another local government entity or contracted out.  It is only in the bottom quartile 
that 3E service provision drops off and the local fire department is less involved in 3E service 
provision.  In rather few cases, shown by the outliers and extreme values, one or more 3E 
services are not provided.  Remaining services are provided by some agency of local 
government or contracted out, as shown by the previously cited respondent number 11 with 
an index score of 1.80.   
Taken together, Figure 4.2 clearly shows that as populations get larger, the 
predominant 3E Index score increases as well.  Furthermore, there is an obvious transition 
point at 50,000 population.  Below this point, there is greater variation in 3E provision.  
Above this population level, 3E delivery schemes are remarkably similar. This lends support 
to the hypothesis that community size affects the provision of 3E services. 
The 3E Index broadly describes how fire prevention services are arranged by a local 
government.  Any arrangement except Service is Not Provided consumes resources (Mohr, 




provision.  Figure 4.3 provides box plots of the 3E Index values for the five categories of 
total department staffing. 
Figure 4.3: 3E Index by Total Fire Department Staffing 
 
 
Note: Results are from a convenience sample of local government survey respondents answering all five 3E 
service questions.  A score of 1 = service is not provided, 2 = service is contracted out, 3 = service is provided 
by other local department, and 4 = service is provided by local fire department. n = 1200. Confidence interval = 
95%. 
 
Three observations are immediately clear in Figure 4.3.  First, across all five 
categories, the interquartile range decreases with an increase in department size 
demonstrating less variation in how 3E services are provided.  Second, the positioning of the 




of services and increasing involvement of the local fire department.  Third, the plot whisker 
length decreases noticeably as department size increases, as do the values of outliers and 
extreme observations.  This points to fewer communities not providing all five 3E services as 
department size increases.  These observations reinforce the previous contention that 
department size influences fire prevention service provision. 
Similar to the population categories, the largest distribution lies in the box plot for the 
smallest staffing category, those with 24 or fewer employees or members, indicating the 
greatest variation in service provision.  The least variation in service provision shows up in 
the largest department size category.  Median values of 4.00 for the largest three department 
sizes show at least half of the survey sample in these groups receive all five 3E services from 
the local fire department.  In addition, the second quartile range and bottom quartile range 
decrease in size.  Corresponding with less variation in how services are provided, the plots 
suggest another transition point.  Once departments reach the 50-99 personnel size, 3E 
service provision transitions mostly to the local fire department.  This is probably the point at 
which fire departments are sufficiently sized to assume more 3E responsibilities, while other 
local government entities begin to drop out of the sample pool. 
Plot whiskers, outliers, and extreme observations extend to small 3E Index values 
across all five department sizes.  While not predominant, scale values below 3.00 indicate a 
mix of local government provision, contracted services, and services not provided.  While it 
is possible that communities with a 3E Index value of 2.00 receive all five 3E services, they 
would all be contracted out.  This is highly unlikely.  The more likely scenario is that local 
government does not provide one or more of these services and this occurs across all 




responsibility for investigation of suspicious fires, while insurance companies investigate 
fires for loss claims.  
Consistent with the other independent variables, I expect the 3E Index reveals 
additional understanding of how fire prevention services are delivered across the four 
department types of concern.  Figure 4.4 reveals important information about service 
delivery.  First, and probably most important, is that some limited number of volunteer 
departments provide the full suite of 3E services.  While the interquartile range extends from 
3.00 to 3.60, the upper range extends to the 4.00 value.  This implies that some all-volunteer 
departments provide service outside of their traditional focus on emergency response.  More 
importantly, the all-volunteer box plot shows that 75% of communities protected by all 
volunteer departments still receive most, if not all of the 3E fire prevention services, just not 
through the local fire department.  The lower range for all volunteer departments extends to 
2.20 and also shows four outliers with values between 1.20 and 2.00.  For mostly-volunteer 
departments, the median value is 3.60. 
For mostly-volunteer, mostly-career and all-career departments the interquartile range 
extends to the 4.00 value.  Further, the range of the interquartile boxes decreases, as does the 
range of the lower whiskers, with values at 2.20, 2.80, and 3.60, respectively.  Figure 4.4 
displays outliers for each of these three department types.  This is expected given the ranges 
shown in community size and department size.  What is not expected is that the box plot for 
all-career departments shows three extreme values at 2.60, 2.80, and 3.00.  I interpret this to 
mean that the fire departments displaying these values are minimally involved in providing 





Figure 4.4: 3E Index by Fire Department Type 
 
 
Note: Results are from a convenience sample of local government survey respondents answering all five 3E 
service questions.  A score of 1 = service is not provided, 2 = service is contracted out, 3 = service is provided 
by other local department, and 4 = service is provided by local fire department. n = 1200. Confidence interval = 
95%. 
 
However, there are two distinct observations drawn from Figure 4.4 that demonstrate 
department type influences the 3E index of communities.  First, it is clear there is less 
variation in the provision of services as fire departments change from all-volunteer to all-
career.  Interquartile boxes shrink by roughly half between mostly-volunteer and mostly-
career revealing less variation in service distribution.  The decrease in variation repeats 




increases through all-volunteer, mostly-volunteer, and mostly-career.  Most importantly, 
Figure 4.4 reveals a third transition point between mostly-volunteer and mostly-career.  Once 
the surveyed departments become mostly-career, at least half of the survey sample in mostly-
career and all-career protected communities received all five 3E services through their local 
fire department.  The lower median values for all-volunteer and mostly-volunteer indicate a 
larger blend of service provision approaches.  
In a nutshell, there are three transition points affecting the provision of 3E services.  
In population size, when communities reach 50,000 persons, they are more likely to receive 
all five services through the local fire department.  For department size, transition seems to 
occur at 50 employees.  Fire departments at or above this size are more likely to provide all 
five 3E services.  Finally, the provision of 3E services transitions to between mostly-
volunteer and mostly-career fire department types.  These transitions imply that in all 
probability, communities above 50,000 population protected by a mostly-career or all-career 
fire department of at least 50 employees receive the full range of 3E fire prevention services.  
Smaller communities, protected by smaller all- or mostly-volunteer departments more than 
likely do not provide one or more of the 3E services.   
These transition points probably represent a combination of external and internal 
resource availability, as well as service demand.  One thing to point out is the inescapable 
correlation between population size and department size, as seen in Figure 4.5.  This speaks 
to the resources a community invests in the local fire department as a reaction to population 
growth.  It appears that the slope becomes steeper above the 50,000-population and 





Figure 4.5: Community Population Compared to Department Staffing 
 
Note: Results are from a convenience sample of local government survey respondents answering all five 3E 
service questions.  Department Staffing: 1 = <24 personnel, 2 = 25-49 personnel, 3 = 50-99 personnel, 4 = 100-
250 personnel, 5 = 250+ personnel. n = 1200. Confidence interval = 95%. 
 
There is one more item to consider regarding the transition points that appear in 
Figures 4.2 through 4.4.  That is department type and how it may affect these transitions.  
Figure 4.6 demonstrates that when community populations reach 25,000-50,000 persons, the 
fire department transition from mostly-volunteer to mostly-career.  It appears that all three 
factors, community size, department size, and department type converge to influence how the 
five 3E services are provided and support the first and second hypotheses.  Above this point, 




department.  Below this point, 3E service provision is increasingly varied and incomplete.  
Further, the confidence intervals shown by the spread on each side of the point estimates for 
the means are quite close, indicating there is not much variation in the data.  This may be the 
point where communities start examining alternative means of addressing fire department 
service demand beyond response and bringing all the 3E services under one management 
umbrella. 
Figure 4.6: Community Population Compared to Department Type 
 
Note: Results are from a convenience sample of local government survey respondents answering all five 3E 
service questions.  Fire department type: 1 = all-volunteer, 2 = mostly-volunteer, 3 = mostly-career, 4 = all-





The 3E Index – Refining the Provision Narrative 
Having examined the more programmatic level relationship between the 3E Index 
and the independent variables, I start my analysis by exploring how the individual 3E 
services are provided in comparison to the various community sizes, department sizes, and 
department type.  Results are presented at the organization level.  As previously noted, visual 
presentation of data is appropriate and often reveals patterns not easily discernable through 
tabular presentation.  Looking at community size, Figure 4.7 immediately shows that the 
public education service mean4 is well above the combined mean of 3E services across all 
population groups5.  The combined mean is shown as a red line across each of the population 
size panels and means below this line indicate many of the 3E services are provided by other 
local government departments, contracted out, or not provided.  For public education, this 
suggests that primary responsibility lies with the local fire department regardless of 
community size.  Moreover, the confidence intervals indicate no statistically significant 
difference across the spectrum of population sizes.  For public education, community 
population appears to have no influence in service provision. 
Another public education observation worth noting is the drop in the mean for the 
100-250 thousand population group before rising again in the 250+ population group.  Figure 
4.2 also shows that for the 100-250 thousand population group, the confidence interval 
spread increased before narrowing again in the 250+ population group.  The combined dip in 
mean and larger confidence interval possibly signals that some fire departments may have 
                                                 
4 The service mean is the average 3E score for all respondents to a particular 3E service within a single category 
of one of the independent variables of community size, department size, or department type. 
5 The combined mean is the average of all 3E service scores for each individual service provided and is 
calculated at the level of the independent variable.  Inspection of observation level data confirms that this is the 
approximate point at which 3E service provision transitions from being provided by other agencies (including 




made the choice to focus on the other 3E services.  These departments may provide only 
limited 3E services.  For example, their focus may be on existing building inspections rather 
than public education.  This focus may occur in communities with high multi-family or 
public housing rates. 




Note: Results are from a convenience sample of local government survey respondents answering all five 3E 
service questions.  A score of 1 = service is not provided, 2 = service is contracted out, 3 = service is provided 
by other local department, and 4 = service is provided by local fire department. n = 1200. Confidence interval 






Beyond public education, Table 4.7 shows a clear upward trend of the individual 3E 
service means towards fire departments providing more of each 3E service as the population 
size increases.  This is particularly evident with populations under ten thousand where the 
individual service means fall well below the combined mean (3.70) of all 3E services 
provided.   
The provision of 3E services by other local government entities also shows up for the 
10-25 thousand populations, though the individual service means fall much closer to the 
combined 3E service mean in this group.  In the 25-50 thousand population group, the 
individual service means are clustered around the overall 3E service mean.  This suggests 
that in communities of this size responsibility for 3E services begins to transition from other 
local entities to local fire departments.  More globally with this transition, Figure 4.7 shows 
that existing building inspections are provided first, followed by new construction 
inspections, and plan review.  This tells me there is some give and take over who in local 
government will provide these services. Above 50 thousand population, it appears that local 
fire departments assume greater responsibility for providing 3E services. 
Figure 4.7 also shows that the 95% CI narrows for most, though not all of the 
individual 3E services as the population group increases.  The narrowing of the CI signifies 
that the margin of error is smaller and therefore, the plausible range for the mean is much 
smaller.  Data variability improves as population group size increases, as well as certainty of 
service provision (Cumming and Finch 2005, Krzywinski and Altman 2013).  Furthermore, 
an examination of confidence intervals for particular 3E services in Figure 4.7 reveals a 
particularly noticeable statistically significant difference (p>.05) (Payton, Miller, and Raun 




thousand population.  This difference is difficult to discern between other adjacent 
population groups. 
Nevertheless, taken as a whole, there is an obvious statistically significant difference 
as population increases.  Accordingly, I conclude that community size has a demonstrable 
effect on the provision of 3E services.  The larger the population group, the more 
concentrated the service provision, be it with other local government departments or the local 
fire department. 
 
  In regards to the effect of community size on individual 3E service provision, Table 
4.3 demonstrates the transition in service provision across the different categories of 
population.  Plan review, new construction inspection, and fire-arson investigation show a 
propensity to be delivered by other local government departments or contracted out, 
particularly in communities of less than 50-thousand population.  Existing building 
Table 4.3: Mean 3E Index Scores by Community Size 
 Population Protected  
 





Plan Review 3.22 3.53 3.65 3.77 3.77 3.80 3.62 
New Construction 
Inspections 
3.22 3.62 3.72 3.83 3.81 3.83 3.67 
Existing Building 
Inspections 
3.29 3.68 3.79 3.86 3.91 3.89 3.74 
Public Education 3.87 3.95 3.93 3.90 3.84 3.90 3.90 
Fire-Arson 
Investigation. 
3.12 3.47 3.71 3.73 3.75 3.77 3.59 
Combined Mean 3.34 3.65 3.76 3.82 3.82 3.84  
Observations 208 257 233 209 149 144  
Note: Mean 3E service scores calculated from convenience sample of survey respondents 
answering all five 3E service questions.  3E Index score is based on rank of 1 = service is 
not provided, 2 = service is contracted out, 3 = service is provided by another local 




inspections are more likely the responsibility of local fire departments beginning at 25 to 50-
thousand population.  Fire-arson investigation shows a clear influence of being delivered by 
other local departments for all categories of population, though the local fire department 
greater responsibility in the population groups above 50-thousand population.  Finally, 
population does not appear to affect the delivery of public education.  It seems to be 
considered a universal service regardless of population, but the extent of these programs 
certainly going to vary by population. 
Turning next to department size, Figure 4.8 provides visual representation of the 
service distribution across the five size categories which are seen on the X-axis.  The first 
thing that is readily apparent is that the distribution of 3E service provision is decidedly 
similar to that of population size.  This makes sense since population has been shown to be a 
service demand driver and effects department size (see Figure 4.5).  The same trend for 
public education is seen in department size as in population size.  Public education, if it is 
provided, seems to be the responsibility of the local fire department across all department 
sizes, though there is greater variability and uncertainty for departments below 24 personnel.  
Payton, Miller, and Raun (2000) caution against drawing conclusions about significant 
differences between groups when the range of the confidence intervals between groups fall 
so close.  Consequently, I find that department size also has minimal influence on whether or 
not public education is provided by the local fire department. 
The same dip in the public education service mean appears in departments in the 100-
250 personnel category, as does a widening confidence interval.  In departments with 25-49 
personnel and 50-99 personnel, the confidence interval for public education is quite tight 




sizes routinely invest more resources into public education and limit resources targeted 
towards the other 3E services.   




Note: Results are from a convenience sample of local government survey respondents answering all five 3E 
service questions.  A score of 1 = service is not provided, 2 = service is contracted out, 3 = service is provided 
by other local department, and 4 = service is provided by local fire department. n = 1200. Confidence interval 
= 95%.  The red line indicates the combined mean (3.69) of all services provided across the categories of 
department size. 
 
There is a clear upward trend in the number of 3E services provided and consolidated 
under the local fire department.  In the two categories for departments with fewer than 49 




confidence intervals are also much wider than for larger departments.  This suggests more 
variability in who provides the particular 3E service, that the majority of services are 
provided by other entities in the community or, in some cases, not provided. 
The transition to greater consolidation of services under local fire department staffing 
appears to be between departments of fewer than 49 personnel and 50 or more personnel.  
The same narrowing trend in the 95% CI is apparent with increasing department size 
indicating that the degree of data variability and certainty of provision improves with 
department size.  Confidence intervals also point to an obvious statistically significant 
difference in service provision between departments with fewer than 49 personnel and those 
with 50 or more personnel.  For the two categories below this point, the difference lies within 
the confidence intervals.  For the three categories above this point, the difference lies within 
the confidence intervals.  Above and below this transition point, there do not appear to be any 
statistically significant differences related to departments size.  Because there is that distinct 
transition, I conclude that department size undoubtedly influences the 3E services provided. 
However, as an overall observation, Figure 4.3 seems to point to local fire 
departments beginning to assume more responsibility for 3E services outside of public 
education once they reach a threshold size of 50-99 personnel.  I suspect at this threshold, fire 
departments reach the critical mass of personnel resources needed to provide fire prevention 
specialization, while other local government entities drop out of the sample pool.  I should 
also note that similar to population, as departments increase in size, they add existing 
building inspections first, followed by new construction inspections, then plan review.  I 
believe this demonstrates that local fire departments are prioritizing occupied structures over 




unoccupied buildings.  Second, the fire department is the local agency with responsibility for 
ensuring safety after the certificate occupancy is issued. 
In my final examination of individual 3E service provision, I look at the independent 
variable of fire department type.  Figure 4.9 shows the four fire department types that I 
compare against the service provision score on the vertical axis.  The figure clearly shows 
that in communities protected by all-volunteer fire departments and mostly-volunteer fire 
departments, 3E services are provided by entities other than the local fire department with the 
exception of public education.  The individual service means for the other 3E services in all-
volunteer fire departments fall around the 3.00 value, which corresponds to service being 
provided by other local government departments.  Fire and arson investigation shows a little 
lower mean, most-likely indicating the entry of some state level actors.  This would not be 
unusual in more rural areas where the state fire marshal or state police have investigative 
responsibility.  Figure 4.9 also shows that the confidence interval for all-volunteer 
departments is much wider than any of the other department types signifying more data 
variability and uncertainty of service provision. 
In mostly-volunteer fire departments, the individual service means fall around the 
3.40-3.50 range and confidence intervals are narrower.  Positioning of the error bars also 
show a statistically significant difference in the confidence intervals between services 
provided by all-volunteer departments and mostly-volunteer departments.  This suggests that 
mostly-volunteer fire departments are picking up some responsibility for 3E service.  More 
than likely this is a result of adding paid staff, who can attend to limited fire prevention 




essence, paid staff provide resource slack time that can be utilized for other non-emergent 
fire prevention activities.   




Note: Results are from a convenience sample of local government survey respondents answering all five 3E 
service questions.  A score of 1 = service is not provided, 2 = service is contracted out, 3 = service is provided 
by other local department, and 4 = service is provided by local fire department. n = 1200. Confidence interval 
= 95%.  The red line indicates the combined mean (3.59) of all services provided across the types of fire 
departments. 
 
Service provision for the other 3E services follow the same general trend seen in the 
independent variables of population size and department size.  Figure 4.9 shows that as 




consolidated under the local fire department.  This trend is evident in the location of 
individual service means and the decreasing range of confidence interval error bars.  Figure 
4.9 indicates a second statistically significant break in the confidence intervals between 
mostly-volunteer and mostly-career departments.  This break is not seen between mostly-
career and all-career fire departments.  This follows the argument from the preceding section 
on department size.  There appears to be a critical mass of career personnel that lends itself to 
fire departments picking up majority responsibility for 3E services.  There is less data 
variation concerning who provides a particular 3E service as fire departments reorient 
towards all-career, as well as whether the service is provided, be it the local fire department 
or other local government agency. 
  As with the other independent variables, department type appears to have little effect 
on the provision of public education.  There is no evidence of a statistically significant 
difference across the four groups.  There are several possible reasons for this.  First, there is 
little regulation of public education services, though the NFPA publishes guidance on 
requirements (National Fire Protection Association 2015).  Second, public education is ill-
defined compared to the other 3E services and includes a spectrum of activities ranging from 
informal community events to systematic, structured curricula.  Third, the NFPA, FEMA, 
and several insurance companies (see www.travelers.com) provide free public education 
materials that minimize resource investment. 
Implications for Dedicated Fire Prevention Units and Staffing 
Finally, in examining how fire prevention services are provided by various 
communities, I look at whether there is a dedicated fire prevention work unit (often referred 




observes that the larger a department and service demand, the greater need for service 
specialization.  The extant literature establishes a positive correlation between population 
size and department size, which Figure 4.5 bears out in this study.  Part of this is attributable 
to increased emergency service demand.  However, population size also increases non-
emergent service demand as well whether it is delivered by the fire department or other 
provider.  Growing, increasingly diverse population bases within limited land areas dictate 
multifamily, commercial, and industrial structures of increasing size and complexity, along 
with increasingly complex social interactions (Adams et al. 2007).  Meeting the associated 
demands placed on local governments requires unique specialized skill sets, rather than 
generalist skill sets.  Thus, I expect that dedicated fire prevention units will show up in larger 
communities and departments.   
Since I am predicting the likelihood of a dedicated fire prevention unit, logistic 
regression is an appropriate method of testing the relationship against other categorical 
variables (Pampel 2000, Johnson and Reynolds 2012).  My dependent variable is based on 
FPC survey question 10, which asks if there is a dedicated fire prevention unit and allows for 
only two answers, yes or no.  I ran a single predictive logistic regression model which is 
found in Table 4.4.   The model regressed the control variables of community population, 
total staffing, and department type on the dependent variable of a dedicated fire prevention 
unit.  These control variables were identified by the FPC survey working group, discussed in 
Chapter 3, as conditions most likely affecting 3E service delivery. 
As Table 4.4 reveals, the full model, with all predictors included was statistically 
significant χ2 = 319.68 (p<.001, df = 3, n = 1200), indicating that the model is a reasonable fit 




fire prevention unit.  The whole model predicts roughly 33% (Nagelkerke R square) of the 
variance in the presence of a dedicated fire prevention unit.  Further, the model correctly 
classified 77.2% of the cases with a sensitivity of 88.8%.  Overall, the model has a positive 
predictive (true positives) value of 80.5% (Pallant 2016). 
 
Looking to the individual control variables, Table 4.4 indicates that all three are 
statistically significant (p<.001).  Based on the coefficients (β), however, total staffing has 
the least effect on the presence of a dedicated fire prevention unit (.35), contrary to 
expectations.  Community population and department type appear to have equal influence 
(.43), though the Wald statistic (37.05) shows the greatest influence for fire department type.  
While not shown in Table 4.4, the odds ratios for the three independent variables were 
positive with values of 1.53 (community size and department type) or 1.42 (department size).  
Table 4.4: Logistic Regression of the Presence of a Dedicated Fire Prevention Unit 
Control Variable β S.E. р 
Community Population .43 .07 .00 
Total Staffing .35 .09 .00 
Department Type .43 .07 .00 
Constant -2.48 .23 .00 
Observations  1200  
-2 Log Likelihood  1153.15  
Chi-square  319.64  
Degrees of Freedom  3  
P-value  .005  
Nagelkerke R2  .33  
Note: Logistic regression results from a convenience sample of survey respondents 
answering all five 3E service questions. n = 1200.  The presence of a dedicated fire 
prevention unit is a dichotomous dependent variable. Yes = 1, No = 0.  The variables tested 
are ordinal variables. Community population: 1 = <10K, 2 = 10K-25K, 3 = 25K-50K, 4 = 
50K-100K, 5 = 100K-250K, 6 = 250K+. Total Staffing: 1 = <24, 2 = 25-49, 3 = 50-99, 4 = 
100-250, 5 = 250+. Department Type: 1 = All Volunteer, 2 = Mostly Volunteer, 3 = Mostly 




Taken individually and together, these values suggest that as departments move from all-
volunteer to all-career, as the size of community protected increases, and as they increase 
total staffing, the likelihood of having a dedicated prevention unit increases as well.  My 
inclination is to say that the presence of a dedicated fire prevention unit is tied to the 
transition points discussed earlier, though additional research would be required. 
Having established the likelihood of a dedicated fire prevention unit being positively 
associated with community and department size, as well as fire department type, I now look 
at how the independent variables of community size, department size, and department type 
influence the staffing of these units.  FPC Survey respondents that did not answer this 
question were listwise deleted leaving a slightly smaller study sample for this analysis (n = 
823).  I rely on error bars for examining dedicated unit size, which provide an estimate of 
mean and data variation.  Mean values are not resistant to outliers, so the range of the error 
bars is important.  Categories with fewer observations are more susceptible to outlier 
influence.  In the last three figures discussed in this chapter, the dependent variable scale 
appears on the vertical axis.  The scale for fire prevention work unit staffing levels is 2.0 = 1-
5 persons assigned, 3.0 = 6-10 persons assigned, 4.0 = 11-20 persons assigned, 5.0 = 21-30 
persons assigned, 6.0 = 31-50 persons assigned, and 7 = >50 persons assigned.  The 
horizontal axis shows the categories for the independent variables. 
Looking at Figure 4.10 and Figure 4.11 finds a clear J-shape distribution of the 
number of personnel assigned.  As expected, there is a spike in dedicated unit size related to 
the 250+ thousand population category and 250+ total department staffing.  I attribute this 
spike to the collapsing of the top three categorical answers to FPC survey question 7, which 




categories of question 8, which captured respondents in departments up to and exceeding 
2000 employees.  What was not expected was the indication of staffing levels of dedicated 
units the smallest communities and departments.  For both, the reported mean values were 
noticeably higher than the lowest reported mean value.  For the smallest communities and 
departments, this likely indicates the presence of dedicated fire prevention units within non-
fire department-based providers, such as a fire marshal’s office located within a building 
department. 
Figure 4.10: Total FP Work Unit Staffing by Community Population Served 
 
 
Note: Results are from a convenience sample of local government survey respondents answering all five 3E 
service questions.  A score of 1 = no persons assigned, 2 = 1-5 persons assigned, 3 = 6-10 persons assigned, 4 
= 11-20 persons assigned, 5 = 21-30 persons assigned, 6 = 31-50 persons assigned, and 7 = >50 persons 




Figure 4.11: Total FP Work Unit Staffing by Total Department Staffing 
 
 
Note: Results are from a convenience sample of local government survey respondents answering all five 3E 
service questions.  A score of 1 = no persons assigned, 2 = 1-5 persons assigned, 3 = 6-10 persons assigned, 4 
= 11-20 persons assigned, 5 = 21-30 persons assigned, 6 = 31-50 persons assigned, and 7 = >50 persons 
assigned. n = 823. Confidence interval = 95%. 
 
Figure 4.10 presents means and variation of staffing data for dedicated fire prevention 
units by community size.  The point estimate means for categories of <10-thousand (x̄ = 2.40, 
n = 67), 10-25 thousand (x̄ = 2.20, n = 136), 25-50 thousand (x̄ = 2.23, n = 179), and 50-100 
thousand (x̄ = 2.3, n = 177) population ranges indicate that dedicated units are likely staffed 
with 1-5 personnel.  Error bar ranges are much narrower for the 10-25 and 25-50 thousand 




shows considerably more variation.  For these four population categories, this implies that 
some dedicated units for these population levels are staffed with 5 to 10 personnel.  
However, there is no statistical difference noted between these four population categories, so 
clearly identifying a change is not possible. 
Communities in the 100-250 thousand population range (x̄ = 2.9, n = 128) are most 
likely staffed between 6-10 personnel, but again falling into two survey categories.  Given 
that the mean for the 100-250 thousand population range is above the mid-point between the 
two staffing values with the error bar spread completely above the midpoint, staffing for 
these units is likely skewed towards the 6-10 personnel range, though a small number may be 
staffed with 1-5 personnel.  The next category is 1.8 points higher on the scale indicating a 
considerable change in local government investment in fire prevention staffing.  For 
communities in the 250+ population category, the mean value (x̄ = 4.7, n = 136) implies that 
the average staffing of a dedicated fire prevention unit within this category falls somewhere 
between 11 and 30 personnel covering two staffing categories from the FPC Survey (see 
Appendix A).  While the spread of the error bar shows wide variation in the data, the mean 
value still falls well within these two categories and shows a bias towards the upper staffing 
level of 21-30 personnel.  The positioning of the error bars in the top two population 
categories indicates statistically significant differences in their staffing levels, as well as from 
the 50-100 thousand population category.  I surmise this reflects the expansion of 3E services 
within larger communities under the fire department and provides limited support for 
community size effecting the size of dedicated fire prevention units. 
Figure 4.11 graphs the same general trend of dedicated prevention unit staffing by 




2.4, n = 80), 25-49 personnel (x̄ = 2.3, n = 165), and 50-99 personnel (x̄ = 2.3, n = 240), the 
means fall below the dedicated staffing midpoint.  The range of the error bars for the latter 
two categories also fall completely below the midpoint, while the error bar for the <24 
category extends past the midpoint.  This suggests that departments of these sizes with 
dedicated fire prevention units mostly staff them with between 1 and 5 personnel though 
some may have larger personnel complements of 6-10 personnel.  It is probable that the some 
of the smaller departments reporting the higher fire prevention staffing levels are located 
within other local government entities rather than the fire department. 
For the population group 100-250 thousand (x̄ = 2.7, n = 178), departments with 
dedicated fire prevention units are likely staffed with between 1 and 10 personnel.  The mean 
value and narrower range of the error bar express a bias towards the 6-10 personnel category.  
While there is only a 0.4-point difference in the mean value from the 50-99 staffing category, 
the range of the error bars indicates a statistically significant difference between the two 
population groups.  This remains true for the next larger population group as well. 
There is a significant jump of 1.8 points in mean value for departments above 250 
total staffing (x̄ = 4.4, n = 160) over the preceding category of 100-250 personnel.  This 
implies that staffing for dedicated units in departments above 250 personnel probably falls 
between 11 and 30 personnel, though most likely between 11 and 20 personnel since the 
mean is below the midpoint of the two staffing categories.  The wider range of the error bar 
indicates actual staffing may be larger or smaller.  Overall, the evidence is limited supporting 
total department staffing influencing the number of personnel assigned to a dedicated fire 
prevention unit.  Nevertheless, it is pronounced in departments above 100 personnel, which is 




Another way of looking at the J-shape of the population and department size figures 
(i.e., Figure 4.10 and Figure 4.11) is that of a bimodal distribution.  This likely has to do with 
how departments (respondents) view fire prevention assignments.  The mode associated with 
larger population and department sizes rises much higher and most likely represents “true” 
dedicated fire prevention units – those personnel assigned a specific 3E service, such as plan 
review.  It also makes sense that these dedicated units are associated large departments 
protecting large communities.  As previously noted, these are the most complex 
environments that fire departments operate in and include steep service demands.  While 
probably not an overt calculation, there may be a comparative advantage by specializing 3E 
tasks in these environments. 
On the other end of the scale, with smaller populations and departments, the smaller 
mode may also have to do with stand-alone units or departments with fire prevention 
responsibility.  For example, Rockville (Maryland) is an incorporated city of approximately 
60-thousand that lies in the center of Montgomery County.  Rockville City has a small 
dedicated Fire Marshal’s Office that provides plan review, new construction inspections, 
existing building inspections, and fire safety education.  It lies within the Department of 
Community and Development Services.  Emergency response is provided by the 
Montgomery County Fire and Rescue Service, which is a mostly-career county level 
department.  As seen in Table 4.1, there are roughly 300 building and other local departments 
providing limited 3E services, mostly in plan review and new construction inspections.  In 






Figure 4.12: Total FP Work Unit Staffing by Department Type 
 
 
Note: Results are from a convenience sample of local government survey respondents answering all five 3E 
service questions.  A score of 1 = no persons assigned, 2 = 1-5 persons assigned, 3 = 6-10 persons assigned, 4 
= 11-20 persons assigned, 5 = 21-30 persons assigned, 6 = 31-50 persons assigned, and 7 = >50 persons 
assigned. n = 823. Confidence interval = 95%. 
 
Figure 4.12 visually displays the effect that department type has on the staffing of 
dedicated fire prevention units.  Unlike the effects of population and department size on 
dedicated fire prevention unit staffing, department type does not appear to have the same 
level of influence.  There are no drastic changes in mean values.  All-volunteer departments 
(x̄ = 2.7, n = 66) exhibit the greatest variation in data, but those that have dedicated fire 




above the midpoint between staffing size categories, I expect that the study sample skews 
towards the 6-10 personnel category.  Mostly-volunteer departments (x̄ = 2.4, n = 114) show 
the lowest mean of department types.  The error bar indicates tighter data variance.  A mean 
below the midpoint and less data variance suggests that dedicated fire prevention unit 
staffing most likely lies between 1 and 5 personnel.  The limited career personnel in these 
departments are likely charged with fire prevention duties requiring fewer staff than all 
volunteer departments. 
There is only a 0.1-point difference between mostly-career (x̄ = 2.8, n = 188) and all-
career (x̄ = 2.9, n = 455) departments.  The range of error bar for mostly-career departments 
is wider than that for all-career department.  Data implies that the average staffing of 
dedicated fire prevention units is probably between 6 and 10 personnel, though some may be 
staffed at higher or lower levels.  The number of observations in each group is likely to 
suppress the effect of outliers, particularly for the all-career category.  Data has shown there 
is a strong relationship between population size and department size.  There is a less strong 
relationship between department size and department type showing that larger communities 
will lean toward career-oriented departments.    
Chapter Conclusions 
In this chapter, I examined the first research question concerning how 3E fire 
prevention services are provided across different communities.  I began with developing a 
common evaluation scale for measuring delivery patterns of 3E fire prevention services.  I 
then looked at how this common scale is affected by the independent variables of community 




a convenience sample survey to conduct my analysis, which is fully described in Chapter 3.  
Throughout this chapter the unit of analysis has been at the organization level. 
I based the common evaluation scale on who delivers the particular fire prevention 
service of plan review, new construction inspections, existing building inspections, public 
education, or fire-arson investigations.  The scale rankings are 1 = no service provided, 2 = 
service is contracted out, 3 = service is provided by another local department, and 4 = service 
is provided by the local fire department.  Scores for each observation are summed and then 
divided by 5 to reach a numeric value.  This is the 3E Index.  The lower the score, the fewer 
services are provided and more entities involved.  Higher scores indicate more services and 
greater consolidation under the fire department control.  Individual observation index scores 
ranged from 1.20 to 4.00 demonstrating wide variation in approaches among communities.   
 Table 4.3 provides a succinct explication of how the average community of different 
sizes in the study sample provide fire prevention services via the 3E Index.  Looking at the 
mean 3E Index score of combined services for each size of community, an unambiguous 
trend of increasing number of services and consolidation under the fire department is evident 
as community size increases.   
The trend of increasing fire department concentrations under the fire department is 
repeated for each individual 3E service with the exception of public education.  Here, there is 
some fluctuation in the mean scores between community sizes, but they are markedly 
consistent.  If provided, public education is the purview of the local fire department.  Perhaps 
more importantly is that as fire departments assume additional responsibilities, Figures 4.7, 




a risk-management approach given that the highest risks are associated with occupied 
buildings. 
Looking at the service means in the last column of Table 4.3 finds that fire-arson 
investigation is most likely to be provided by another government department, followed by 
plan review and new construction inspections.  The average community receives all five 3E 
services.  The difference lies in who provides the service. 
Nuances in 3E service provision can be seen in Figure 4.2, Figure 4.3, and Figure 4.4.  
These figures indicate that despite what the average community receives in the way of 3E 
services, many communities do not receive most 3E services from local government, 
particularly those of less than 10,000 population, served by small local governments, or 
predominantly volunteer fire departments.  Under the population category, the transition 
point appears to be between 25-50 thousand and 50-100 thousand population, while the 
transition for department size seems to be between the 25-49 total staffing and 50-99 total 
staffing levels.  The transition in service provision for fire department type occurs between 
mostly-volunteer and mostly-career.  Interestingly, these three transitions appear to overlap.  
When communities reach 50-100-thousand population, they will likely have a fire 
department between 50 and 99 personnel, and be protected by a mostly- or all-career fire 
department.  To me, this represents a significant tipping point.  These observations support 
the premise that community size, department size, and department type influence the scope 
of 3E service provision. 
The logistic regression seen in Table 4.4 shows a positive influence (p<.001) of all 
three of the independent variables in predicting a dedicated fire prevention unit.  




most likely due to large response-focused all-volunteer departments in the study sample 
(>100 members, n = 19).  Overall, 62.1% (n = 113) of all-volunteer departments reported not 
having a dedicated unit.  When present, population served and department size strongly 
influence the staffing levels of such dedicated fire prevention units., with the median and 
mode being 1-5 personnel.  Department type appears to have minimal influence on the 
staffing of these units.  Department size has a clear influence. 
Discussion 
Drawing on Rubin (2010), the locus of budget control substitutes for the measure of 
program importance to politicians, the community, and department leadership.  When 
program control is removed from the service it effects, importance of that service likewise 
diminishes in relation to other organization priorities.  Lower scores then, not only indicate 
fewer 3E fire prevention services, they indicate communities and departments locked into a 
suboptimal pattern of relying on emergency response to manage the collective fire problem.  
Political will is lacking to force free riders into behaviors that relocate responsibility to 
individual system users. 
This situation is tolerable so long as the fire department has slack in its capacity to 
respond to calls for service.  Such tolerance has a discernable change point.  As I noted in my 
earlier discussion, there appear to be transitions associated with data patterns concerning 
population served, department size, and department type.  These can be seen in the provision 
scores assigned to each individual service and the combined 3E Index score.  I believe these 
transitions represent when fire departments go from being a public good to a common pool 
good.  It is at these transition points that the 3E activities, other than public education, take 




or not to act on the knowledge.  However, when fire department service demand saturates 
available resources, the more coercive 3E services become more vital to preventing Hardin’s 
Tragedy. 
This problem is particularly acute in smaller communities served by small and/or 
volunteer-oriented departments, but certainly not limited to these communities as indicated 
by the number of outliers associated with larger communities in Figure 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4.  Fire 
loss patterns in the United States are much higher per capita in smaller communities than in 
larger jurisdictions, despite the attention larger jurisdictions receive (Tri-Data Corporation 
1997, Allareddy et al. 2007, National Fire Data Center 2016).  However, the sheer weight of 
numbers in larger communities forces difficult service decisions. 
Smaller communities and larger resource strapped communities, such as those losing 
core industries, lack the tax base to implement comprehensive preventive 3E services.  Fire 
departments in these communities may lack authority to impose requirements or sanctions on 
persons who attempt to free ride.  Further, they may find themselves in politically untenable 
positions when they do try to enforce requirements.  Enforcement inevitably leads to charges 
of the fire department eroding the tax base by closing businesses.  Instead, this effort is left to 
other local government departments who may or may not place the same level of importance 
on fire prevention or lack understanding of the fire department’s service demand saturation.  
One means around this dilemma is to staff a standalone fire marshal’s (or other) office with 
specific authority and responsibility to provide the fire prevention function. 
There are also cultural issues of self-reliance and perceived government interference 
that raise barriers to most of the 3E services (Mattson 1994).  Enforcement of fire prevention 




homeowners are reluctant to spend scarce resources on something they do not see as 
necessary or depriving them of some other form of economic benefit.  Many will actively 
seek to avoid compliance.  This leaves public education as the most acceptable means of 
influencing fire safe behavior.  It does not require community members to give up control of 
possessions (money and property) and leaves intact their freedom of choice. 
Finally, existing response practices are reinforced due to the relatively low level of 
fire suppression demand, which are highly visible public events.  Service demand saturation 
generally occurs from the non-fire events that make up the bulk of response in larger 
communities.  Smaller communities do not generate the level of service demand found in 
larger population centers.  However, in all-volunteer or mostly-volunteer departments, an 
annual call volume of only a hundred events can tax staffing resources such that fire 








WHICH DEPARTMENTAL PROVISION SCHEMES WERE AFFECTED BY 
THE GREAT RECESSION CUTBACK? 
 
Chapter 4 addressed my first research question and examined how 3E fire 
prevention services are provided across different communities in my convenience 
sample.  It established a 3E Index that incorporates various approaches based on who 
delivered the particular fire prevention service, if delivered at all, and whether provision 
was concentrated under the fire department or covered through other providers.  Higher 
3E Index scores indicate more services are provided by the local fire department.  Lower 
scores indicate fewer services are provided and those provided are dispersed among 
different entities.  The chapter then examined how 3E service delivery is affected by 
community size, department size, and fire department type, and whether the presence of a 
dedicated fire prevention unit has any influence on delivery. 
This chapter addresses the study’s second query: Which departmental provision 
schemes were affected by the Great Recession Cutback?  These schemes are indicated by 
the 3E Index score which provides one parameter of interest along with the individual 3E 




size, fire department type, and existing 3E service approach lead to budget cuts of 3E fire 
prevention services. 
FPC Survey question 12, “Has your organization made cuts to fire prevention 
services in the last two years?” operationalizes this second research question by acting as my 
key dichotomous dependent variable.  The survey work group chose the two-year window for 
cuts based on two factors.  First, not all local governments operate on the same budget year 
cycle.  Budget cycles may coincide with the calendar year, use a July to June budget year, or 
align with the federal government budget year (Rubin 2010).  Second, public budgeting 
experiences a lag from economic downturns, particularly those that depend on property taxes.  
These are typically collected at the end of calendar years, so that shortfalls may not be felt for 
several months or longer (Scorsone and Plerhoples 2010).  The two-year window allowed for 
capture of the different budget variations and differing reactionary time lags in the single 
survey.  Survey respondents in the study sample that did not answer question 12 were 
listwise deleted from this analysis.  A frequencies count conducted in SPSS returned the 
sample size for this question’s analysis (n=827), with 50.2% (n=415) indicating that cuts 
were made and 49.8% (n=412) indicating that cuts were not made. 
Chapter 2 established the importance of fire prevention as a tool for addressing fire 
department capacity saturation.  Capacity saturation finds its roots in public free-riding 
behaviors and is ingrained in suboptimal organizational reactions (Kelman 1981).  Saturation 
takes the local fire department from a type of public good to a common pool good (Ostrom 
1990), meaning that at some point the fire department will lack the resources necessary to 
respond to all calls for assistance in time to affect positive outcomes (Randall 1983).  In that 




positioned and as a result response times will be stretched.  Research has clearly shown that 
positive incident outcomes are tied to response times (Challands 2010). 
Given that half of the surveyed departments are making cuts to fire prevention, the 
resulting question centers upon who is making cuts.  Smaller communities, smaller 
departments, and predominantly volunteer departments probably have some amount of slack 
in their service capacity, so that they will not slide into a common pool resource.  
Nonetheless, these bodies also face smaller resource pools to support their services.  Cuts to 
3E services may be more easily accepted and a preferred option to losing response capacity 
in those settings.  The suboptimal reliance on emergency response to manage the community 
fire problem likely continues as the policy of choice.  
Larger communities, larger departments, and predominantly career departments with 
high service demand may already be beyond the tipping point toward being a common pool 
good.  For these entities, cutting back 3E services may further entrench already suboptimal 
strategies.  As service demand increases or emergency events become more serious and 
resource intensive, opportunities to shift responsibility for preventing incidents are 
diminished as resources are pulled from prevention.  The underlying effects of these 
situations typically are evident as stressed response capacity affects the public and politicians 
are quickly brought into loop.  This, in turn, may lead to reactionary decisions to spread 
response forces even thinner to meet service demands.  National fire loss statistics show that 
when insufficient resources support response activities, property and human losses increase.  




Distribution of Fire Prevention Cuts 
To answer my second research question, I begin by recoding the dependent variable 
from FPC question 12 according to convention (i.e., no = 0, yes = 1) and retitle the new 
variable budget outlook.  As with the first research question found in Chapter 4, the survey 
working group believed that community size, department size, and department type would 
influence budget cuts to fire prevention.  Each of these variables have different conditions 
thought to effect resource availability and service demand.  Accordingly, I use these 
independent categorical variables and recode them as necessary.  My first examination 
compares these independent variables against the dichotomous dependent variable of budget 
outlook.  Since both are categorical/ordinal variables, cross tabulation is an appropriate 
method for analysis (Johnson and Reynolds 2012).  Convention dictates that the dependent 
variable be placed on the Y axis and the independent variable is placed on the X axis. 
Keeping with Johnson and Reynolds (2012) admonition to avoid using a single 
analytic test method, I report two test statistics.  Chi-square tests the chance that two 
categorical data sets are related by comparing observed results against expected results if the 
data sets were independent.  Gamma tests both the strength of a relationship between ordinal 
variables and its direction by measuring the difference in probability that a randomly drawn 
pair of observations is concordant as opposed to being discordant.  For each, I also report the 
probability of chance occurrence following convention of p<.05. 
Organization Level Factors and Budget Cuts 
For the first cross tabulation, represented in Table 5.1, I examine budget outlook by 
the six categories of population under the independent variable population served.  The 




associated with a greater likelihood of budget cuts to fire prevention.  Population served and 
budget cuts to fire prevention are significantly related to each other (i.e., chi-square = 39.29; 
5 df; p<.001 two-sided test), meaning that I can reject the null hypothesis.  Data for the study 
sample (n=827) show a moderate, statistically significant positive connection (gamma = .28, 
p<.001) between community size and budget cuts (Laerd Statistics 2016).  For communities 
with less than ten thousand population, approximately 30% made budget cuts to 3E services.  
By the time communities reach a population of 250-thousand plus, the level of budget cuts to 
3E services rises to nearly 70%.  This relationship probably is related to the overall number 
of 3E services provided, as well as the career-volunteer composition of the fire department.  
Chapter 4 found a positive relationship between the number of 3E services provided and 
community size.  Smaller communities generally provide fewer 3E services and these are 
more likely spread out among other entities.  Fewer services means fewer opportunities for 
cuts. 
The sample data from Chapter 4 reveal that community size has a robust relationship 
with the type of fire department providing services.  The smaller a community the more 
likely it is to depend on an all-or mostly volunteer fire department.  Community size also is 
tied to the potential for a dedicated fire prevention unit.  In the case of small career-oriented 
departments, the covered communities do not tend to be resource rich.  Smaller communities 
often lack dedicated fire prevention units, meaning that the cutting of 3E services is a less 
obvious strategy for managing budget shortfalls. 
Again, there is a slight transition point in the trend between the 25-50K and 50-100K 
population categories.  This is consistent with the observations of Chapter 4 and conceivably 




Table 5.1: Budget Outlook by Community Population  
  Population Served  
  <10K 10K-25K 25K-50K 50K-100K 100K-250K 250K+ Total 
Budget Outlook No Cuts 70.15% 60.14% 50.84% 51.41% 45.38% 30.15% 49.82% 
         
 Budget Cuts 29.85% 39.86% 49.16% 48.59% 54.62% 69.85% 50.18% 
         
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
 (67) (138) (179)      (177)      (130)      (136)      (827) 
Notes: Crosstabulation results are from a convenience sample comprised of respondents to a survey on budget cuts to 3E fire prevention services. n = 1200. This 
particular table concerns the dichotomous dependent variable Budget outlook (no cuts / budget cuts) against the size of the population protected by the 




environment.  It may be at this point that emergency response demand begins to outpace 
slack capacity forcing departments to pull funds from fire prevention to maintain response 
capacity. 
In Table 5.2, I inspect the relationship between the independent variable of 
departmental staffing versus budget outlook.  The recoded independent variable offers five 
possible categories of department size.  Consistent with population size relationship, a 
systematic trend can be found.  As departments increase in personnel, the likelihood of 
budget cuts to fire prevention tends to increase.  Otherwise, the data displays an overall 
connection between department size and budget cuts (i.e., chi-square = 26.99, 4 df, p<.001 
two-sided test) rejecting the null hypothesis.  Data indicates a moderate, statistically 
significant positive connection between department size and budget cuts (gamma = .22, 
p<.001).   
The conspicuous exception is with departments of 24 or fewer personnel.  In this 
particular category, the cuts / no cuts data shows an even 50% split.  While not shown in 
Table 5.2, data shows that the distribution of cuts/no cuts across department types at this size 
is fairly even.  The number of departments reporting no cuts (n = 40) ranges from 9 to 11 by 
type and those reporting cuts (n = 40) ranges from 8 to 12 by type.  Further, data also shows 
consistent distribution of cuts/no cuts between fire department providers (cuts n = 23, no cuts 
n = 24) and non-fire department providers (cuts n = 17, no cuts n = 16).  This leads me to 
believe that there is another factor at work influencing the cut/no cut decision with providers 
at this size.  One possibility is the presence of volunteer providers who, by definition, 
consume fewer resources in service delivery.  Budget cuts would do little to deter service 




Table 5.2: Budget Outlook by Total Department Staffing 
  Department Staffing  
  <24 25-49 50-99 100-250 250+ Total 
Budget Outlook No Cuts 50.00% 61.82% 53.91% 46.93% 34.38% 49.82% 
        
 Budget Cuts 50.00% 38.18% 46.09% 53.07% 65.63% 50.18% 
        
Total  100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
  (80) (165) (243) (179) (160) (827) 
Note: Crosstabulation results are from a convenience sample comprised of respondents to a survey on budget cuts to 3E fire prevention services. n = 1200. 
This particular table concerns the dichotomous dependent variable Budget outlook (no cuts / budget cuts) against the total staffing of the respondent fire 




Recession was extremely uneven in its effect across rural, suburban, and urban environments 
(Bennett, Yuen, and Blanco-Silva 2018).  Small departments in rural settings faced more 
budget difficulty than small departments situated in a more urbanized setting.   
While the smallest departments in the study sample appear to have an even chance of 
cutting fire prevention programs, data shows departments in the range of 25-49 personnel 
have only a 38.18% chance of cutting 3E services.  From this low point, the likelihood of 
cuts to 3E series rises to 65.63% for departments above 250 personnel.  Unlike population 
size, however, there is no dip in the trend as department size increases.  Again, these trends 
parallel the observations of Chapter 4.   
The 3E Index indicates the smallest fire departments offer the fewest 3E services for 
their communities.  Many of the 3E services in the community are likely provided by other 
government departments or outside agencies.  If the local fire department only offers one or 
two 3E services, then that severely limits available strategies during economic downturns.  
Opportunities to employ resisting or smoothing actions may not exist.  Keeping with the 
literature that non-mission critical programs are sacrificed first (Jick and Murray 1982, Plant 
and White 1982, Berne and Stiefel 1993), it makes sense that departments at this size would 
make cuts to budget demands that affect emergency response capacity.  On the other end of 
the scale, the largest departments have much larger budgets resource pools and capacity.  It is 
easily conceivable that they could make cuts to emergency response, as well as fire 
prevention services without severely jeopardizing the overall delivery of either service.  
The results of last cross tabulation for this chapter are shown in Table 5.3.  This table 
compares budget outlook with the four categories of fire department typology.  The budget 




Table 5.3: Budget Outlook by Fire Department Type 




Volunteer Mostly Career All Career Total 
Budget Outlook No Cuts 71.64% 60.87% 47.87% 44.64% 49.82% 
       
 Budget Cuts 28.36% 39.13% 52.13% 55.36% 50.18% 
       
Total  100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
  (67) (115) (188) (457) (827) 
Note: Crosstabulation results are from a convenience sample comprised of respondents to a survey on budget cuts to 3E fire prevention services. n = 1200. 
This particular table concerns the dichotomous dependent variable Budget outlook (no cuts / budget cuts) against the fire department type. Valid cases n = 827. 




cuts to fire prevention are systematically related (i.e., chi-square = 23.57; 3 df; p<.001 two-
sided test).  This result allows me to reject the null hypothesis of non-association.  Table 5.3 
displays a moderate, statistically significant positive connection between fire department type 
and budget cuts (gamma = .25, p<.001). 
As departments transition from all-volunteer to all-career, the likelihood of budget 
cuts to fire prevention services increases.  It is also very clear that the addition of career staff 
makes a marked difference in the frequency of budget cuts.  Between all-volunteer and 
mostly-volunteer, there is an 11-point change in percentage of cases reporting budget cuts.  
Between mostly-volunteer and mostly-career, there is another 13-point change in percentage.  
However, between mostly-career and all-career, this change drops to 3 percentage points.  
This seems to indicate that cuts made to fire prevention are mostly associated with personnel 
in the mostly-volunteer and mostly-career departments. 
Simply put, volunteer departments might have no real cuts (e.g., personnel or other 
forms) to make.  Except in cases where personnel are hired from department funds as casual 
labor or receive a stipend for certain services, the 3E services may be covered like all other 
services.  Because minimal resources are allocated, there may be nothing to really cut.  Along 
these lines, Chapter 4 found that all-volunteer departments were least likely to provide any of 
the 3E services except the category for public education.  Public education is the 3E service 
that is least resource intensive, so that is intuitive.  As departments move into mostly-
volunteer structures, the 3E Index confirms that additional 3E services are added.  The career 
staff in these settings would be most likely to cover these services, and of course, they would 
be vulnerable to budget cuts.  Perlman and Benton (2012) noted that local governments 




Along these lines, it seems that as more career personnel are added to the department roster, 
the more 3E services are added and the more likely cuts to fire prevention become. 
Distribution of Fire Prevention Cuts by Individual 3E Service 
In the preceding section, I examined how the independent variables of community 
size, department size, and department type interacted with the dichotomous dependent 
variable of budget cuts.  In this section I explore budget cuts to individual 3E services.  For 
this and the remaining analysis in this research paper I focus on departmental staffing and 
fire department type.  I will minimize my attention to community population because of its 
high correlation with department size and because the departmental variable tends to perform 
better in modeling results.6  When constructing my analysis, I use 95% confidence interval 
(CI) error bars to determine how variations in department size and type affect the likelihood 
of budget cuts to the individual fire prevention services.  My dependent variable is the 3E 
Index score, which categorizes who provides a particular service within a jurisdiction.  As 
discussed in Chapter 3, a score of 1 means the service is not provided; 2, the service is 
contracted out; 3, the service is provided by a local government entity other than the local 
fire department; and 4, the service is provided by the local fire department. 
Error bars provide two basic pieces of information.  One, they are a means intended 
to help “assess the significance of the difference between two values” (Krzywinski and 
Altman 2013, 921).  Two, they are a visible representation of a point estimate’s precision 
(Cumming and Finch 2005).  The bar extending from either side of the point estimate shows 
                                                 
6 The preceding discussions show a clear positive correlation between population and staffing.  This connection 
is well documented in the extant literature (Walker 1979, Brueckner 1981, Ladd 1992, Jennings 1999, Young 
2012, Jennings 2013).  I drop analysis of population since many of the service-oriented political and managerial 
decisions regarding budget cuts occur at the departmental level and not at the community population level.  
Analysis of both population size and department size would be duplicative and not add any important 




the margin of error for the estimate or data variability.  Three types are in common use: 
standard deviation, standard error of the mean, and confidence interval (CI).  Of the three 
types, Krzywinski and Altman (2013) note that CI provide a more intuitive interpretation of 
measurement reliability.  Further, of the three, CI error bars do not have a fixed value.  
Researchers can change the interval value according to the accuracy needed, though 95% CI 
is most common and corresponds to p <.05 null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) 
threshold. 
Cumming and Finch (2005) offer guidance for interpreting error bars for independent 
samples.  First, begin with identifying the dependent variable and explicate the measurement 
scale.  Identify the effect of interest and how the mean and CI lead to any conclusions from 
the data.  Focus first on the means and any discernable patterns.  Explain how these fit 
against research hypotheses and if the effects significant.  The CI identifies the range of 
probable values for the true population mean.  Values outside the CI are unlikely.  Any value 
outside the CI rejects the null hypothesis with p <.05 (two-tailed).  If the CI is narrow around 
the point estimate for the mean, this reasonably represents the true mean of the population.  
Explicitly, 
“For a comparison of two independent means, p ≤.05 when the overlap of the 
95% CI is no more than about half the average margin of error, that is when 
proportion overlap is about .50 or less.  In addition, p ≤.01 when the two CIs 
do not overlap, that is, when proportion overlap is about 0 or there is a 
positive gap.  These relationships are sufficiently accurate when both sample 
sizes are at least 10, and the margins of error do not differ by more than a 
factor of 2.” (Cumming and Finch 2005, 176). 
 
Following Cumming and Finch (2005) for my analysis,  I look first at the predicted 
means.  In Figure 5.1, one observation apparent across all department sizes is that there is no 




did not make cuts.  This holds regardless of who provides the plan review service as 
indicated by the index score.  This indicates that the service scheme is not driving cuts to 
plan review services.  Figure 5.1 also reveals that as departments get larger, they approach 
the index value of 4, meaning there is more uniformity among service providers and greater 
concentration plan review under the local fire department.  At the lower end of department 
size, Figure 5.1 show some small variation in mean scores between cuts and no cuts.  I take 
this to indicate that the introduction of other plan review service providers increases the 
chance of budget cuts. 
When looking at fire department type, Figure 5.1 again shows that budget cuts are 
associated with the introduction of alternate plan review service providers into delivery 
schemes.  This association is greatest with all-volunteer departments, though also seen in 
mostly- and all-career departments.  The exception is mostly-volunteer where there is no 
apparent difference.  The location of the predicted mean and width of the error bars show a 
clear reliance on other entities inside and outside of local government to provide plan review 
when the local fire department is all volunteer.  The width of the budget cuts error bar for this 
category is the largest and appears to be twice the width of the no cuts error bar revealing a 
great deal more variability in the data.  This data variability leads me to surmise that the other 
plan review providers, mostly from local government or contracted to local government were 
subject to budget cuts.  This is not surprising.  New development and new construction are 
tied tightly to the economy.  When economies shrink, these activities slow or stop (Miller 
and DiRocco Jr. 2012). 
For non-fire department agencies who are focused on new development and 




Figure 5.1: Budget Cut Environment for Plan Review Services 
Department Staffing Fire Department Type 
  
Note: Results are from a convenience sample comprised of respondents to a survey on budget cuts to 3E fire prevention services. A score of 1 = service is not 
provided, 2 = service is contracted out, 3 = service is provided by other local department, and 4 = service is provided by local fire department. The study 
sample for this question (n = 827) is derived from the original study sample (n = 1200) through survey question 12, which serves as the dependent variable. 




self-supporting enterprise funds that depend on the fees generated from the services 
provided, usually plan review and new construction inspections.  In smaller departments 
where a few people provide all the available 3E services, as shown in Chapter 4, and pre-
recession housing growth was lackluster, the effect of the downturn may not be as 
pronounced on plan review services. 
In communities experiencing rapid growth in the housing market prior to the Great 
Recession, adding plan review capacity through civilian employees would have been 
relatively easy.  In larger career-oriented departments, usually associated with larger, 
established communities, it is also more likely that dedicated civilian staff provide plan 
review.  In either case, reduction strategies would target cuts to reduce or reassign 
unnecessary personnel.  The strategy employed to reduce costs would affect whether it 
showed as a cut or no cut.  The major difference is that in larger communities and larger 
departments, reductions can be accomplished through normal attrition associated with a 
larger workforce.  Work associated with unreplaced personnel can be shuffled off to other 
employees.  If the positions are kept on the books, but simply not filled, the cost savings may 
not be reported as a cut.  If the positions are eliminated, then the cost savings shows up as a 
cut.  In small communities, with smaller workforces, the opportunity to use normal attrition 
for cost savings is just not available.  When the housing market crashed, revenue stopped and 
cutbacks became imminent since these organizations lack the capacity to shuffle work load. 
Closely tied to plan review, new construction inspections are the next step towards 
occupancy of new buildings.  Figure 5.2 provides graphic evidence of this relationship.  For 
both fire department size and type, the new construction inspection trends are markedly 




Figure 5.2: Budget Cut Environment for New Construction Inspections 
Department Staffing Department Type 
  
Note: Results are from a convenience sample comprised of respondents to a survey on budget cuts to 3E fire prevention services. A score of 1 = service is not 
provided, 2 = service is contracted out, 3 = service is provided by other local department, and 4 = service is provided by local fire department. n = 1200. 




construction inspection becomes a responsibility of the local fire department.  Data certainty 
regarding budget cuts to new construction inspection also improves.  In addition, the width of 
the error bars indicates more variety in who is providing new construction inspection.   
Two of the department size categories are worth noting.  Departments in the 25-49 
and 50-99 categories indicate that higher 3E index ratings for new construction inspections 
are associated with budget cuts.  They comprise 49.3% (n=408) of the study sample for this 
second research question. This points to the possibility of some unique conditions emerging 
in departments that of these sizes.  As previously mentioned in chapter 4, there appears to be 
a transition when fire department service passes from public good to common pool good.  
Particular 3E service cuts may be where the additional stressors on service demand are felt.  
Fire departments may also begin to specialize prevention services and civilianize these 
employees.  High service demand tends to force departments to make critical decisions on 
where to place available resources.  Path dependency theory predicts that this will be in 
maintaining emergency response capacity. 
A possible compounding factor is that communities protected by these departments, 
particularly those in the Sun Belt, were experiencing significant growth at the same time they 
were losing revenue (Greenblatt 2014, Maciag 2015, 2017).  Since many of these size 
departments already relied on alternate delivery strategies, the recession would have forced 
cuts to services not directly supporting the population growth.  New development takes years 
from plan inception to occupancy.  New construction inspections were probably cut with the 
anticipation that they would be restored when development caught up with growth.   
However, compared to plan review, there appears to be greater involvement of local 




means against the 3E service index.  This possibly indicates a desire to maintain some quality 
control aspect over new construction or that personnel providing new construction 
inspections, also provide other services.  Plan review is considerably easier to contract out or 
consolidate since it is essentially piece-work and is less subject to externalities, such as travel 
time and job site conditions. 
Fire department type in Figure 5.2 shows greatest variability in delivery schemes for 
all-volunteer departments.  The 3E scale indicates that more non-fire-based entities are 
involved when communities are protected by such departments.  Discussion of Figure 5.1 
pointed out that non-fire department-based service providers may be at greater risk to 
economic down-turns than fire department-based providers.  This risk would also apply to 
fire departments that have specialized their fire prevention services (i.e., dedicated plan 
reviewers).  Fire departments that have non-specialized fire prevention services may be able 
to redirect resources without having to cut services. 
Unlike plan review and new construction inspections, existing building inspections 
are concerned with the safety of occupied buildings.  Failures to maintain the fire safety 
features of these buildings place many more people at risk.  Figure 5.3 addresses the relative 
certainty of budget cuts to the 3E service of existing building inspections.  Figure 5.3 shows 
the consistent trend of decreasing variation in providers as departments increase in size.  
Another trend is also visible in the Department Staffing panel.  With the exception of 
departments with less than 24 employees, the mean values for budget cuts is greater than the 
no cuts mean values among the four categories of fire department size greater than 25 
personnel.  This indicates greater consolidation of existing building inspections under the fire 




service.  Larger departments are more often associated with well-established center cities or 
mature suburban communities with high service demand.  In such cases, consolidation of 
service under the local fire department would likely increase the potential for budget cuts, 
while the introduction of alternate service provides would decrease the potential for cuts. 
  Looking back to chapter 4, these communities appear to have consolidated most of 
the 3E services under the local fire department.  These communities are also more likely to 
implement cutbacks early in response to fiscal stress (Lobao and Adua 2011).  Alternatively, 
smaller, faster growing communities look to other means, such as cooperative 
intergovernmental service delivery and alternate revenue sources to manage such stress (Kim 
and Warner 2016).  This differentiation would be reflected in the choice to cut or not cut 
services. 
When department type is examined, the uncertainty associated with budget cuts 
decreases as fire departments transition from all-volunteer to all-career.  That said, the mean 
rate for budget cuts versus no cuts is noticeably even across all department types.  Looking at 
both panels in Figure 5.3, error bar overlap in department staffing and department type shows 
no statistically significant likelihood (p>.05) of existing building inspections budget cuts 
compared to no cuts. 
Figure 5.3 also exhibits greater centralization of existing building inspections under 
the fire department as departments get larger or increase career staffing.  This is particularly 
evident in the three largest staffing categories and career-oriented department type categories.  
In these, the index values are close to 4.0.  As the predicted means approach 4.0 in the 
staffing panel of Figure 5.3 existing building inspections have a greater association with 




Figure 5.3: Budget Cut Environment for Existing Building Inspections  
Department Staffing Department Type 
  
Note: Results are from a convenience sample comprised of respondents to a survey on budget cuts to 3E fire prevention services. A score of 1 = service is not 
provided, 2 = service is contracted out, 3 = service is provided by other local department, and 4 = service is provided by local fire department. n = 1200. 




scores, there is greater association with cuts for the smallest departments and all-volunteer 
departments.  Remember that fire department size is strongly linked to community size and 
service demand.  So, for smaller departments in growing communities it becomes easy to 
justify curtailing or consolidating existing building inspections under the building or similar 
department, while the fire department focuses on keeping pace with demand.  These actions 
would all show up as a cut to this 3E service, while still providing the service.  In established 
larger and career-oriented departments there is likely greater capacity and adaptability in how 
service is delivered without severely limiting service delivery.  Instead, it becomes an 
exercise in changing program objectives within politically acceptable limits, such inspect all 
commercial buildings according to imposed risk in lieu of inspect all commercial buildings 
once every two years.  There is a clear difference in the level of resources required for each 
option. 
Regardless of department size or type the prevailing argument against existing 
building inspections is that those buildings subject to inspection are safe (Jennings 2013).  
First, with few exceptions, the existing building stock has already been subject to plan review 
and new construction inspections.  Second, building owners frequently see existing building 
inspections as superfluous and infringing on property rights.  Third, bringing existing 
buildings into compliance can be very expensive. Fourth, commercial structures do not burn 
with such frequency that it raises prolonged community attention.   
  The next figure addresses Public education, the most pervasive of the 3E fire 
prevention services provided by fire departments.  It has been called the cornerstone of fire 
prevention (NCFPC 1973) and a critical factor in gaining code compliance (May and Wood 




panel on department staffing shows public education is the almost exclusive province of the 
local fire department, though other schemes are evident from the index score across most 
department sizes and types.  Data shows that in only 34 communities is public education 
provided by another local agency.  In 27 communities, it is simply not provided.  The 
noticeable stand out is the smallest department category and all-volunteer departments, which 
show much greater variation.  Here, other providers enter the arena or the service is 
completely cut.  This tells me that when a local fire department cuts public education, it is 
not picked up by another local entity. 
One example for the provider mix is a municipality that has a standalone fire 
marshal’s office that provides 3E services, while response is handled by the local fire 
department.  This is not an unusual occurrence with college campuses and small 
municipalities embedded in larger county systems, such as Gaithersburg, MD and Altamonte 
Springs, FL.  A similar pattern is visible in the department type pattern, with evidence of 
external or no providers with all department types, but concentrated in the all-volunteer 
category for the same reasons.   
The means for both department staffing and department type exhibit a bit of a sine-
wave shape, which is difficult to interpret and not reflective of the previously discussed 3E 
services.  One possible explanation concerns which entity is providing the service.  When the 
mean value is closer to four, there is less variation in providers.  Respondent level data 
indicates that roughly 5% (n = 61) of fire departments, regardless of size or type, do not 
provide public education services.  In half of these (n = 34), another entity provides the 
service.  These other providers may be spread out among the various categories for each 




Figure 5.4: Budget Cut Environment for Public Education 
Department Staffing Department Type 
  
Note: Results are from a convenience sample comprised of respondents to a survey on budget cuts to 3E fire prevention services. A score of 1 = service is not 
provided, 2 = service is contracted out, 3 = service is provided by other local department, and 4 = service is provided by local fire department. n = 1200. 




Looking at cuts versus no cuts, I take the proximity of the means in each category to 
indicate that when local fire departments provide this service, they may be engaging in 
resistance strategies.  I pose several possible intertwined reasons for public education cuts in 
larger career-oriented departments.  First, large departments are in well-established 
communities and probably taxed by emergency service demand.  Cutting emergency 
response forces in such circumstances requires deep shortfalls and lack of other options.  
Second, in these larger departments, civilian public educators are frequently hired to provide 
this service.  Uniformed firefighters typically take months and considerable expense from 
time of hire to providing service.  Civilian employees can usually begin delivering a service 
within a week or so.  From an institutional standpoint, this makes them much easier to 
replace.  Further, uniformed firefighters can perform much of the public education service, 
but civilian public educators cannot perform any emergency response duties.  Thus, public 
education tasks are more easily shifted to emergency response forces.  Finally, many of these 
larger, established departments are unionized, which provides some level of protection 
against reductions for uniformed personnel, but not for civilian educators.  These providers 
become the least difficult choice to cut and transfer responsibility. 
Judging from the location of the predicted means, budget cuts to public education 
occur slightly less often than no cuts for department staffing and department type, with one 
exception in each panel.  Under department staffing, in the staffing category of 25-49 
personnel, public education seems to be cut slightly more often than not.  Further, width of 
the error bars for budget cuts indicates little variability in the data.  When compared to the 
other four 3E services, the value of the mean and width of the error bar indicates that public 




3E services provided by local fire departments in this category as indicated by comparing the 
Figures 5.1 to 5.5 against each other.  Thus, when cuts are necessary, there is no other choice 
but to cut from public education.  There is little opportunity for across-the-board cutting from 
multiple 3E services. 
In the department type panel, all-career departments seem more likely to avoid cuts to 
public education.  The predicted mean value is close to four and bound tightly by the error 
bar.  The predicted mean for budget cuts is noticeably lower and there is no overlap with the 
error bars with no cuts indicating there is no likelihood that the predicted means could have 
the same value (p<.05).  This tells me that in all-career departments, particularly in well-
established communities in which interagency bonds have been developed, there is a greater 
emphasis on retaining internal public education services when compared with the other 3E 
services provided.  Cooperative programs, such as Risk Watch7, which depend on alternate 
providers, are easy targets for cuts by other agencies, which may not share the same priorities 
as the fire department. 
The greatest uncertainty is associated with all-volunteer departments which is 
probably due to the involvement of other service providers.  That said, the width of the 
budget cuts error bar indicates that regardless of who provides the services, budget cuts to 
public education were not limited to any one provider.  The changes in mean location and 
error bar widths across the different department types is probably indicative of how the 3E 
public education service is perceived and delivered.  Activities considered to be public 
education run the gamut from fire station visits by local school classes to evidence-based 
                                                 
7 Risk Watch is an NFPA developed program targeted at grade school children that teaches fire and injury 
prevention.  The program is designed to be delivered through local school systems in cooperation with local fire 




programs, such as Remembering When8.  All-volunteer and mostly-volunteer departments 
are probably focused on the less resource intensive public education activities rather than 
those programs that deliver a measurable product.  This would hold true in the fire 
departments focused on growth and were protecting expanding communities prior to the 
Great Recession.  From a budget cuts perspective and certainly not in every case, this means 
that comprehensive programs get cut in mostly- and all-career departments, while scattershot 
activities are curtailed at the all-volunteer level.   
The last 3E service reviewed is fire-arson investigation, found in Figure 5.5.  This 
service occupies a unique and important role in fire prevention.  Public attention focuses on 
the arson investigation side, since it involves solving a crime.  However, it is general fire 
investigation that carries the most benefit to overall fire prevention efforts.  Fire investigation 
focuses on determining origin and cause (O&C), which must occur before a finding of arson 
can be made and further investigation begins.  Arson is intentional and only a small slice of 
the total fires that occur.  In its fullest extent, fire investigation also looks at human behavior, 
and structural and fire protections systems behavior.  It is the all-important feedback loop to 
plan review, code enforcement, and public education.  Fire investigation identifies what 
worked, what did not work and why, how did human behavior contribute to the losses, and 
what are the emerging fire problems.  As important as it is to the fire department mission, it 
is also the 3E service most-likely provided by another local department or external provider. 
Looking at both panels in Figure 5.5, the involvement of external service providers is 
evident in all categories of department staffing and department type, though with changing 
                                                 
8 Remembering When is a comprehensive 16-point fire and fall prevention program developed by NFPA and 




Figure 5.5: Budget Cut Environment for Fire-Arson Investigation 
Department Staffing Department Type 
  
Note: Results are from a convenience sample comprised of respondents to a survey on budget cuts to 3E fire prevention services. A score of 1 = service is not 
provided, 2 = service is contracted out, 3 = service is provided by other local department, and 4 = service is provided by local fire department. n = 1200. 




emphasis across those spectrums.  One significant observation in the staffing panel is that for 
categories 50-99 and 250+, local fire department provided fire-arson investigation is more 
likely cut.  When external providers deliver the service the likelihood of cuts decreases 
substantially.  Considering the associated error bars in these two categories, those 
surrounding the predicted mean for cuts are tight, indicating that there is little variation in the 
data.  Whereas, the error bars for no cuts are considerably wider indicating much greater 
variation in delivery practices.  Further, no or minimal overlap of the paired error bars in 
these two categories indicates minimal chance that they have the same value (p<.005).  In 
other words, for fire departments in these two categories, department size influences the 
decision to cut services and does not support the null hypothesis.  For the other three 
categories under staffing there is not seem to as great a differentiation between means of cut 
and no cuts, though there is a small fluctuation in the means for the 25-49 category.  This 
possibly indicates that alternate delivery schemes get cut more often.  However, the overlap 
of the error bars for each these three categories is such that differentiation of values is not 
possible. 
One potential reason for this observed difference in the 50-99 and 250+ categories is 
that for the crime of arson, there is always the fallback of turning the service over to the 
police.  Fire departments traditionally perform origin and cause (O&C) investigations, but 
not necessarily arson investigation.  Fire O&C investigation emerge as an important function 
fairly early in fire department growth.  Arson investigation does not.  Both require 
specialized knowledge and training.  However, with arson there is the addition of legal 
concerns.  In smaller and volunteer-oriented departments, the burden of training and 




involvement of local and state law enforcement agencies with these levels.  As departments 
get larger and increase their career complement, it is more likely that the responsibility for 
fire and arson investigation is consolidated under the fire department, which can be seen in 
the department type panel in Figure 5.5. 
Under the department type panel in Figure 5.5, the most noticeable trend is the 
increase in index score as departments move from all-volunteer to all-career.  Coupled with 
the decreasing width of the error bars, this indicates that responsibility for fire-arson 
investigation is increasingly concentrated under the fire department.  While obvious with all-
volunteer and mostly-volunteer departments, scrutiny of the four paired means finds that fire-
arson investigation has a slightly greater chance of being cut than not, though the error bars 
indicate no statistically significant difference.  Overall, for the fire departments with any 
career personnel, I cannot reject the null hypothesis.  However, for all-volunteer fire 
departments, I can make the argument that department type likely influenced the service cut 
decision (p<.1). 
As with the other 3E services, there is increased provision by other sources when the 
local fire department is all-volunteer.  However, when compared against the other 3E 
services (Figures 5.1 through 5.4), fire-arson investigation reverses the likelihood of budget 
cuts versus no cuts.  The mean for budget cuts is significantly higher on the scale than no 
cuts.  This demonstrates that fire-arson investigation is cut at the local provision level, 
regardless of who is providing the service.  When contracted out, fire-arson investigation has 
a better chance of not being cut.  This relationship continues through the other department 





Prior to the Great Recession, suburban communities were experiencing substantial 
growth in residential markets as new homebuyers migrated out of center cities.  This would 
have increased overall fire service demand in these communities.  Such suburban fire 
departments were likely focused on expanding their emergency response capacity even at the 
expense of other services.  It also follows that after the onset of the Great Recession, overall 
fire department demand in these communities further increased as the downturn increased the 
level of poverty in these communities (Jennings 1999, Wiltz 2014).  Many fire departments 
and fire marshal’s offices further expected that the run of foreclosures would result in 
increased arson and suspicious fires and took steps to prepare, such as cross-training.  
However, the much-anticipated rise in fire and arson rates did not materialize.  Business 
continued as usual in this case.  If cuts were made, there was no net loss of community level 
services, only a transfer of responsibility for arson fires due to legal requirements, though the 
fire department reports this as a budget cut. 
Regression Analysis of Independent Variables on Budget Outlook 
To further develop my analysis for the second research question, I also include 
logistic regression which simultaneously controls for effects related to my independent 
variables.  Logistic regression is a proper method for exploring potential relationships 
between dichotomous dependent and numerous independent variables (Aldrich and Nelson 
1984, Pampel 2000, Johnson and Reynolds 2012).  I run two models regressing the control 
variables of Total Staffing, and Department Type against the dichotomous dependent 
variable, Budget Outlook.  The first model also includes the control variable of 3E Index, 




separate five categories of 3E services as control variables in lieu of the singular 3E Index.  
These models are found in Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4: Logistic Regression of Department Budget Cuts 
 Index Individual Services 
Control Variable β (s.e.) р β (s.e.) р 
Total Staffing .17 .06 .01 .18 .06 .01 
Department Type .30 .09 .00 .28 .09 .00 
3E Index -.26 .25 .28    
Plan Review    -.39 .19 .04 
Inspection – New    .10 .25 .68 
Inspection - Existing    .07 .22 .75 
Public Education    -.32 .18 .08 
Fire-Arson Investigation    .19 .12 .12 
Constant -.54 .84 .52 -.09 .95 .92 
Observations  827   827  
-2 Log Likelihood  1115.86   1106.44  
Chi-square  30.59   40.02  
Degrees of Freedom  3   7  
P-value  .00   .00  
Nagelkerke R2  .05   .06  
Note: Logistic regression results from a convenience sample of survey respondents answering all five 3E 
service questions.  Budget outlook is a dichotomous variable drawn from FPC Survey question 12 (i.e., Has 
your organization made cuts to fire prevention services in the last two years?) with values 0 = no cuts, 1 = 
budget cuts.  The control variables tested are ordinal variables. Total Staffing: 1 = <24, 2 = 25-49, 3 = 50-99, 4 
= 100-250, 5 = 250+. Department Type: 1 = All Volunteer, 2 = Mostly Volunteer, 3 = Mostly Career, 4 = All 
Career. 3E Index is the aggregate score: 1 = service is not provided, 2 = service is contracted out, 3 = service is 
provided by other local department, 4 = service is provided by local fire department.  Plan Review, New 
Construction Inspection, Existing Building Inspection, Public Education, Fire-Arson Investigation are the 
individual 3E services: 1 = service is not provided, 2 = service is contracted out, 3 = service is provided by 
other local department, 4 = service is provided by local fire department. 
 
Table 5.4 shows that the first model, incorporating the three independent variables, 
was statistically significant with χ2 = 30.59 (p<.001, df = 3, n = 827) and a reasonable fit.  
The full model distinguishes between those departments likely to make budget cuts to fire 
prevention services versus those that do not make cuts, though the Nagelkerke R square 




such as these.  The full model correctly classified 52.2% of the true positives and 66.0% of 
true negatives.  It has a positive predictive value of 59.9% and a corresponding negative 
predictive value of 60.4% (Pallant 2016). 
Considering the control values next, Table 5.4 shows that Department Type has the 
most statistically significant influence (p<.001), followed by Total Staffing (p<.01).  The 
coefficient for Department Type (β = .30) is positive and shows that changes in its value 
generates a reasonably robust change in the probability of budget cuts as one moves from 
volunteer departments to all career departments.  In other words, the more career-oriented a 
department is, the more likely 3E services will face budget cuts.  Changes in Total Staffing (β 
= .17) also produce independent changes in the probability of budget cuts.  More staffing 
increases the likelihood of fire prevention budget cuts.  On the other hand, the combined 3E 
Index (p<.30, β = -.26) is not significant at traditional probability levels, but it does show 
some residual strength with respect to direction.  The negative parameter would suggest that 
the greater provision of 3E services is a related to a smaller probability of budget cuts, 
although it is not significant.  Below I control for the separate 3E services and find that some 
types are significantly related to budget cuts, while others are not. 
The Wald statistic also indicated the same hierarchy of influence on the likelihood of 
budget cuts with values of 12.48 (Department Type) and 7.90 (Total Staffing).  The odds ratio 
for the two control variables are 1.35 (Department Type) and 1.19 (Total Staffing).  Thus, as 
department type changes from all-volunteer to all-career, study sample respondents were 
roughly one-third more likely to report budget cuts.  Similarly, each increase in staffing 
category size is associated with a 20% greater likelihood of reporting budget cuts.  The 3E 




The first model in Table 5.4 tells me that Department Type exerts the most influence 
on the likelihood of budget cuts, followed by Total Staffing.  However, 3E Index or how 
many services are provided and who provides them could act as a counter-influence.  In 
short, the more career personnel in the department, the greater probability of fire prevention 
budget cuts, but providing more fire prevention services might have some ameliorative 
influence.  To further investigate that effect, I separately control for the different 3E 
categories in the next model configuration in Figure 5.4.  
The first thing noticeable in the second model is the consistency of the coefficients 
and significance of Department Type and Total Staffing.  Significance does not change, while 
influence of Department Type drops by .02 points and the influence of Total Staffing 
increases by .01 point.  This second model correctly classified 52.9% of true positives, with a 
sensitivity of 64.3%.  It has a positive predictive value of 57.9% and a negative predictive 
value of 59.6%. 
Looking at the individual 3E services, the second model shows that Plan Review 
(p<.05) and Public Education (p<.05 single tail test) are statistically significant.  Both of 
these variables have fairly large negative coefficients, β = -.39 and β = -.32 respectively, 
meaning that higher scores are associated with decreases in the likelihood of budget cuts to 
the service.  The p-value for Fire-Arson Investigation shows some marginal strength (p<.10 
single tail test), so there may be a slight positive influence related to budget cuts.  The p-
values for New Construction Inspection (p≤.68) and Existing Building Inspections (p≤.75) 
are not meaningful with respect to likelihood of budget cuts.  Wald statistics confirm that of 
the five 3E services, Plan Review (4.19) has the greatest influence on the possibility of 




Looking to the odds ratios given, for every unit increase in the Plan Review, the likelihood of 
respondents reporting budget cuts is .68 time less likely.  For Public Education, the 
likelihood of reported budget cuts is .72 time less likely.  Judging from the two models, I can 
conclude that Department Type and Total Staffing contribute to the likelihood of budget cuts, 
while higher 3E Index scores decrease the likelihood of budget cuts.  Specifically, Plan 
Review and Public Education exert influence against budget cuts.  Inspections appear to have 
no influence either way, while Fire-Arson Investigation exerts minimal budget cut pressure. 
Chapter Conclusions 
I explored this second research question concerning which 3E fire prevention 
provision schemes were affected by the Great Recession.  At this moment, many local 
governments have yet to fully recover and history foretells another downturn is forthcoming.   
My examination began at the organizational level.  I looked at the effect of community 
population, department size, and fire department type on the probability of fire prevention 
service budget cuts.  In the following sections, I inspected program level data.  I examined 
the probabilities of budget cuts for each 3E service according to department staffing and fire 
department type.  Finally, I compared the 3E Index with the individual 3E services.  I started 
with the same convenience sample discussed in Chapter 3.  However, I used survey question 
12 to operationalize my inquiry and refine my study sample.  Respondents that did not 
answer question 12 were listwise deleted, leaving a smaller study sample (n = 827).  Of this 
smaller study sample, 826 of the respondents indicated that the organization had a dedicated 
fire prevention unit, which is worth noting for later study.   
I analyzed the organization level budget cut factors using cross-tabulation.  I found 




percentage of departments making budget cuts also increases.    Another striking observation 
is the sharp uptick in the percentage of departments making cuts in the largest category of 
each independent variables.  This means that the largest departments in the largest 
communities made budget cuts to fire prevention.  This is probably the result of the uneven 
impact of the Great Recession and following recovery.  Charles (2019) observes that half the 
economic recovery since 2010 occurred in the nation’s 20 largest metro areas.  The author 
further noted that roughly half of net new business in the decade following the onset of the 
recession was limited to Washington, D.C. and New York City.  The vast majority of urban 
areas were very much struggling to balance their budgets. 
The observation that budget cuts are mainly focused on the largest populations and 
departments is followed by the same pattern in department types.  Once departments are 
majority career, the percentage of departments reporting budget cuts to fire prevention 
increases dramatically.  This pattern is also tied into the economics of the downturn.  There is 
a relationship between population size and department type.  Larger communities lean 
towards mostly- and all-career fire departments. 
The common denominator for all three organizational level variables appears to be 
the ratio of career personnel to total department staffing as defined by department type.  
Obviously, the trend of all-volunteer to all-career reflects this.  Data from this study sample 
also shows that as departments increase in size, they tend to migrate towards all-career, with 
population more than likely driving that shift.  Personnel costs account for the largest 
proportion of expenditures and potential savings in local government – more paid personnel, 




I next examined which 3E services were impacted by cuts.  Looking across all five 3E 
services, I found that the greatest variability in provision schemes and lower index scores 
were associated with the departments in the <24 personnel and all-volunteer department 
categories.  This indicates greater inclusion of delivery by other entities.  While some of 
these departments may deliver all five 3E services, the majority do not.  Examination of 
respondent level data finds that those respondents from these groups who deliver all five 3E 
services are most-likely non-response oriented, such as standalone fire marshal’s offices.   
  Analysis results also indicated that plan review is more resistant to cuts when 
provided by local government, including the fire department.  The most-likely explanation is 
that plan review is often associated with a revenue stream accepted by developers and 
builders as a cost of doing business.  Where inspections are concerned, there appears to be 
greater chance of preserving new construction inspections when the local fire department is 
either all- or mostly-volunteer and the service is provided by other entities.  This would 
follow from being part of a revenue stream.  Whereas, for mostly-career and all-career 
departments, there is no differentiation.  In all probability, these inspections are tax-
supported, as is the case for existing building inspections. All things being equal, department 
size seems to be the driver of budget cuts in inspection services.   
As expected, data shows that where public education is concerned, the local fire 
department is the most numerous provider.  Regardless of department size or type, there 
appears to be a greater likelihood of no cuts being made.  This service is not heavily 
dependent on resources, is easily transferred to emergency response units, is non-




Public education frequently doubles as a public relations tool.  Cuts to this service run 
counter to the best interests of the local fire department. 
Results for fire-arson investigation do not show any systematic relationship with 
department staffing.  Two categories (i.e., 50-99 and 250+) show a greater propensity toward 
cuts than not. For volunteer-oriented departments, budget cuts are more likely, while in 
career-oriented departments, the probability of budget cuts is about even.  This indicates that 
volunteer-oriented departments, if they provide the service, have a fallback option for fire-
arson investigation, such as the state fire marshal’s office.  Many, of these external agencies 
automatically involved if a crime is suspected.  O&C investigations do not hold the same 
level of urgency and budget cuts are more easily made. 
In the last part of my analysis for this second research question, I look at the 
likelihood of budget cuts as influenced by total staffing, department type, the 3E Index, and 
the individual 3E services.  Two logit regression models found that department type (p <.01) 
has the greatest effect on the probability of budget cuts, followed by staffing levels.  Taken 
together, these show that as the proportion of career employees in the personnel complement 
increases, so too does the likelihood of budget cuts. 
As important, the 3E Index model suggests that higher scores may decrease the 
probability of budget cuts (β =-.26, p = .28).  However, in the second model plan review (β = 
-.39, p <.05, two-sided test) and public education (β = -.32, p <.1, two-sided test) express an 
association with lowering chances of budget cuts.  I believe this indicates that generally, the 
3E Index is inversely related to the chance of budget cuts.  However, data for the other 





Following the trend that seems most obvious from Tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3, that career 
personnel increases lead to greater possibility of budget cuts to 3E services.  This means 
mostly- and all-career departments face budget cuts more frequently than mostly- and all-
volunteer departments.  Taking the trend another step leads to the eventual observation that 
the largest departments and communities are cutting fire prevention to balance budgets.  
More telling, the budget cut trendlines for community and department size accelerate with 
the largest categories of each.  It appears that fire departments in the largest communities are 
most frequently hit by cuts.  This should not be construed however, to mean that smaller 
community fire departments are faring better in fire prevention.  A quick look at population 
data shows that communities in two categories 25K-50K and 50K-100K were also especially 
hard hit, but not as a proportion of total communities at that size. 
Furthermore, data shows that smaller communities are more likely to outsource 
certain 3E services or simply not provide these services.  Thus, when budget cuts hit 3E 
services, there are fewer to cut.  The net effect of budget cuts is probably be more extreme 
than with larger communities.   
Looking at individual services, plan review is easily provided by private engineering 
firms.  Among survey respondents, 7% (n = 13) of plan review not provided by the local fire 
department was contracted out.  Only, 2% (n = 5) reported contracting out new construction 
inspections.  For both services, budget cuts were about 50%.  The major concern here is 
losing control over the service and its quality (Mohr, Deller, and Halstead 2010).  A conflict 
of interest situation is easily foreseeable and the local government lacks the expertise and 




On the other hand, fire-arson investigation is outsourced to other government entities 
by 17% (n = 142) of the survey respondents.  This practice ensures both provision and 
general quality of the service.  Most likely, who provides service is dictated by statute.  
However, data indicates that the only 41.5% (n = 59) of these made budget cuts versus a rate 
of 52% (n = 356) among fire department providers.   
Existing building inspections and public education present special situations.  Neither 
service is easily outsourced except to another local government entity and generally are not 
mandated by law.  Data shows that existing building inspections are outsourced to another 
government entity by about 9.5% (n = 78) of survey respondents, while public education is 
outsourced by only 2.7% (n = 22) in the survey sample.  For both services, the budget cut 
rates were roughly 38% and 58%, respectively.  For public education, it is almost equally the 
case (n = 16) that the service is not provided.  
A parallel observation that accompanies community and department size, and 
department type, is that the large departments more than likely provide all five 3E services.  
Chapter 4 clearly established the relationship between department size and the 3E Index.  As 
departments increase in size, they also increase the number of 3E services provided.  This 
trend is also evident as fire departments transition from all-volunteer to all-career.  Taken to 
its end, the result is that the largest all-career fire departments protecting the largest 
communities likely provide all five 3E services and are more likely to make cuts to these 
services. 
From a fire protection standpoint, this is problematic.  Fire prevention is a key 
component of a community’s fire protection.  Fire risk is greatest in densely population 




improved fire protection and economies of scale when both services are provided (Duncombe 
1992, Duncombe and Yinger 1993, Donahue 2004a).  Large communities that make cuts to 
fire prevention services may actually be increasing their cost of fire protection. The likely 
result is increased service demand, both in terms of volume and severity.  This will increase 
the demand for more emergency response resources, leading to additional cuts to fire 
prevention and other areas.  Communities become locked into a cycle of sub-optimal choices. 
Having established that fire prevention budget cuts are more likely in larger, career-
oriented departments, the next logical question is to look specifically at which services are 
being cut.  One thing that becomes apparent when looking across all five 3E services from 
department staffing and department type perspectives.  This is certain services have an 
increased likelihood of budget cuts depending on whether or not it is provided by the local 
fire department.  Plan review seems more resistant to budget cuts than not regardless of 
which perspective taken.  The only other service that appears to have systemic resistance to 
budget cuts is public education, though this is marginal in some categories.  Otherwise the 
data is conflicting across categories.  
Plan review is normally associated with a revenue stream regardless of who provides 
the service.  Demand for plan review and new construction services slow down, but generally 
does not disappear during downturns. Instead, renovations and additions become their 
mainstay.  Building and fire codes frequently call for a plan review for such smaller 
reconstruction projects, but may do away with the inspection requirements based on the 
square footage or alteration of existing building components.  Local governments will likely 




self-funding.  In jurisdictions where plan review is tax-funded, new construction increases 
tax revenues and again, will be resistant to budget cuts. 
Public education occupies a unique role in fire prevention.  First, it is recognized as 
the cornerstone service.  Public education has a synergistic effect on every other fire 
prevention service (May and Wood 2003).  Second, public education is not coercive.  
Citizens and businesses participate at their own choice.  Failure to participate carries no 
penalty other than an increased risk, which generally goes unrecognized (Clark, Smith, and 
Conroy 2015), and costs are distributed to the community rather than being borne by the 
individual (Brueckner 1981).  Third, public education requires few dedicated resources, 
unlike the other 3E services.  Finally, public education places the fire department in a 
positive light.  Firefighters are viewed as subject matter experts by the community.  In a 
nutshell, 3E services associated with revenue and the public perception of the fire department 
are resistant to budget cuts. 
This presents a bit of a mixed bag from the view of fire protection.  It is a truism 
among fire prevention practitioners that a building is never safer than the day the certificate 
of occupancy is approved.  From that point forward it is subject to the wear and tear of 
human occupation.  Fire protection systems and inherent fire safety features required during 
plan review begin to breakdown.  The 3E service intended to counteract this gradual failure, 
existing building inspections, appears to be background noise in the data, so no conclusion 
can be drawn.   
However, it can be said that inspections are a frequent source of complaint, but a 
critical aspect of maintaining building fire safety.  At best, they are viewed as a necessary 




Public education on the other hand has been shown to be an effective tool to reducing fire 
risk at relatively low cost to a community (Schaenman et al. 1990, Ta et al. 2006).  Fire 
safety can be delivered at much lower costs than other of the 3E services.  It is easily 
delivered by emergency response units, making it difficult to cut.  Public education outreach 
by uniformed firefighters has been shown to have higher acceptance and retention rates (Ta 
et al. 2006).  Furthermore, the data shows that public education programs decrease the 
probability of budget cuts. 
Overall, the data demonstrates that communities most likely delivering the most 
comprehensive fire prevention schemes as measured by the 3E Index will also be the most 
likely to face budget cuts.  These communities tend to be more densely populated and present 
the greatest service demands, both emergency and non-emergency.  They are also likely 
facing the greatest economic challenges, which were exacerbated by the Great Recession.  As 
for the individual 3E services, programs associated with revenue streams or public image 
help reduce the chance of budget cuts, while those that are easily shifted to other agencies or 
result in political fall-out are more likely to see budget cuts.  The particular strategies used to 






HOW DID DEPARTMENTS WITH DIFFERENT PROVISION SCHEMES 
STRATEGICALLY APPROACH CUTS TO 3E SERVICES? 
 
Chapter 4 investigated the overarching question of how different jurisdictions 
provided 3E fire prevention services.  It established an index for ranking the service 
delivery schemes based on how many of these services are provided and who provides 
each of the individual services.  Chapter 5 then looked at how the various delivery 
schemes were affected by the economic downturn of the Great Recession.  That chapter 
found that, in general, the likelihood of budget cuts followed the proportion of career 
personnel as measured by fire department type, with total department size following in 
influence.  The introduction of outside service providers can significantly change the 
likelihood of budget cuts to individual 3E services in either direction.  Providing plan 
review and public education are associated with marked decreases in the likelihood of 
budget cuts.  On the other hand, providing fire-arson investigation increases the prospect 
of budget cuts.   Having gained some insight into which programs departments will likely 
be affected by cuts, I examine the strategies employed to make those cuts. 
This chapter addresses the third question of the study: How did different provision 
schemes strategically approach cuts to 3E services?  The decision to cut budgets for 




reflects the high-level priorities in a community (Giroux, Mayper, and Daft 1986).  Cutback 
decisions made as a result of economic recession must consider the parameters of size, 
duration, and urgency (Glassberg 1978, Baker 2011, Perlman and Benton 2012).  Each of 
these factors affects the cutback options available to local government.  Deeper and longer 
downturns require more significant cuts.  The pace of the downturn dictates whether local 
government reaction is “incremental or quantum” (Glassberg 1978, 327). 
Existing research indicates that local government will initially approach these 
cutbacks through across the board cuts.  This approach to cuts helps maintain service 
capacity and shares the burden of cutting back across the various units or subunits of 
government.  It also eases potential political costs by avoiding the prospect of alienating 
those constituencies invested in particular services (Reddick and Hassan 2003).  If the 
downturn is sufficiently prolonged or severe, then local government will turn to targeted 
eliminations and major reductions (Scorsone and Plerhoples 2010).  At this level of cutback, 
elected officials forego retaining capacity and deliberately prioritize among the services 
provided by government.  Strategic decisions frequently turn on questions of which services 
must be provided versus which services constitute amenities.  Legal dictates and direct 
implications on public health and safety often means that the fires service is prioritized ahead 
of other services (e.g., parks and recreation), but it too faces the threat of the knife. 
The specific details of budget cuts are usually made at the department level within 
politically set performance and resource parameters (Giroux, Mayper, and Daft 1986).  As 
with overall local government reaction, individual departments may also implement across 
the board or targeted cuts.  Departmental belt-tightening involves strategic service decisions 




external organizational integrity.  The focus of the FPC survey, described in Chapter 3, and 
the premise of this study is the department level reaction to retrenchment.  Thus, this research 
question is aimed at department level strategic choices, rather than at political level strategies 
for addressing a constrained resource environment. 
Numerous scholars have identified a range of cutback strategies that are available to 
local governmental departments, which can be summarized to include: 1) prioritizing 
services, 2) shifting services to alternate providers, 3) decreasing service levels, 4) 
discontinuing services, and 5) building alternative service capacity (Glassberg 1978, Levine 
1978, McTighe 1979, Jick and Murray 1982, Packard et al. 2007, Baker 2011, Perlman and 
Benton 2012).   Furthermore, such strategies may be internalized, as in the case of layoffs, or 
externalized as in decreased service hours for staff (McGowan and Stevens 1983).  The 
literature on these cutback strategies points to personnel cutbacks as the primary method of 
budget balancing during the Great Recession (Scorsone and Plerhoples 2010, Perlman and 
Benton 2012) and that premise is consistent with the previous literature (Caiden 1981, 
Levine, Rubin, and Wolohojian 1982, Bozeman 2010) on cutback strategies. 
As discussed in chapter 3, the FPC survey captured cutback strategy information 
through a series of questions found in its second section.  The survey work group identified 
three expected methods of cutting 3E services, including: cutting personnel, cutting the 
number (or level) of services provided, and cutting back on the resources needed for job 
performance.  Of these three, I focus on personnel cuts, since service delivery is achieved 
through people and it includes some measure of the other two identified methods.  In the next 
section, I examine whether cuts were across the board or targeted, whether strategic 




Strategic Reactions to Budget Cuts  
My analysis of this third research question is grounded in established cutback 
practices (Glassberg 1978, Levine, Rubin, and Wolohojian 1982, Stipak and O'Toole 1993, 
Scorsone and Plerhoples 2010).  I look into whether the fire departments and other 3E service 
providers adopted strategies in the same manner as those identified in the literature.  The 
literature points to across the board decremental cuts as the first reaction of local government 
in the face of downturns with the expectation is that the downturn will be short-lived and 
recoverable.  Targeted cuts come into play when the fiscal situation is dire or extended.  
Thus, the principal strategic question is whether across the board, or targeted cuts, were 
implemented.  An analysis of whether cuts were across the board or targeted also provides 
some indication of the depth of the financial impact on local fire departments and other 
service providers. 
Initial Strategic Reactions 
I examine initial strategic reactions to budget cuts by exploring whether cuts were 
made across the board or targeted by comparing department level budget cuts to 3E service 
budget cuts.  The survey work group expected that overall department level cuts would drive 
cuts to fire prevention services.  However, recognizing the size disparity between emergency 
response forces, fire prevention units, and their respective budgets, the survey work group 
selected different scales in the survey question responses. 
I operationalize this examination through FPC survey questions 14, 15 and 20.  FPC 
survey question 20 (n = 263) asked: Did any other work units in the department experience 
cuts?  Respondents indicated that cuts were shared across work units in 73% (n = 193) cases 




preponderance of departments approach cuts from the perspective of sharing the burden.  
However, this perspective lacks nuance.  The other two questions provide more detail. 
Question 15 (i.e., What percent of the fire prevention work unit(s) budget was cut?) 
lists six categories of cut levels ranging from <5% to 25%+ in five percent increments.  
These categories provide the dependent variable.  They were recoded to round categories 
values to whole numbers for consistency, to collapse a category of extreme values, and 
subsequently retitled Budget Allocation.  Question 14 (i.e., What percent of the overall 
department was cut?) provides the independent variable.  The survey provided for six 
possible categorical answers ranging from <2.5% to >15%, in two and half percent 
increments except for the final five percent category. 
The comparison of department level cuts and fire prevention unit cuts were made 
using cross-tabulation.  Respondents that did not answer both questions were listwise deleted 
to provide the study sample (n = 366).  As Johnson and Reynolds (2012) note, cross 
tabulation is an appropriate method for examining the relationship between categorical 
ordinal variables.  I report both the chi-square and gamma test statistics.  Chi-square tests the 
chance that two sets are related or independent.  Gamma expresses the strength of any 
relationship and its direction.  I also report the p-value indicating the probability that any 
relationship is a chance occurrence.  Table 6.1 presents the comparison data.  In this 
particular table, the dependent variable is shown on the X-axis and the independent variable 
is shown on the Y-axis.  While not presented according to convention, visual analysis of the 
data is clearer. 
I use the proportionality of cuts to provide some indication of whether cuts were 




Table 6.1: Department Budget Cuts Compared to 3E Service Budget Cuts 
  3E Services Budget Cuts  
  <5% 5-9% 10-14% 15-20% 20-25% 25%+ Total 
Overall Department Budget Cut <2.5% 36 8 5 3 1 2 55 
 2.5-4.9% 39 20 9 3 5 9 85 
 5.0-7.4% 16 18 14 3 9 4 64 
 7.5-9.9% 3 10 3 4 4 3 27 
 10-15% 5 18 29 5 13 6 76 
 >15% 4 2 8 12 23 10 59 
 Total 103 76 68 30 55 34 366 
Note: Crosstabulation results from the convenience sample comprised of respondents to a survey on budget cuts to 3E fire prevention services. n = 1200. This 
particular table evaluates cuts made to 3E fire preventions services relative to overall department budget cuts. Valid cases n = 366. Missing cases n = 834. 




reasonably commensurate with overall department level cuts are indicative of across the 
board cuts.  Whereas cuts to 3E services that are disproportionately larger or smaller than 
overall department level cuts are indicative of targeted cuts.  However, fire prevention 
budgets are only a fraction (3% - 5%) of overall department budgets (NCFPC 1973, 
Schaenman 1993), so it would be difficult to make up a significant shortfall by limiting cuts 
to fire prevention.   
Table 6.1 compares department level cuts with fire prevention unit cuts.  A visible 
trend, bounded by sharp drops in value runs from the upper left to bottom right of the table.  
This tells me a majority of departments made reasonably commensurate across the board 
cuts.  This is consistent with previously observed cutback behavior in local government.  Test 
statistics indicate there is a relationship between department level budget cuts and 3E service 
budget cuts (chi-square = 157.03; 25 df; p<.001 two-sided test), so the null hypothesis is 
rejected.  Data from the sample also indicates a strong, statistically significant positive 
connection (gamma = .49, p<.001) between department level cuts and 3E service cuts (Laerd 
Statistics 2016). 
In addition, I find some clear evidence of disproportionality at both ends of the scale 
that mostly disfavor 3E services and are suggestive of targeted cuts.  In the upper right 
corner, the table shows that multiple departments made dramatic cuts to 3E services 
compared to overall department cuts.  Accepting that personnel costs typically take up 85%-
90% of fire department budgets, budget cuts exceeding 20% of a budget allocation must 
involve loss of personnel and 3E service capacity.  The closer a department moves to the 
upper right of the table the more targeted the budget cuts become with regard to fire 




prioritize 3E services over other organizational units.  As can be seen, however, relatively 
few departments appear to be making this preventative type of investment in 3E.   
One possible reason is that these communities have already cut as much as possible 
from fire prevention short of abandoning the service, and are making cuts elsewhere.  
Declining central cities and suburbs, such as those found in the Rust Belt, lacked the 
resources to respond effectively to the downturn.  Likewise, in those places experiencing 
rapid housing growth, employment and local government finances were based on the 
construction industry.  Departments protecting either declining central city suburbs or those 
experiencing vigorous economic growth prior to the Great Recession were especially hard 
hit.  Targeted cuts may reflect severely financially stressed departments. 
Across the board cuts appear to be the more likely reaction to an economic downturn 
for those departments that made cuts.  Emergency response and fire prevention share the 
stress of cutbacks.  However, this does not mean that all five 3E fire prevention services were 
equally affected.  Looking back to chapter 3, the 3E service index clearly shows that other 
agencies are involved in service delivery or the particular services may not be provided.  
Other service providers external to the fire department likely have different budget priorities.  
For example, building departments may emphasize retaining plan review over existing 
building inspections since this is a service that is frequently associated with significant 
revenue generation.  Even within dedicated fire prevention units, different priorities may 
emphasize prevailing conditions within the community.  A community experiencing growth 
will probably prioritize plan review and new construction inspections over existing building 




building inspections and public education to minimize risk of ignition.  The next reasonable 
step is to evaluate how retrenchment strategies affected the individual 3E services.   
Strategies Affecting Individual 3E Services 
I examine the specific cutback strategies departments employed by assessing the 
likelihood of cuts to each 3E fire prevention service.  In a study of local government 
managers, Stipak and O'Toole (1993), identified four basic reactions or strategies to fiscal 
stress: 1) reduce services, 2) raise revenues, 3) improve productivity, and 4) shift services.  
This section examines cuts to specific 3E services, which fall under the reduce service 
strategy.  At the same time, I will build upon the last section’s observation that across the 
board cuts seem to be the default strategy for departments, while looking for signs of 
prioritization.  Question 20 established a broader approach to cuts, but does not lead to 
conclusions regarding prioritization among the 3E services.  It is possible that all elements 
within a department experienced cuts, but that one particular service was targeted to bear the 
brunt of those cuts. 
I operationalize this section of the research through FPC survey question 16 (i.e., 
Which FP services were affected by budget cuts?).  Question 16 provided for five possible 
answers, four of which concerned specific service categories and the fifth listed “other”.  It 
allowed respondents to select all services that were affected.  Each of the four possible 
service answers (fire investigations, code inspections, plan review, and public education) 
were recoded into separate dependent variables for this analysis9.  “Other” (n = 29) was 
dropped from the analysis as most respondents used this option to clarify cuts captured in the 
                                                 
9 Note than new construction inspections and existing building inspections are combined in this question.  The 
survey work group felt that within any one department providing 3E services, the same individuals are probably 




specific service categories and did not add to the analysis.  My study sample for this line of 
inquiry was developed by filtering the original sample set with question 16 respondents.  
This provided 813 observations and seven distinct independent variables. 
In this section I examine the likelihood that any one of the 3E services is cut.  I use 
logistic regression to test the relationship between two categorical variables (Aldrich and 
Nelson 1984, Pampel 2000, Johnson and Reynolds 2012).  My dichotomous dependent 
variables are based on the recoded categories from FPC question 16 described above.  The 
recoded variable permit only two conditions regarding budget cuts, yes = 1 when answered, 
or no = 0 if unanswered.  I ran four models, one each for plan review, code inspections, 
public education, and fire-arson investigation.  Each model regresses the control variables of 
total staffing, fire department type, and each of the five 3E services on the individual 
dependent variable indicated.  These models are found in Table 6.2. 
Plan Review 
The first model, Plan Review is seen in Table 6.2.  Of the individual control values 
tested in the model, two demonstrated statistical significance.  Department type (p <.1) and 
existing building inspections (p <.05) are statistically significant.  Coefficient values show 
that of the two, existing building inspections (β = 1.03) has a much greater influence than 
department type (β = .24) on the probability that plan review is cut.  Two other control 
variables, total staffing (p = .20) and public education (p =.20) exhibited residual strength 
and are considered only for direction of influence.  Total staffing’s coefficient is positive (β = 
.11) indicating that this variable increases the likelihood of cuts, whereas public education’s 




Table 6.2: Logistic Regression of Budget Cuts to Individual 3E Prevention Services 
 Plan Review Code Inspections Public Education Fire-Arson Investigations 
Control Variable β (s.e.) р β (s.e.) р β (s.e.) р β (s.e.) р 
Total Staffing .11 .09 .20 .17 .07 .02 .14 .07 .04 .33 .09 .00 
Department Type .24 .13 .06 .35 .11 .00 .14 .09 .12 .12 .13 .35 
Plan Review -.23 .24 .34 -.43 .20 .04 -.36 .19 .06 -.27 .25 .29 
Inspection - New .06 .33 .85 .12 .28 .68 .41 .26 .12 .11 .35 .74 
Inspection - Existing 1.03 .51 .04 .67 .34 .05 -.05 .23 .82 .34 .40 .40 
Public Education -.25 .20 .20 -.30 .19 .11 -.40 .18 .02 -.05 .23 .83 
Fire-Arson Inv. -.02 .17 .92 .25 .15 .10 .06 .13 .65 -.05 .17 .76 
Constant -5.13 1.91 .01 -3.83 1.33 .00 -.12 .97 .90 -3.67 1.58 .02 
Observations  813   813   813   813  
-2 Log Likelihood 712.40  937.74  1044.27   657.80  
Chi-square  21.82   52.28   20.83   22.72  
Degrees of freedom  7   7   7   7  
P-value  .003   .000   .004   .002  
Nagelkerke R2  .05   .09   .04   .05  
Note: Logistic regression results from a convenience sample of survey respondents answering all five 3E service questions and indicated that cuts had been 
made to particular 3E services in FPC Survey question 16 (n = 813).  Budget Cuts to Plan Review, Code Inspections, and Public Education are dichotomous 
dependent variables with values 0 = no cuts, 1 = budget cuts.  The control variables tested are ordinal variables. Total Staffing: 1 = <24, 2 = 25-49, 3 = 50-99, 
4 = 100-250, 5 = 250+. Department Type: 1 = All Volunteer, 2 = Mostly Volunteer, 3 = Mostly Career, 4 = All Career. 3E Services Provided (Plan Review, 
New Construction Inspection, Existing Building Inspection, Public Education, Fire-Arson Investigation): 1 = service is not provided, 2 = service is contracted 




dependent variable Plan Review.  While not shown in the table, Wald statistics and odds ratio 
values indicate a similar pattern of significance for these same variables.   
The values in this first model suggest that if a fire department provides existing 
building inspections, it increases the likelihood of cuts to plan review.  Further, as fire 
department type changes from all-volunteer to all-career the likelihood that plan review will 
face cuts increases.  Drawing on the observations from the previous two chapters, this means 
that larger departments in populous communities are more likely to be making these cuts.  
For a community hard hit by the Great Recession and struggling financially, this will 
increase overall fire risk and service demand.  Total department staffing exerts influence 
towards cuts, while public education tends to offset that influence in favor of decreasing the 
likelihood of cuts.  In total, large all-career fire departments providing existing building 
inspections in their fire prevention service suite are more likely to experience plan review 
cuts. 
 The full model with all predictors included is statistically significant with χ2 = 21.82 
(p = .003, df = 7, n = 813).  Test statistics indicate the model as a whole is a reasonable fit 
and distinguishes between respondents that reported cuts to plan review and those that did 
not.  The model correctly classifies 83% of cases.  Running the model including the control 
variable produced no change in predicted values from the model run without control 
variables (Pallant 2016). 
Code Inspections 
In Table 6.2, the model Code Inspections, finds that with the exception of new 
construction inspections (p = .68), all the others were statistically significant at the various 




staffing (p = .02), plan review (p = .04), existing building inspections (p = .05), and fire-
arson investigation (p = .10) all contribute substantially to the predictive value of the model.  
Public education (p = .11) is borderline.  Coefficient values show that existing building 
inspections (β = .67) most-likely produces the greatest change in the likelihood of Code 
Inspections being cut, followed by the opposite influence of slightly less magnitude with plan 
review (β = -.43).  Despite the seeming contradiction in these values, they actually make 
sense from a practical view.  The dependent variable code inspections includes both new 
construction inspections and existing building inspections.  New construction inspections are 
typically part of a fee-based plan review process and required as part the building permit.  If 
part of the permit process, their influence would be to dampen cuts to inspections, but would 
show up as noise in the model.  Existing building inspections, on the other hand are tax 
supported.  They generate considerable political and donor-class interference, responsibility 
is easily transferred either inter- or intra-agency, and their risk impact is difficult to quantify 
within any given budget cycle.  In a nutshell, existing building inspections are an easy target. 
Other control variables producing change in the likelihood of cuts to Code 
Inspections include department type (β = .35), fire-arson investigation (β = .25), and total 
staffing (β = .17).  Though statistically borderline, public education (β = -.30) probably 
contributes significantly to decreasing the likelihood of cuts.  Wald and odds-ratio values for 
each of the control variables follow the same hierarchy of influence and do not add any 
interpretive value. 
In this model, six of the seven control variables contribute influence to the likelihood 
of cuts to code inspections.  The exception being new construction inspections.  Departments 




to code inspections.  However, department demographics of type and total staffing, as well as 
providing existing building inspections and fire arson investigation increase the odds for 
budget cuts to code inspections.  Looking at this model in total, the values presented seem to 
show that larger, all-career fire departments face greater odds of cuts to code inspections.  
Code inspections is most likely to experience cuts, but it will be focused on existing building 
inspections rather than new construction inspections.  This has serious fire risk management 
implications.  As mentioned earlier, no building survives human occupation intact.  Normal 
wear and tear will degrade passive and active fire protection features.  Existing building 
inspections are intended to counteract this influence.  In dense population environments, fire 
protection systems failures put many more persons at risk in a given location.  Most fire 
department staffing and response allocations are predicated on the single family structure 
(National Fire Protection Association 2009).  Fires in large structures require significantly 
greater emergency response resources to manage.  This quickly strips resources from larger 
geographic regions affecting the ability of a community’s emergency resources to address 
other emergencies. 
The full code inspections model also shows that with all predictors included, it was 
statistically significant, χ2 = 52.28 (p = .000, df = 7, n = 813). The full model is a good fit.  It 
is capable of discerning between departments that made cuts to code inspections and those 
that did not.  The full model correctly classified 70.7% of the cases, but demonstrated 
minimal improvement (.5%) over the model with none of the control variables included.  The 
complete model has a positive predictive value (true positives) of 59%.  Its negative 





In the third model, Public Education, only three of the seven control variables are 
statistically significant.  Total staffing (p <.05), plan review (p <.10), and public education (p 
<.05) significantly contribute to the predictive value of the model.  Department type (p <.10, 
single tail test) and new construction inspection (p <.10, single tail test) are borderline and 
contribute to the direction of the prediction.  Of the three statistically significant control 
variables, coefficients show that public education (β = -.40) has the greatest influence, albeit 
negative.  This seems to indicate that departments providing public education try to avoid 
losing the service.  Public education has been shown to be a low-investment, high-impact fire 
safety approach (McConnell, Dwyer, and Leeming 1996a).  Further, public education 
enhances the visibility and standing of the fire department.  It is an excellent public relations 
tool in addition to its primary intent.  In terms of magnitude, public education is closely 
followed by plan review (β = -.36), then total staffing (β = .14).  Wald and odds ratio values 
trend similarly and do not add any predictive value in this model. 
This model suggests that as department size increases and department type changes 
from all-volunteer to all-career the probability of cuts to public education increases.  In other 
words, the larger a department, and the more it leans toward a career roster, will act to 
increase the likelihood of budget cuts to this service.  However, for departments providing 3E 
services, the odds of cuts to public education decrease if they provide plan review.  It may be 
that two things are happening in response to the downturn.  First, departments are making 
cuts to public education, but they are limited in scope so as to maintain an intact program.  




elements.  P-values are too large to make assumptions regarding the influence of existing 
building inspections and fire-arson investigation.   
The whole public education model is shown to be statistically significant, χ2 = 20.83 
(p = .004, df = 7, n = 813).  The full model presents a reasonable fit with all the predictors 
included and distinguishes between those departments that made cuts to public education and 
those that did not.  The full model correctly classifies 65% of cases.  Running the model with 
all the control variables included produced a one-point improvement in predicting cuts/no 
cuts to public education, from 63.7% to 64.7%.  The model exhibits a 63% positive 
predictive value and a 65% negative predictive value. 
Fire-Arson Investigation 
The final model in Table 6.2, Fire-Arson Investigation, correctly classifies 85.2% of 
the cases and has a commensurate negative predictive value.  It does not demonstrate any 
positive predictive value.  Predicted and observed values did not change between the model 
run without control variables included and the model run with all control variables included.  
When looking at the individual control variables in the model, only total staffing was 
statistically significant (p <.001).  It’s coefficient (β = .33) shows substantial positive change 
in likelihood of cuts to fire-arson investigation with change to the value of department size.  
P-values for the remainder of control variables provide nothing of analytic value.  The full 
model, including all control variables was statistically significant χ2 = 22.72 (p = .002, df = 7, 
n = 813).  The chi-square value indicates that the model as a whole, fits and is able to 
distinguish between departments that made cuts to fire-arson investigation and those that did 
not.  In a nutshell, this model points to total staffing as the sole factor in determining the 




chance of cuts.  This tells me that fire-arson investigation is resistant to budget cuts, perhaps 
because of dual involvement with other agencies and legal requirements.  However, given 
that the only influencing factor is total staffing, when cuts become necessary, they will come 
from personnel. 
Combined Perspective 
Examining each of the service-based model provides insight into how each service 
fares in relation to the others.  It clarifies which variables in a particular service have the 
greatest influences on each of the other services provided throughout the four models.  
Developing the larger picture of cut probabilities among services builds on the primary 
observation from the previous section, that across the board cuts appear to be the dominant 
strategy within departments.  However, as also noted, cuts may be across the 3E services 
provided, but particular services may get cut more than others.  A global review provides 
some evidence of prioritization is evident when taking a look at Table 6.2. 
The first noticeable pattern follows the total staffing control variable.  It is the only 
variable that exhibits any strength across all four dependent variables, though for plan review 
it is in direction only.  The influence is also in a positive direction.  This tells me that total 
staffing will be a constant factor affecting the likelihood of budget cuts.  3E services in larger 
departments are more vulnerable to cuts than those in smaller departments.  This may be a 
function of the budget constraints on the largest communities.  High levels of emergency 
services demand may force difficult choices about cuts to ensure that response capacity is 
maintained, even if it means cutting back other critical functions. 
Department type is influential in changing the probability of cuts across plan review, 




investigation.  Again, the influence in the first three services leans toward increasing the 
likelihood of budget cuts.  As department type changes from all-volunteer to all-career, the 
probability of cuts to these services increases.  The lack of influence on fire-arson 
investigation is probably due to the high number of non-fire-based service providers (e.g. 
local and state police) that are beyond the influence of fire department type or, in many cases, 
is mandated by law and essentially is non-negotiable.  All in all, the pattern tells me that for 
departments providing fire-arson investigation, only department size influences the 
likelihood of cuts. 
With regard to other 3E service-based independent variables, coefficients for plan 
review and public education are negative across all four dependent categories.  However, the 
independent variable plan review is statistically significant only against code inspections and 
public education.  I take this to mean that when a department provides the plan review 
service, that provision exerts pressure decreasing the likelihood of cuts to non-investigative 
3E services.  As a general rule, fees associated with the provision of a government service 
must be applied to only that service or risk being labeled a tax.  However, when one 3E 
service (or more) is fee supported, it takes budget pressure off of other non-supported 3E 
services.  In essence, fees for one service reduces the competition for scarce resource dollars 
among the other services.  Public education applies influence that decreases the likelihood of 
budget cuts across three of the dependent variables.  This may have more to do with how 
tasks are allocated across available personnel rather than direct budget pressure on other 
services.  If high-value tasks are distributed, they may influence the opportunity to identify 




One nuance under the dependent variable code inspections must be mentioned.  As 
indicated before, code inspections includes new construction inspections and existing 
building inspections.  New construction inspections are typically part of the building permit 
process that includes plan review.  They are paid for at time of plan submittal for review.  
Existing building inspections are stand-alone.  If new construction inspections are essentially 
bundled with plan review, then is seems likely that they would not have a significant 
influence one way or the other on the likelihood of cuts to the other 3E services.   
Looking first at the individual dependent variables from a blanket view, it is obvious 
that code inspections are most susceptible to influence in either direction from the control 
variables.  However, the balance tilts in favor of increasing the likelihood of budget cuts.  
Public education also shares predictor variables that point in both directions and appears 
fairly neutral overall.  Plan review responds to existing building inspections and public 
education.  Cuts to fire-arson investigation do not appear to be influenced by any of the other 
service-based control variables.  Looking at the demographic factors, Table 6.2 displays that 
total staffing has the most extensive roll influencing budget cuts to 3E services.  This is 
followed by department type, with the exception of fire-arson investigation.  In a nutshell, I 
read table 6.2 to say that as departments increase in size and change towards all-career, the 
likelihood of cuts to particular 3E service increases.  And, when budget cuts cannot be 
avoided, code inspections will be cut first, followed by public education.  Cuts to plan review 
and fire-arson investigation will come only as a last resort.  With total staffing being most 
predictive of cuts, it seems reasonable that those cuts would focus on personnel.  In the next 
section, I will develop further insight into how personnel cut strategies are implemented by 




Short-term Strategy - Personnel Cuts  
As discussed earlier, the extant literature points to personnel cuts as the most common 
choice of local government managers to address shortfalls (Scorsone and Plerhoples 2010).  
Personnel cuts, when done through furloughs or layoffs can close shortfalls quickly since 
employee compensation makes up the bulk of local government expenditures.  Attrition takes 
longer and is less difficult for organization and employees in that it allows for advance 
planning.  Regardless, the various methods of cutting personnel cuts share long-term 
consequences for organizations.  First is an increased workload for remaining employees, 
decreased overall productivity, and sinking morale (Berne and Stiefel 1993, Olson, Seymour, 
and Weaver 2004).  Perhaps more importantly, personnel cuts frequently lead to the loss of 
the organization’s most talented and resourceful employees (Cayer 1986).  Employees are the 
brain-trust of an organization.  They have the most-extensive knowledge of how service is 
actually delivered and received, as well as customer expectations (Lipsky 2008).  Thus, when 
personnel are cut, the organization is less effective and efficient.  
Based on experiences within the survey work group, three questions were included in 
the FPC regarding personnel cuts.  I use question 17 (Were personnel cut from the FP work 
unit(s)?) as the basis for my query into personnel cuts and to identify my study sample (n = 
812).  This question also serves as a proxy test for short-term strategies.  The binary choice 
of answers provides me with my dichotomous dependent variable, Personnel Cuts.  Question 
17 was recoded according to convention, so that No = 0 and Yes = 1.  My study sample for 
this section includes all respondents who answer this question on the FPC survey.  In 
particular, I am concerned with the probability of personnel cuts at the 3E program level and 




model, titled “3E Index”, regresses total staffing, department type, and 3E index against 
personnel cuts.  The second model, titled “Individual Services”, also regresses total staffing 
and department type, but drops the 3E Index and substitutes the individual services that 
comprise the index.  These two models can be found in Table 6.3, under the heading 
“Personnel Cuts”. 
The first model in Table 6.3, 3E Index, shows that two of the three control variables, 
total staffing (p <.001) and department type (p <.001) are statistically significant.  The third 
control variable, 3E Index, shows moderate strength (p <.1, single tail test).  Positive 
coefficients for the three variables indicate that department type (β = .50) has the greatest 
influence increasing the chance of budget cuts to personnel, followed by total staffing (β = 
.38).  However, the Wald statistics for total staffing (30.09) and department type (23.19) 
show that total staffing is the more important of the two predictor variables (Pallant 2016).  
The variable 3E Index, on the other hand, has a negative coefficient (β = -.44) indicating a 
possible influence decreasing the chance of budget cuts to personnel.  The odds ratios for the 
three variables indicate that department type (OR = 1.7) will also produce the largest 
movement in the chance of personnel cuts, followed by total staffing (OR = 1.5), and 3E 
Index (OR = .65). 
The full model with all predictors included is statistically significant with χ2 = 81.38 
(p = .000, df = 3, n = 812).  Test statistics demonstrate that the model as a whole is a 
reasonable fit.  It differentiates between respondents who reported personnel cuts and those 
that did not.  The model accurately categorizes 70% of observations, with a 61% positive 
predictive value and a 71% negative predictive value.  Running the model with all predictors 




Table 6.3: Logistic Regression of Personnel Cuts and Compensatory Action 
 Personnel Cuts Compensatory Action 
 3E Index Individual Services 3E Index Individual Services 
Control Variable β (s.e.) р β (s.e.) р β (s.e.) р β (s.e.) р 
Total Staffing .38 .07 .00 .38 .07 .00 .01 .06 .92 .01 .06 .94 
Department Type .50 .10 .00 .46 .11 .00 -.03 .08 .69 -.04 .07 .61 
3E Index -.44 .29 .13    .73 .19 .00    
Plan Review    -.48 .21 .02    .06 .15 .70 
Inspection - New     -.12 .28 .66    -.16 .18 .36 
Inspection - Existing     .56 .31 .07    .48 .16 .00 
Public Education    -.58 .21 .01    .17 .17 .30 
Fire-Arson Inv.    .24 .15 .11    .25 .10 .01 
Constant -.197 1.00 .05 -2.00 1.23 .10 -3.38 .62 .00 -3.66 .78 .00 
Observations  812   812   1148   1148  
-2 Log Likelihood 954.16  935.74  935.74  1421.77  
Chi-square  81.38   99.74   21.48   30.65  
Degrees of freedom  3   7   3   7  
P-value  .000   .000   .000   .000  
Nagelkerke R2  .13   .16   .03   .04  
Notes: Logistic regression results from a convenience sample of survey respondents answering all five 3E service questions and indicated that personnel cuts 
had been made in FPC Survey question 17 (n = 812) in the first two models.  Personnel Cuts to total 3E Index and Individual Services are dichotomous 
dependent variables with values 0 = no cuts, 1 = budget cuts.  In the second two models, Compensatory Action, the dichotomous dependent variables are 3E 
Index and Individual Services with values of 0 = no compensatory action taken, 1 = compensatory action taken.  The control variables tested are ordinal 
variables. Total Staffing: 1 = <24, 2 = 25-49, 3 = 50-99, 4 = 100-250, 5 = 250+. Department Type: 1 = All Volunteer, 2 = Mostly Volunteer, 3 = Mostly 
Career, 4 = All Career. 3E Services Provided (Plan Review, New Construction Inspection, Existing Building Inspection, Public Education, Fire-Arson 





This data suggests to me that as fire department type changes from all-volunteer to all-
career and as departments increase in size, the likelihood of cuts to personnel in fire prevention 
increases.  However, higher 3E index values exert influence decreasing that likelihood.  More 
robust fire prevention programs are more resistant to personnel cuts.  One way of looking at this 
is that in large, established departments in large communities, program responsibilities have been 
sorted out and are well-entrenched.  Resource scarcity is shared among all departments.  Efforts 
to realign service provision will likely be met with resistance, particularly if realignment does 
not fit neatly with perceived missions and it means more responsibility without commensurate 
funding.  If more comprehensive fire prevention programs demonstrate some resistance to 
personnel cuts, then it seems reasonable to examine which services within a program are more 
vulnerable to cuts.  I investigate this potential effect in the second model in Table 6.3 under the 
“Personnel Cuts” heading, in which I control for the individual 3E service categories. 
In this second model of Table 6.3, Individual Services, two things are immediately 
apparent looking at the second model in Figure 6.3.  First is that the values for significance (p 
<.001) and the coefficients (β = .38) for total staffing did not change between the first and second 
models.  For department type, significance (p <.001) remained unchanged.  However, the 
coefficient for department type (β = .46) lost .04 of value in this second model, indicating it 
produces a slightly smaller effect on the probability of personnel cuts when including the 
individual 3E services in the model.  Here again, the Wald statistic for total staffing (28.08) and 
department type (18.09) indicate that total staffing is the more important predictor variable, even 
though it does not produce as great a reaction.  Test statistics indicate that the full model is a 
good fit (χ2 = 99.74, p <.001, df = 7, n = 812) and differentiates between cases reporting cuts to 




approximately 71% of cases, which is a 4.5% improvement over the model run without 
explanatory variables.  This model has a positive predictive value of 63% and a negative 
predictive value of 72%. 
The second pattern that stands out in this second model is the opposing influences seen in 
the test statistics for the individual 3E services.  Public education is statistically significant (p 
<.01) and with a negative coefficient (β = -.58) exhibits significant influence decreasing the 
likelihood of personnel cuts.  Plan review follows with statistical significance (p <.05).  It also 
has a negative coefficient (β = -.48) and displays significant influence decreasing the probability 
of personnel cuts.  Existing building inspections, on the other hand, are statistically significant (p 
<.10) and with a positive coefficient (β = .56) indicates it strongly influences increasing odds of 
personnel cuts.  Fire-arson investigation is also statistically significant (p <.10, single tail test).  It 
also has a positive coefficient (β = .24) showing moderate influence increasing the odds of 
personnel cuts.  Statistics for new construction inspections provide no useful information. 
Of the individual 3E services, Wald statistics show that public education (7.62) is the 
most important of these five variables influencing personnel cuts, followed by plan review 
(5.43).  Importantly, both of these variables decrease the likelihood of personnel cuts.  Existing 
building inspections (3.18) and fire-arson investigation (2.49) increase the likelihood of 
personnel cuts.  However, of the five individual services, existing building inspections (OR = 
1.74) influence the greatest movement in the chance of personnel cuts, above both total staffing 
(OR = 1.46) and department type (OR = 1.58). 
Comparing both personnel cuts models finds that total staffing is the more important of 
the two demographic variables, though it does not produce the same level of effect as department 




probably limited to plan review and public education.  Existing building inspections show 
considerable vulnerability to personnel cuts and fire-arson investigation shows moderate 
vulnerability.  In other words, the larger a department is, the more likely it is to experience 
personnel cuts.  However, within the larger total staffing categories, greater percentages of career 
personnel further increase the probability of personnel cuts.  If and when personnel cuts are 
made, they will probably come out of the existing building inspections service followed by fire-
arson investigations. 
While these two models plainly illustrate which variables have the greatest influence on 
the likelihood of personnel cuts, they do not fully answer the question of short-term or long-term 
strategic approach.  A more detailed crosstabs review finds that fire departments and other 
providers likely followed the short-term strategy path.  Of the study sample for this inquiry (n = 
812), 33.5% (n = 272) made personnel cuts.  At first glance, this would seem to indicate that 
most 3E service providers took a longer-term approach.  However, when compared to 
respondents also indicating budget cuts in FPC survey question 12 (n = 401), data reveals that 
65% (n = 260) of respondents indicated cuts were made and they included cuts to personnel.   
Further, a crosstab comparing 3E service budget cuts against personnel cuts finds that cutting 
personnel occurs more often than not at every level except <5% cuts.  When comparing 
department level cuts to loss of personnel in fire prevention, data shows that cutting personnel 
occurs more often than not at every level beginning at <2.5%.   
This paints a different picture.  The likelihood is that departments will look to personnel 
cuts first.  Personnel cuts provide an easy fix as Scorsone and Plerhoples (2010) note.  However, 
for many fire prevention units, there are not many personnel to cut.  From chapter 4, this study 




towards the lower numbers.  This does not make for a very deep savings well.  Consider also that 
tasks are distributed among these personnel with the possible exception of plan review.  From a 
practical standpoint, plan reviewers are retained because they are tied to a revenue stream.  
Personnel cuts come from the remaining personnel.  The number of tasks that can physically be 
accomplished are scaled back.  Emphasis is placed in new construction inspections as part of the 
plan review process and public education because of it effect and image potency.  This leaves 
existing building inspections to bear the brunt of cuts. 
Despite the importance of employees in delivering 3E services, the personnel cuts models 
in the preceding paragraphs demonstrate that they are vulnerable to cuts, following trends found 
in the literature.  Personnel cuts create budget saving quickly, even at the sacrifice of service 
quality and capacity.  Employees represent the collective experience of a department.  When 
those positions are cut, that experience is lost.  If the 3E service is transferred to another part of 
the department or another agency and the particular service curtailed, it will take years to recover 
that expertise and associated capacity (Berne and Stiefel 1993, Lipsky 2008, Pandey 2010).  
Stipak and O'Toole (1993) note four basic reactions to fiscal stress, of which only one involves 
cutting services.  The other three focus on longer term strategies that maintain or improve 
capacity.  The authors also found in their study of public sector managers that productivity 
improvement was ranked as important as reducing services and raising revenue during times of 
fiscal stress.  Accordingly, I briefly explore whether departments took any actions that fall under 
longer term strategies. 
Long-term Strategy – Compensatory Actions 
 Longer-term strategies are based upon attempts to increase capacity, improve 




anticipated that some departments would take this longer strategic view, and implement some 
form of compensatory action to make up for substantial budget and personnel cuts, as well as 
program effectiveness.  The FPC survey included two questions regarding compensatory actions.  
The first, question 25 (Did your department take any compensatory action?) invited only a yes or 
no answer and I use this to operationalize this as my dichotomous dependent variable.  My 
sample is drawn from all respondents who provided an answer to this question in the FPC 
survey.  I recoded the variable according to convention and retitle it Compensatory Action.  
As in the last section on personnel cuts, I ran two logit models for compensatory action.  
Again, these serve as proxy measures, but for longer-term strategies.  Looking at both of the 
compensatory models shows that neither total staffing or department types exhibits any influence 
on the likelihood of taking some form of compensatory action to make up for services losses.  
This tells me that department characteristics are not determinants such behavior.  The critical 
determinant for increasing the likelihood of a department taking compensatory action are the 
provision scheme of its existing fire prevention program.  These are reflected in the 3E index 
scores for departments.  The higher the score, the more the services are provided and 
concentrated under the local fire department.  Two separate comparisons of department level 
budget cuts and 3E service cuts with compensatory action shows that across all categories of 
cuts, departments took some form of compensatory action at an overall rate approaching 50%. 
The two models are found in Table 6.3, in the third and fourth columns.  The third model 
regresses the demographic characteristics, as well as 3E index on the dependent variable.  It 
shows that of the three control variables, only 3E index is statistically significant (p <.001) and 
has a positive coefficient (β = .73) indicating that higher 3E index scores positively influence the 




communities with robust, full-spectrum 3E service programs will try to preserve the 
effectiveness of these programs, even in the face of fiscal stressors.  Compensatory actions show 
that these departments are implementing long-term strategies that include improving efficiency 
and productivity, such as consolidating services and intra-agency transfer of service 
responsibility.  3E program goals and objectives are important to local fire department decision-
makers as a part of their community fire protection activities. 
The third model as a whole is statistically significant (χ2 = 21.48, p <.001, df = 3, n 
=1148) and is a reasonable fit.  It distinguished between those respondents who indicated 
compensatory action and those that did not.  The statistics associated with the total staffing and 
department type are inconsequential regarding influence on increasing or decreasing the 
likelihood that compensatory action was taken. 
In the fourth model I regress the department demographic variables of size and type 
against the dependent variable compensatory action.  I disaggregate the 3E index and include 
each of the individual 3E services as control variables to identify under what provision schemes 
compensatory action is most likely to be taken.  Only two of the seven control variables, existing 
building inspections (p <.005) and fire-arson investigation (p <.05), were statistically significant.  
Both have positive coefficients with existing building inspections (β = .48) showing greater 
influence than fire-arson investigation (β = .25).   
Existing building inspections and fire-arson investigation show an increased likelihood of 
compensatory action.  This tells me that these two services were likely targeted due to their ease 
of making service delivery changes.  Responsibility for basic level existing building inspections 
is easily transferred to emergency response units.  In fact, many departments assign this 




technically detailed inspections to a few specialists.  The same can be said for fire-arson 
investigation with the referral factor being the potential that a crime is involved. 
Statistics shown in this fourth model indicate that none of the other five control variables 
contribute to its predictive value.  Other 3E services may not be as easily amenable to long-term 
solutions.  Further, if delivery of 3E services is already distributed within the fire department, 
such as public education, or among other providers, such as contracted plan review, the 
opportunities for long-term solutions may not be available.  This fourth model in Table 6.3 also 
proves to be statistically significant (χ2 = 30.65, p <.001, df = 7, n = 1148) as a whole and a 
reasonable fit.  It correctly identifies cases according to those who reported compensatory actions 
were taken and those that did not.   
Chapter conclusions 
In this chapter, I examined the third research question: How did departments with 
different provision schemes strategically approach cuts to 3E services?  This question suggests 
that strategic cutback decisions are not made in a vacuum.  Public managers must weigh trade-
offs between community benefits, which services to cut, and organizational continuity.  In large 
part, these strategic decisions hinge on both internal and external factors that affect the operating 
environment.  Whether found in articles of incorporation or statutory responsibilities, department 
mission statements typically define the services to be provided.  However, community conditions 
also drive the unique mix of services provided to the public.  Certain conditions affect this 
platform, including the political, physical, and demographic environments.   
Cuts to fire prevention services clearly affect community safety, but these cuts also affect 




third research question thus looks at some fundamental strategic choices and provides some 
leverage about how departments prioritize their fire prevention services. 
Drawing on the literature, I focused my research in three specific areas.  First, I examined 
the department-level baseline strategic choice of across the board versus targeted cuts.  (Scorsone 
and Plerhoples 2010) observe that local government will first try across the board cuts.  If the 
downturn is prolonged or severe, they will then turn to targeted cuts.  This examination also 
provided relative information on the severity of the downturn and priority of fire prevention 
against emergency response.  Next, I considered whether the department-level approach carried 
through to the fire prevention delivery level and how individual services were affected.  At the 
point of actually cutting services, managers must consider citizen service expectations, political 
responsiveness, as well as tradeoffs between effectiveness, efficiency, and equity (Honadle 1984, 
West and Davis 1988).  These value judgements are reflected in the choices on service cuts and 
the rank order of priorities among the 3E services.  Finally, I conducted a brief look at whether 
short-term versus longer-term strategies were employed in making cuts.  These elements are 
reflected in the use of personnel cuts and compensatory actions.  While personnel cuts generate 
quick budget savings, they have long-term quantity and quality of service consequences for a 
department.  Personnel cuts are usually indicative of short-term budget balancing strategies.  
Alternatively, compensatory actions, such as productivity improvements, aimed at preserving 
services suggest longer-term strategies. 
Findings 
The first analysis in this chapter examined whether cuts were targeted or across the 
board.  Table 6.1 provides a foundation that indicates a majority of departments opted for the 




between department budget cuts levels and 3E service cut levels.  Finally, when also considering 
the response on FPC survey question 20, that roughly three-quarters of respondents (n = 263) 
indicated other department work units experienced cuts, it is clear that the preferred action was to 
make cuts across the board.  This has the effect of preserving some service capacity and still 
focusing on the community’s fire problem from preventive standpoint.  However, it is also clear 
that a substantial minority of departments will opt for targeted cuts for reasons that are not 
disclosed in the FPC survey. 
In the second analysis, I considered whether the preferred across the board approach 
continued into the individual 3E services and, was there any evidence of prioritization among the 
3E services.  A pattern of priorities emerges from Table 6.2.  When budget cuts are necessary to 
deal with an economic downturn, total department staffing is the greatest predictor of cuts, 
followed by fire department type.  From that point, the individual services exert their own 
influence, which varies both in magnitude and direction.  The pattern also demonstrates that code 
inspections face the greatest probability of cuts and within that that broader category, existing 
building inspections are likely sacrificed first.  Public education follows with a somewhat lower 
risk of cuts.  Plan review appears moderately resistant to cuts influenced by the other 3E 
services, but not to cuts driven by department demographic factors. The chance of fire-arson 
investigation cuts seems only influenced by department size, though this has overlap into 
department type.   
In the third part of my analysis, I examined whether cut decisions were made with an eye 
towards short-term or longer-term remedies.  My analysis of both approaches is seen in the four 
models in Table 6.3.  The first two models look at personnel cuts and demonstrate that both total 




The larger a department, the greater the odds of personnel cuts to personnel.  The same applies 
for department type.  More career personnel in the department increases the odds that cuts will 
come from personnel.  The local government budget crisis was made worse by the Great 
Depression.  It hit all sizes of communities, but not all communities were hit equally hard.  Data 
implies that for those that experienced difficulty, the situation was worse the larger the 
community and fire department, and for those protected by career-oriented departments.  
Compounding this plight, the more 3E services provided, the greater the likelihood of facing 
budget cuts.  The second model indicates that when cuts are made, personnel likely will be cut 
from existing building inspections service.  This action increases fire risk in the community by 
reducing service capacity and effectiveness in those communities hardest hit.  All told, I take this 
mean that larger departments in financially struggling communities will favor short-term budget 
balancing approaches.  The effect of budget balancing within a single budget cycle is detrimental 
to providing effective service. 
However, the first two models show that departments with more developed fire 
prevention programs, as measured by the 3E index, appear to look at some longer-term 
strategies.  This leads to the third and fourth models in Table 6.3 which evaluate whether 
departments were likely to take steps to make up for the loss of personnel and service capacity, 
indicative of longer-term compensatory strategies.  The first thing apparent is the total lack of 
influence by total staffing and department type.  This indicates this is not strictly a result of 
budgetary difficulties.  More likely, this involves management approaches that takes in strategies 
of efficiency improvements (Stipak and O'Toole 1993), not just cuts.  In the third model, higher 
3E index values increase the likelihood that compensatory is taken.  The fourth model shows that 




longer term compensatory actions.  This tells me that department management will entertain 
longer-term views when the services are more conducive to compensatory actions.   
Overall, my analysis suggests that departments will approach retrenchment through 
across the board cuts.  While across the board cuts may be the apparent norm, cuts to 3E services 
may still be prioritized within that broader approach.  These actions are consistent with short-
term budget balancing approaches that address shortfalls within an annual budget cycle, but do 
not address longer-term solutions.  Within the mix of across the board and targeted cuts, the 
single most important variable affecting the probability of budget cuts is department size.   While 
the evidence implies that departments will favor short-term strategies, there is evidence that 
some departments with more concentrated 3E programs will take steps to lessen the impact of 
cutbacks. 
Discussion 
This chapter set out to determine what strategies were used by the various organizations 
delivering 3E fire prevention services.  I found that departments typically relied on across the 
board cuts even when department level cuts were extreme (>15%).  Across the board cuts are 
indicative of an incrementalist approach to maintain a service even though it may be resourced 
below an effective level.  Incrementalism provides for policy stability but does reinforce 
suboptimal behavior. 
Service prioritization seemed more pronounced within the 3E services provided by 
departments.  Analysis also showed that departments will employ compensating actions to make 
up for lost capacity, though the data does not reveal the extent of such actions.  The data 
indicates that such compensatory actions occurred regularly, with roughly half of departments 




some long-term efforts to improve productivity, but also imply smoothing strategies that reduce 
the impact of cuts. 
Consistent with (Scorsone and Plerhoples 2010), it appears that most departments made 
across the board cuts during the Great Recession as did most local governments.  However, there 
are more than a few departments that obviously made targeted cuts.  At the extreme, two 
departments reported greater than 25% cuts to 3E services while cuts to the department budget 
cut was less than 2.5%.  This level of disparity in some of the targeted cuts invites brief 
discussion.  Targeted cuts should not be construed to mean that fire prevention is not viewed as 
important.  It could reflect a department level resisting strategy by cutting an important program 
that forces elected officials to make the difficult choices between programs.  Alternatively, it 
could simply be a management decision reflecting the priorities of elected and appointed 
officials that places the emphasis on emergency response.  This would be consistent with rapid 
growth.   
For example, in Montgomery County (MD), the fire and rescue service opened four new 
stations in response to population growth during years that overlapped the Great Recession.  To 
make up the necessary personnel complement for these stations, 33 uniformed fire inspectors and 
supervisors were pulled from code enforcement and reassigned to operations.  Responsibility for 
all 3E services except fire-arson investigation and public education aimed at seniors was 
transferred to the building department.  Political leaders had been contemplating this move for 
several years due to the expense of uniformed firefighters compared to non-uniformed civilian 
employees.  As indicated in earlier chapters, most 3E services are concentrated under the fire 





Furthermore, the FPC survey did not delve into community economic conditions.  The 
fact that a number of departments made targeted cuts may be the result of the unequal economic 
impact of the Great Recession.  More than likely, these departments were located in larger, more 
populous communities.  Work force characteristics and job market structure largely dictated 
which local areas experienced the sharpest declines (Thiede and Monnat 2016).   
Emergency service demand or call load is a function of population served.  Growing 
communities experience growing call loads.  At the opposite end of the spectrum, declining 
communities with increasing rates of poverty and aging building stock also face increasing call 
loads (Tri-Data Corporation 1997).  Prior to the Great Recession, housing booms in smaller 
communities increased service demand as population grew astronomically.  Demand for service 
strained existing fire department resources.  When cuts hit due to the sudden collapse of local 
government revenue streams, department efforts to maintain emergency response capacity may 
have forced them to forgo the chance to reduce unnecessary service demand.   
Increased call load has a corroding affect in the ability to maintain service effectiveness 
and efficiency.  There is a finite limit to the number of calls for service that a fire department can 
manage within established parameters for effective service.  Beyond that point, response times 
and effectiveness deteriorate rapidly.  Costs for excess calls for service is borne by the 
community at large in a classic case of Hardin’s Tragedy.   
While most departments indicated that cuts were made across the board, it does not say, 
that cuts were necessarily equal across the board.  Two particular 3E services have the potential 
to drastically reduce the growth curve of service demand.  These are existing building 
inspections and public education.  Unfortunately, data indicates that of these two services, 




the data that cutting personnel from existing building inspections is a prevailing strategic choice 
for making up budget shortfalls. 
As previously observed, cutting personnel is a short-term budget reconciliation approach 
to managing shortfalls.  It does not address any long-term solutions that reduce demand on the 
fire department.  For example, false alarms have been identified as a major source of response 
over-utilization with 45 false alarms for every 10 structure fires.  Thirty-two percent of these are 
due to system malfunctions (Fire Analysis and Research Division 2011).  One of the 
responsibilities under existing building inspections is to check for maintenance of fire alarm 
systems.  Other systems include smoke control, stairwell pressurization, and sprinklers.  Cutting 
of personnel from existing building inspections degrades the opportunity to prevent unnecessary 
responses from fire prevention systems neglect.  Further, failure of fire control systems 
dramatically increases the risk to occupants and emergency response forces, while also 
increasing the demand for additional forces to control fire events.   
However, in today’s political environment, cuts to personnel has a good deal of political 
appeal.  Personnel cutbacks receive extensive media coverage.  From a public perspective, 
politicians can argue that something visible has been done, even if the result is counter-
productive (Greenhalgh and McKersie 1980).  What may have been a technical problem, is now 
subject to political judgement and political values. 
From an emergency response standpoint, failure to fully engage all of the 3E services 
places emergency responders and the general public at greater risk.  The mantra in today’s 
construction industry is value-construction.  In other words, lightweight construction engineered 
to meet minimum design criteria and heavily dependent on active fire protection systems rather 




buildings burn and fail rapidly (Kerber 2012).  Emergency response forces have a very limited 
opportunity to effectively intervene with positive results. 
From the 3E fire prevention standpoint, fire departments and like agencies must explore 
alternative methods of effective service delivery.  First, it is not necessary that fire departments 
deliver all five 3E services.  Economic realities point elsewhere.  Plan review and new 
construction inspections can possibly be passed off to a building department or similar agency, 
or even contracted out with uncertain implications for citizen and firefighter safety.  There are 
other means to hold developers and builders accountable, such as licensing.  Existing building 
inspections, those that occur once a building is occupied are more critical.  No building ever 
remains static after occupancy.  This is the period of greatest risk. 
One alternative would be to shift the responsibility for existing building inspections to 
emergency response units.  This is already practiced in many departments.  These inspections are 
often high-level and focused on easily identified or frequent problems.  Potential problems 
requiring more technical corrections are referred to specialists either internal or external to the 
fire department.  Furthermore, firefighters are already in many commercial buildings as part of 
familiarization and pre-planning functions.  Including inspection responsibility is simply an 
efficiency exercise.  Public education should also be practiced from emergency response units.  
Research has shown prevention messages received from uniformed firefighters are given more 
credence and retained longer (Ta et al. 2006).  Finally, fire-arson investigation can be 
accomplished by emergency personnel, as well.  While arson investigations receive the press, 
origin and cause investigations are much more critical to identifying trends and conditions that 




Departments must be open to changing their structural paradigm.  They will need to 
develop strategies that improve flexibility and transition between modes of emphasis.  Growing 
communities face different demands than stable or declining communities.  At different times, 
different prevention approaches will be necessary.  The U.S. fire service culture must change 
from an inward facing organization that focuses on emergency response proficiency to an 






CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The Problem 
The basis for this study began with the Great Recession and the affects it was 
having on fire prevention providers across the United States.  Exchanges in electronic 
chatrooms, and commentary in industry magazines, provided anecdotal evidence to 
suggest that fire prevention programs frequently were targeted first when budget 
shortfalls had to be closed.  Fire prevention is a critical part of a community’s strategic 
approach to reduce fire risk and the demand for emergency services.  3E services 
associated with fire prevention help serve two primary functions: 1) educate and change 
people’s behavior so that they routinely practice fire safe behavior and 2) shift the cost of 
maintaining a fire safe environment onto the owner/occupants of buildings from the 
community at large.  It also has the added benefit of being the most efficient means of 
reducing fire loss in a community. 
Reducing service demand is critical to these communities because fire 
departments have limited service capacity.  They span the boundary between public 
goods and common pool goods.  Below its capacity threshold, the fire department is a 
public good.  Cross that threshold and the fire department becomes a common pool 




community resulting in longer response times, increased risk, poorer incident outcomes, and 
generally decreased levels of public safety.  Increasing response capacity only reacts to 
immediate demand and does little to reduce the collective fire problem.  A community’s 
population is the primary driver of service demand, which, in turn, drives the size of the fire 
department.  Furthermore, the scope of the fire department’s mission has broadened in 
response to community demand which adds additional pressure.   
Fire departments, whether all-volunteer, all-career, or somewhere-between, provide 
an expected government service and ensure public safety.  Whether funded directly through 
tax dollars or through donations or some mixture thereof, economic downturns effect fire 
departments the same as other government services.  Providing a fire department is an 
expensive community proposition regardless of department type, but especially so for those 
departments that rely to any extent on career personnel to meet service demand. 
Economic difficulties are not new for local governments.  Since the 1970s, local 
governments have repeatedly faced tighter budgets for a myriad of reasons.  In parallel, local 
governments have likewise faced increasing service demand from their communities.  The 
fire department has not escaped this dual-fold challenge.  Following the Great Recession, 
constrained resources have become the new normal for all local government departments and 
services.  Despite an external issue of environmental atrophy which would normally lead to 
organizational decay, fire departments are in no danger of problem depletion (Levine 1978).   
The issue becomes one of applying strategies to meet service demand in a diminished service 
environment. 
External expectations and organizational culture influence the opportunities available 




problem is that the most cost-effective option to increase investment in prevention and 
reduce service demand is not the most workable option.  Environmental pressures, such as 
political expediency and budget cycles, as well as internal culture and the need to maintain 
organizational viability generally force decision makers to emphasize short-term strategies 
that favor response capabilities, while limiting long-term strategies that would decrease 
service demand.  These pressures trap communities into suboptimal policy patterns in the 
face of diminishing resources. 
In this study, I look at how 3E fire prevention service provision was affected by the 
Great Recession and the extended recovery.  While this study uses the Great Recession as a 
backdrop, budgetary pressures from economic downturns and other factors (e.g. California’s 
Proposition 13) are a fact of life and occur with regularity.  Understanding the reaction of fire 
prevention providers to economic downturns will help inform policy-makers of the 
implications of funding priorities. 
Research Questions 
If the purpose of this study is to understand how 3E fire prevention service providers 
react to budgetary contractions, it is first necessary to identify how providers deliver those 
services.  There is no optimum mix of services prescribed for all communities.  Each 
community presents a different set of factors that affect the collective fire problem in that 
community.  Communities consequently configure 3E service delivery relative to those 
factors, including service demand, historical precedent, political desires, legal requirements, 
and size and type of fire department. 
Therefore, the necessary first step in my analysis was to develop a common tool for 




delivery strategies.  Such a tool must take into consideration factors that were expected to 
influence how fire prevention services are provided.  These factors included community size, 
department size, and department type.  This leads to the first research question, which 
involved both developing and applying a comparison tool: 
1.  How are 3E fire prevention services provided across different communities? 
Answers to the first question established a baseline for comparison.  It follows that 
the next step would be to determine how the Great Recession effected the various schemes 
identified in the first question.  My analysis was predicated on whether a department made 
cuts to fire prevention.  If so, analysis would also indicate which 3E service provision 
schemes were mostly likely affected by cuts and which individual 3E were likely affected.  
Further, given the uneven impact of the Great Recession, it was important to understand how 
the community size, department size, and department type features influenced the likelihood 
of budget cuts to these services.  The second research question therefore asks: 
2.  Which department provision schemes were affected by the Great Recession 
cutbacks? 
 
Finally, with my second in hand it seemed that the next reasonable query should look 
at the strategies used to implement cutbacks.  Most research on local government cutback 
management is limited to macro-level reactions and strategies.  The extant research focuses 
on how government adjusts across the breadth of its services.  Accordingly, the third research 
question investigates: 
3.  How did departments with different provision schemes strategically approach cuts 






Results and Conclusions 
The answers to these three queries stem from an empirical analysis of a convenience 
sample of fire professionals.  The Vision 20/20 survey took place in the wake of the Great 
Recession and offers us new perspectives on fire prevention efforts in the midst of significant 
economic constraints. 
How Are 3E Services Provided Across Different Communities? 
Question one essentially consisted of two parts.  First, a common method of 
comparison was developed, which has been described as an essential first step before more 
rigorous study can take place.  In the second part of the question, the means of comparison 
was then applied to the range of communities in the FPC survey. 
Literature on fire department performance measures and public budgeting guided 
development of the common evaluation method, the 3E Index.  Scholars have observed that 
any service that contributes to the fire department’s mission should be included in an 
evaluation, in this particular case fire prevention, and the closer to the fire department having 
budget authority over the program likely reflects the importance of that service (Schaenman 
and Swartz 1974, Rubin 2010).   
Development of the 3E Index was simple and straight-forward.  The first five 
questions in the FPC survey asked who delivered a particular 3E service.  Response options 
were ranked from one (not provided) through four (provided by the local fire department).  
This furnished a 3E score for each service.  The 3E Index scores were then constructed by 
combining and averaging each of the individual service scores.  The resulting 3E Index 
method consists of an ordinal scale that was applied to each observation 




services are provided and more dispersed among providers, if provided at all.  Higher index 
scores indicate more services are provided and that they are consolidated under the fire 
department.   
When the 3E Index was compared across communities, three fundamental 
observations were made.  First, more than half of all respondent communities receive all five 
3E services through their local fire department.  Second, larger community and department 
sizes are generally associated with higher 3E Index scores.  Third, higher index scores are 
generally associated with reliance upon career staffing.  These trends show that more 3E 
services are added and consolidated under the local fire department as career personnel are 
added.  Clearly, all three demographic characteristics influence the provision of 3E services. 
However, these associations do not follow straight lines.  Rather, there are distinct 
transition points between categories for both population and department size.  A transition 
point is also seen in department types between mostly-volunteer and mostly-career.  It strikes 
me that these transition points represent two developments.  From one perspective, these 
transition points speak to fire departments transitioning from public good to common pool 
good.  Generally, it is at this point that fire departments begin to struggle with matching 
service capacity with service demand.  The second development is the presence of sufficient 
career personnel to provide the resource capacity needed to begin delivery of 3E services and 
help move the department from a predominantly reactive stance to a more proactive stance.  
At these transition points, fire prevention services become increasingly important to meeting 
and controlling service demand. 
When looking at the individual 3E services, it becomes evident that public education 




and type, public education is provided by the local fire department.  Another tendency in the 
provision of services is the remarkably consistent order of priority as fire departments add 
new 3E tasks.  Again, across all three demographic dimensions, existing building inspections 
is picked up first, then new construction inspections followed by plan review.  Fire-arson 
investigation is generally last.  This demonstrates the presence of other providers, mainly in 
plan review and investigations.  Certainly, even small communities have a building authority 
and law enforcement.  Plan review and fire-arson investigation responsibility likely evolves 
with these organizations as the fire department transitions to include career personnel.  
However, viewed from a risk management perspective, this prioritization makes sense.  As 
previously discussed, occupied buildings present a much greater risk than unoccupied 
buildings.  Further, that risk increases the longer the building remains occupied.  Accepting 
that the fire department has responsibility for mitigating any fire events, inspections of 
existing buildings plainly contribute to mission. 
As more career personnel are added to a local fire department, the fire prevention 
scheme also encompasses service delivery through dedicated units.  The staffing of these 
units is generally small except in departments above 250 personnel.  Data shows that units 
are mostly staffed with between one and ten personnel.  It may be that in many smaller 
volunteer-oriented departments, personnel are brought on board specifically to provide fire 
prevention services and limited operational duties, such as driving apparatus.  Further, in 
small career-oriented departments, one or two-person fire prevention offices are not unusual, 




Which 3E Service Provision Schemes Were Affected by the Great Recession? 
My analysis of the second question addressed identified which 3E provision schemes 
suffered budget cuts after the Great Recession.  The first part of that analysis looked at trends 
in those departments that were making cuts.  Data revealed that budget cuts were associated 
with increasing community size and department size, as well as department type.  In other 
words, the greatest proportions of budget cuts occurred in all-career fire departments 
protecting our largest communities.  There are some economies of scale in providing 3E 
services in larger population centers, particularly as part of a unified fire protection effort 
including emergency response.  Increased concentration means more people and buildings 
can be reached with less effort.  Conversely, when 3E services are cutback, larger segments 
of the population face increased risk. 
The link between the trends in the characteristics of size and type of department is the 
proportion of career personnel.  Survey data shows that the greater the proportion of career 
personnel, the greater the percentage of departments making cuts to fire prevention.  Not only 
does the predominance of career personnel relate to the proportion of departments making 
budget cuts, but it is inversely related to the mix of service provision.  Smaller departments 
and those that trend toward volunteer orientation, show a much greater mix of service 
providers and a clear inclination not to provide some services.  The addition of career 
personnel leads to the expansion of the types of fire prevention service offered and 
consolidation of those services within the fire department.  From a cutback budget 





Where actual service delivery schemes are concerned, my analysis found that 
individual 3E services were not similarly affected by cutbacks.  Plan review shows some 
resistance to cuts, as does public education.  In fact, a logit model reveals a statistically 
significant and negative relationship with the presence of budget cuts for both.  Results 
associated with new construction inspections and existing building inspections were 
inconclusive, though there is some evidence that new construction inspections fare better 
when provided by entities other than the local fire department.  This follows from new 
construction inspections being part of the new construction permit process.  Results for fire-
arson investigation are marginal in favor of increasing the likelihood of cuts. 
In the cutback environment, services that do not have a strong constituency (i.e., 
internal to the organization or external to it) are sacrificed first.  A logit analysis shows that 
the 3E Index score has an overall negative effect on the chance of budget cuts to fire 
prevention activities.  Plan review and public education both demonstrate a negative and 
statistically significant relationship with the likelihood of budget cuts.  In other words, 
services that are normally associated with a revenue stream and those that are low-cost, non-
controversial, and image enhancing face less of a chance of experiencing cuts.  Plan revue is 
normally associated with a revenue stream and probably has strong internal advocates.  
Public education is viewed favorably by the community.  Whereas, existing building 
inspections generate pushback from powerful community constituencies. 
How Did Departments with Different 3E Provision Schemes Strategically Approach Cuts? 
Answering this third research question delved into the basic underlying strategies 
used by departments to make cuts to 3E services.  Such strategies can take on dimensions of 




Consistent with research from the previous questions, the greatest predictor of budget cuts to 
fire prevention was total department staffing followed by department type. 
Examination of the data revealed that the most common approach was to make across 
the board cuts that extended beyond fire prevention.  This is consistent with other research 
showing that local government departments generally use this cut everything approach first 
and will resort to targeted cuts only when the retrenchment environment is deep or 
prolonged.  In this FPC Survey, three quarters of the respondents to question 20 (i.e., Did any 
other work units in the department experience cuts?) answered yes.  However, this does not 
automatically mean that emergency response shared in the cuts made to fire prevention.  
Depending on department size, cuts may have included administration, communications and 
training sections.  Regardless, it shows that budget cuts were spread around for most 
departments.   
The data also revealed that that some departments made very targeted cuts to fire 
prevention.  A quarter of those respondents to question 20 indicated that 3E services were in 
fact targeted.  This observation invites consideration of how the Great Recession impacted 
different communities.  Economic impact varied across the country.  Communities in rust-
belt states were hit particularly hard where communities were dependent on manufacturing 
industries.  Accordingly, targeted cuts could have roots in several explanations: 1) a 
department that has already made cuts to emergency response, 2) consolidation of 3E 
services within the fire department, 3) outsourcing of 3E services beyond the fire department, 
or 4) particularly deep cuts.   
While across the board may have been the norm at the program level, this does not 




service preferences within fire prevention programs.  Existing building inspections service is 
clearly sacrificed first, which stands at odds with results showing that this service is the first 
service added as departments increase in size.  Perhaps this is the result of the relative ease of 
moving the inspection task function to emergency response units.  Career-oriented fire 
departments already practice building familiarization at the company level.  Requisite 
training could be delivered during normal duty times and the additional time commitment is 
marginal.  Reassignment may be the approach of choice for a department desiring to 
maintain service provision.  This action would show up as a cut to fire prevention if the 
service was transferred from a dedicated unit.  In fact, those respondents indicating that cuts 
had been made to fire prevention also had a dedicated fire prevention unit.   
Budget cuts or at least constrained resources have become the norm for most local 
governments.  An important question is whether departments made cuts with an eye towards 
short-term budget balancing strategies or long-term strategies that can help reduce service 
demand.  This research looked at two of these strategies: personnel cuts and compensatory 
actions with implications for short- or long-term strategies. 
Analysis showed that cuts will more than likely take a short-term view in the form of 
personnel cuts, with the key driver being department size.  Interestingly, data also showed 
that personnel cuts predominated in every category of department level budget cut from 
<2.5% to >15%.  This confirms the literature observations that local governments and their 
departments will turn to personnel cuts first.  Of course, this may simply be a reflection of 
the economic state of many communities.  Operating and capital expenditures have already 





Personnel costs are the single largest cost center in local government departments and 
cuts can lead to quick and sizeable savings.  Nonetheless, personnel cuts also introduce a 
long term drag on departments.  Aside from decreasing morale, personnel cuts have been 
shown to decrease mission effectiveness, and innovation, both of which lead to growing costs 
over the long-term (Berne and Stiefel 1993).  Personnel cuts can also be seen as crossing 
between the scope of internalizing and externalizing cuts.  The literature points to personnel 
cuts as an internalized response where the cuts are borne by the department.  However, given 
that the fire department is a service industry, it also externalizes the effect on communities by 
cutting back upon the level and quality of service provided to the community. 
Longer-term strategy perspectives were tested by looking at whether some 
departments took steps to minimize service impacts to the community.  This was captured in 
the survey by asking if any compensatory actions had been taken.  Of the 375 respondents on 
this question, 48.3% (n = 181) indicated that steps had been taken to compensate for the loss 
of service capacity.  Compensatory actions were indicated in every category of fire 
prevention work unit budget cut from <5% to >25%, but were not tied to department size or 
type.  Instead, they were tied to the 3E index scores.  Higher 3E provision scores were related 
to negative parameters on the probability of budget cuts and a robust positive influence (β = 
.73, p<.001) would take some type of compensatory action.  Departments taking 
compensatory measures outweighed those not taking such action in the categories at or below 
15% budget cuts.  The reverse is true above 15%.  These seems to indicate that for budget 
cuts above 15%, departments view compensatory efforts as more futile, than not, and they 
focus their remaining resources on emergency response.  Overall, the data suggests to me that 




budget cuts than smaller limited programs and departments providing such programs will 
take steps to maintain those functions. 
The Big Picture 
There are two fundamental community fire safety services delivered by local 
government.  These are fire suppression and fire prevention.  Both are critical to maximizing 
the effectiveness and efficiency in the provision of fire protection in a community.  Each is 
comprised of different services that attend to emergency and non-emergency functions.  In 
the case of fire prevention, those functions are the 3E services of plan review, new 
construction inspections, existing building inspections, and fire-arson investigation.   
In 1973, America Burning reported that fire departments spent approximately five 
percent of their annual budget on fire prevention (NCFPC 1973).  In the early 1990’s, 
Schaenman (1993) reported that fire prevention expenditures had dropped to roughly three 
percent of budget, on average, for U.S. fire departments.  Mirkhah (1999) reaffirmed the 
decrease in fire prevention investment in his study of major metropolitan fire departments.  
Schaenman (1993) further reported that countries who invest heavily in public education and 
code enforcement have consistently lower fire loss rates per capita than the United States, 
even with longer emergency response times.  This was true across the developed world in 
1993 and remains true in this century (Schaenman 2007, 2008, 2009). 
This pattern coincides with the literature that documents local government fiscal 
stress beginning around the time of the tax-payer revolt of the late 1970s and continued 
through President Reagan’s new federalism of the 1980’s, into the Tea Party movement of 
the 2000’s, and most recently, the Great Recession.  Regardless of the cause, there has been a 




same time cutting back upon their necessary resources.  This has dramatically changed local 
government priorities. 
If budgets are a reflection of governmental priorities (Lewis 1981, Rubin 2010), then 
where the money flows should indicate which services local government and, by extension, 
departments prioritize.  Remembering that only half of the total study sample reported 
making cuts to fire prevention is a fair indication that fire prevention remains a priority in 
many communities and for many fire departments.  However, this also says that the Great 
Recession had a significant impact on the other half of departments. 
Increasing Community Risk 
This study indicates that half of the survey respondents to the FPC Survey have 
increased their community risk by cutting back on fire prevention services.  Data indicates 
that 85% (n = 351) of those making cuts were mostly- and all-career departments.  Looking 
at population protected, the data indicates that communities above 100-thousand population 
reported more cuts than not.  For communities between 100- and 250-thousand, 55% (n = 71) 
of respondents reported cuts.  For communities above 250-thousand, that rate jumps to 70% 
(n = 95). 
While the analysis was drawn from a nonrepresentative sample, the results are still 
troubling.  It means that dense, high risk population centers are cutting back on prevention.  
In other words, the career-oriented departments protecting 65.5% of the U.S. population are 
ending up with higher risk levels.  Contrast that versus those fire prevention cuts found in 
smaller communities that are protected by mostly- and all-volunteer departments.  These 




Cutting back on fire prevention should exacerbate service demands in terms of call volume 
and incident severity.  
However, the suggestion that high-population communities face the greatest threats 
from fire prevention cutbacks remains somewhat misleading.  These larger communities also 
possess a much deeper resource pool.  Smaller communities have relatively fewer resources 
on which to draw.  In fact, rural localities, those protected by mostly-and all-volunteer fire 
departments, have greater proportions of poverty than more urban settings.  Further, smaller 
communities suffer fire losses at higher per capita rates than more urban settings (Allareddy 
et al. 2007).  Perlman and Benton (2012) found that the cost of living increases brought on by 
the Great Recession affected jurisdictions between 5,000 and 99,000 hardest.  These 
communities have been slower to recover (Farrigan 2014).  This limits the resources 
available to address collective community concerns.  Budget cuts that do not appear drastic 
when compared to larger communities, may actually have much greater impact in those 
contexts. 
Analysis on the 3E Index indicates that many of these smaller communities do not 
provide the full range of 3E services.  Most provide only one or two services, typically public 
education through the local fire department, and plan review and fire-arson investigation 
through alternate providers.  Data shows that 30%-50% of these smaller communities 
reported budget cuts.  When fire prevention programs already operate at the margin, even 
small cuts can significantly impact a 3E program.  This would explain the number of 
departments reporting loss of fire prevention personnel with department cuts below five 




Regardless of rural to urban setting, community risk from lack of fire protection 
features increases when fire prevention functions are underprovided.  Larger departments in 
urbanized settings should consider reconfiguring 3E service provision to take advantage of 
the resource slack in emergency units.  One example for accomplishing this can be taken 
from the provision of advanced life support (ALS) emergency medical services.  Despite 
early resistance, many fire departments now provide ALS services by including a paramedic 
on all apparatus.  Nothing precludes the specialized training of a firefighter in public 
education or code enforcement.  This would permit scarce resources to be shared or focused 
on fire prevention tasks that are not so easily co-provided, such as plan review. 
For smaller volunteer-oriented departments, assistance could be solicited from other 
community organizations, such as faith-based organizations, to help reach out to community 
members.  Another alternative probably more helpful to smaller, more rural volunteer-
oriented departments could be found in state and federal level grants, though it is still 
applicable for larger departments.  For example, FEMA Staffing for Adequate Fire & 
Emergency Response (SAFER) Grants are focused on funding emergency response 
personnel.  The primary assignments requirements could be amended to include collateral 
fire prevention duties (FEMA 2019). 
3E Service Audiences and Fire Prevention Cuts 
Another factor that should be considered relative to fire prevention cuts is who the 
primary audience is for each 3E service.  Each audience for a 3E services is fundamentally 
different.  This likely has had a large impact on the perceived importance of the service, the 





The primary audience for plan review and new construction inspections is developers 
and builders.  The intent is to ensure that the new construction meets the requirements of the 
appropriate zoning, site, building, and fire codes.  Typically, no building is designed or 
constructed without an architect and/or engineer involved.  The purpose behind plan review 
is simply insurance on the part of the community that the built environment is as safe as 
practicable at the time of construction.  The community also has a financial stake in new 
construction that influences budget cut decisions.  First, plan review and new construction 
inspections are generally associated with a direct revenue stream.  Second, new construction, 
whether commercial or residential, improves the tax base of the community and provides an 
indirect revenue stream that helps keep local government functioning.  Third, fire events in 
non-code-compliant structures take considerably more resources to control than those in 
compliant structures.  Local government will likely not want to cut this service.   
The audience for existing building inspections is two-fold.  First, there are the 
building owners and operators.  In commercial buildings, which includes leased multi-family 
residential, this audience forms a powerful, vocal political constituency, which tends to 
resent almost any (except the most cursory) involvement of government enforcement of fire 
safety systems maintenance in their buildings.  Fires are infrequent events in such structures 
and maintenance of fire protection systems is easily prioritized below the maintenance of 
other building systems such as heat and air conditioning. 
The secondary audience for existing building inspections are the occupants of these 
buildings.  While this audience has the most to lose in unmaintained buildings, as a political 
constituency, they are loosely organized, if at all.  When fires do occur, they tend to impact 




risk of harm to exposure from those fires increases dramatically.  Incipient fires are not 
suppressed, smoke control fails to clear stairwells, and alarms systems cannot be heard.  
Thus, fires in these structures become low-frequency, high consequence events.  
Unfortunately, anything short of a catastrophic event will not generate sufficient political 
push to ensure that funding is available to provide this service.  Furthermore, even though 
human behavior is the single largest cause of fires, legal doctrine prevents fire departments 
from inspecting the residential portions of multi-family building and single-family homes. 
This leads to the 3E service audience for public education.  The public education 
audience theoretically consists of every person in a community.  However, in practice, public 
education focuses on younger and aged population groups.  It has been demonstrated that 
these two groups are the most vulnerable to death and injury from fire, so that is where fire 
departments tend to target their efforts.  These groups are not politically organized and have 
little voice in budget deliberations.  However, they have high political and public salience 
that can be leveraged to maintain these programs. 
Finally, there is the audience for fire-arson investigation.  Unlike the other 3E 
services, it is important to recognize that fire-arson investigation is not a direct delivery 
public service in the same terms.  For fire-arson investigation, the direct client is the 
government and insurance provider.  Government is concerned with fire-arson investigation 
so that trends in cause can be identified and other services directed to reduce the risk and 
incidence of fire.  In the rare case that the fire is arson in origin, the government’s interest is 
in prosecuting a criminal case, which generally receives high priority.  Likewise, the 




payouts, or in the case of negligence, equipment malfunction, or criminal intent seeks to 
subrogate or avoid payouts. 
Overall, the choice of which services will be cutback comes down to the political 
pressure that can be brought into budget deliberations.  Those with weak political 
constituencies will be sacrificed first.  This means that plan review and arson investigation 
are relatively safe from budget cuts.  New construction inspections are safe when part of the 
building permit process.  Existing building inspections have a strong adversarial and weak 
supportive constituency and will be sacrificed first.  Service providers would do well to 
combine existing building inspections into emergency response forces to lessen the budget 
implications and make it more difficult to tease out direct costs.  Further, the mere presence 
of uniformed firefighters to perform base-level inspections often serves to raise awareness 
and improve compliance (Ta et al. 2006).  When combined with building familiarization 
exercises and approached from a public education perspective rather than a compliance 
perspective (May and Wood 2003), building owners and operators will likely be less 
resistant. 
Practical Implications of Cuts to 3E Services 
While fire prevention remains a priority in many communities, economic constraints 
force other communities to deemphasize fire prevention.  This is concerning as most likely 
target of cuts is existing building inspections.  Next to public education, these inspections 
have the greatest potential to make a positive impact on fire safety for those who live and 
work in a community, and for emergency responders protecting it.  Unfortunately, failure to 




Savings are made at current financial rates, but paid out in future inflated rates, making 
contemporary comparisons difficult (Wasem 2007). 
Existing building inspections are intended to ensure that building owners and 
occupants maintain installed active fire protection systems function correctly when needed.  
This is a difficult proposition given that fires are infrequent, but high-consequence events.  
The associated risk is seldom perceived in realistic terms and the risk has increased with 
changes in construction methods and materials.  At the time America Burning was written in 
1973, construction techniques relied on natural materials that possessed a certain amount of 
fire resistance, such as dimensional lumber and solid wood doors.  Furthermore, design 
features of the day accentuated inherent compartmentalization that slowed the spread of fire 
and combustion by-products.  Finally, furnishings were also made of naturally occurring 
materials, such as cotton and wool. 
That has all changed.  Buildings are now constructed with value engineering in mind 
and then filled with synthetic furnishings.  This means light-weight construction that is easily 
compromised by fire damage and a fire load with many times the heat release rate.  A perfect 
example of the effect of these changes is illustrated by Kerber (2012).  Whereas fires in 
legacy construction usually led to flashover in roughly 20-30 minutes, followed by collapse 
in around 40 minutes, modern construction techniques and living conditions result in 
flashover in as little as three minutes and structural collapse in under ten minutes.  These are 
not survivable events for occupants nor for emergency responders. 
New construction methods are highly dependent on fire protection systems to 
maintain structural integrity and allow occupants time to escape when fires do occur.  This 




weight construction, high density, tight configurations of buildings.  From a fire protection 
standpoint, buildings less than 30 feet apart constitute a single fire area.  This means a much 
heavier emergency response commitment when fire protection systems fail.  Emergency 
operation objectives easily change from confining the fire to the room of origin to confining 
it to the building or block of origin.  Planners need to start considering conflagration potential 
in resource analyses.  
Unfortunately, most owners and occupants do not understand the importance of 
maintaining fire protection systems and neither do most firefighters.  Existing building 
inspections function as insurance before the event for occupants and emergency responders.  
For the same reasons that changes in construction have increased occupant risk, they have 
increased risk to firefighters.  If one compares the flashover and collapse time frames to 
recommended response times for career and volunteer fire departments, it can be seen that 
about the time firefighters arrive and begin operations, structural components will be starting 
to fail.  Maintaining fire protection systems increases the time to flashover and structural 
failure allowing for occupant evacuation and for emergency responders to successfully 
intervene. 
Greene and Andres (2009) found that human behavior is the most important factor in 
fire cause.  Changing human behavior is the province of public education.  Thus, the 
importance of public education, which really has several audiences.  Fire departments tend to 
concentrate on the young and elderly, since these demographics have a tendency to be at 
greatest risk of injury and death.  However, this risk is associated with an inability to react 
appropriately when confronted with a fire scenario.  The audience in these situations should 




care responsibility for young children and older adults.  Subramaniam (2004) studied the lack 
of fire safety awareness in young adults and found that they changed behaviors fairly easily 
when confronted with actions that increased risk.  These groups are just harder to reach, 
particularly in economically challenged communities where work and other factors constitute 
barriers to access. 
There is another practical consideration to be made concerning cuts to 3E services.  
That is when services are cut rather than transferred internally or externally, it becomes 
extremely difficult to restore them.  Given that personnel cuts seem to be the approach of 
choice, it must be understood that these cuts are short-term approaches to closing a budget 
gap.  Unfortunately, personnel cuts also have long term consequences for fire departments, 
particularly in niche services, such as fire prevention.  Loss of personnel equals loss of 
expertise and capacity.  If personnel cuts are too deep, departments risk falling below an 
effectiveness threshold – the department no longer has the capacity to fulfill the service.  Still 
worse, a department can find itself in a position when it is extraordinarily difficult to rebuild 
that lost capacity.  Spinning up a program requires more investment than maintaining a 
program.   There is always lag time between bringing on new people and having them 
produce a resulting effect within the community.  Proficiency requires at least a year, if not 
two. 
Further, fire prevention impact takes years to become obvious.  It follows that 
departments may gamble that fire prevention could be cut to survive the immediacy of the 
budget downturn and be restored at a later date before the effect of 3E service cuts become 
pronounced.  However, this becomes a quite difficult end to achieve within the short confines 




for scarce resources.  When 3E services are cut, it is more than likely not coming back.  By 
way of example, the data in this research shows that when public education is not provided 
by the local fire department, it is seldom provided by another entity.  In the overall study 
sample (n = 1200) only 2.8% (n = 34) of cases report public education is provided by another 
local organization.  It would be a mistake to think that this only applies to public education. 
In closing, it is worth noting that Southwick Jr and Butler (1985) observed that the 
elasticity of demand for fire losses were substantially higher than for relative wages 
expended to maintain a firefighting force.  The critical implication of this relationship is that 
investment in alternative means of reducing fire loss, such as the 3E fire prevention services, 
will reduce the demand for more firefighters vis-à-vis the population protected.  In other 
words, fire prevention is less expensive than buying fire trucks and firefighters.  This 
research remains relevant given predictions for another downturn within the next year or two 
(Mauldin 2018).  If past is prolog, it seems reasonable that the various delivery schemes will 
be subjected to the same economic stressors and reactions that further entrench suboptimal 
behaviors. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
The Vision 20/20 survey also asked questions on whether activities and resources 
were cut back across the five 3E services (in addition to personnel).  Analysis on these 
variables might provide additional insight into service priorities and cutback strategies.  
These questions also included the possibility of categorical variables that would possibly give 
information of budget impact of the recession on capital items versus operating costs.  This 




An important research question worth exploring is the apparent coincidence of the 
transition points in community size, department size, and department type.  Certain external 
factors seem to come together that influence how communities chose to deliver emergency 
and non-emergency fire department services.  Given the discussion on fire departments 
transitioning from public goods to common pool resources, research could provide a 
quantitative assessment of when service demand begins to overtake fire department capacity, 
particularly as is relates to the type of fire department providing service. 
This research should also be expanded to tap into a representative sample of fire 
service providers.  The inherent bias in the development of this study sample was 
unavoidable given the limitations of an unknown population and a means of contacting 
providers at the time the survey was conducted.  Since then, a public website has been 
developed that provides a directory of fire departments (and stations) by state (see 
https://firedepartment.net).  This website may provide a means of obtaining a true random 
sample to which the 3E Index could be applied. 
Were that to be the case, the survey would need to be reconfigured to clarify 
perceived duplicate questions, such “Were activities cut back?” and “Were activity resources 
cut back?”.  Additional factors should be added to improve the strength of independent 
variables.  These should include socioeconomic conditions, as well as fire rate and loss data.  
These data items would help inform decision-makers and policy in deciding on 3E fire 
prevention provision.  Many local governments are still struggling financially and in many of 
these communities, the population is also suffering economically.  There is a known link 




would provide a richer, more robust picture of fire prevention service provision in a variety 
of community conditions. 
Last and probably one of the most important studies that could reasonably be 
accomplished is a small-N or case study of whether the 3E Index has any relationship to the 
cost of fire10 within a community.  Variations in the 3E Index could be compared to this total 
cost of fire given reasonably comparable communities.  Most of the necessary information is 
readily available or obtainable with minimal effort.  While certainly not definitive, such a 
study would help establish the viability of the 3E Index as a tool for comparison and the 
effectiveness of different provision schemes.
                                                 
10 The cost of fire has been defined as including the cost of maintaining a fire department, the cost of fire 
insurance, the accumulated losses from actual fires, and the cost of installing and maintaining building fire 
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APPENDIX B – SURVEY INTRODUCTION EMAILS 
 
 
Initial e-mail to survey candidates: 
 




As a fire professional you see first hand the loss and devastation that fires cause in peoples lives and the 
impact these catastrophic events can bring not only to them and their families, but the community as well. 
Vision 20/20 is working to solve this problem, but we need your help. 
 
Vision 20/20 is a grassroots effort to help define and implement national strategies for fire prevention 
practices in the U.S. The goal of Vision 20/20 is a simple one - to marshal forces for the development and 
support of a national strategic agenda to prevent fire loss. The program is supported with funding from the 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Assistance to Fire Fighters Fire Prevention and Safety Grant 
program, and the Institution of Fire Engineers US Branch. For complete details on the Vision 20/20 
program visit www.strategicfire.org  
 
So how can you help? 
The economy has forced local governments and public safety agencies to make tough budget decisions. 
Fire Prevention activities are among the first to be sacrificed when public safety agencies must implement 
cuts. The Vision 20/20 program is asking you to take a few moments to complete a short survey so that 
we can establish the initial impact these cuts in prevention programs are having on organizations across 
the United States.  
If you can take a few moments to help, simply click (insert hyperlink to survey here) 
This survey is completely anonymous and the collective results will be shared with the Vision 20/20 team 
as they work to coordinate efforts to improve fire prevention efforts across the nation. 
Please feel free to share this message and invite other members of your organization to complete this 
survey.  
Please complete your survey response by (Insert date here – I’d suggest 30 days out from when 
email is sent.) 
Thank you, 
 







APPENDIX B – SURVEY INTRODUCTION EMAILS 
 
 
Second email – two weeks after first email. 
 




A few weeks ago we sent you information on the Vision 20/20 program and our efforts at improving fire 
prevention programs across the nation and how you can help. Each year thousands of people lose their 
lives, tens of thousands of people are injured and billions of dollars in property are lost. These losses from 
fires are more than those from floods, hurricanes, tornados, earthquakes and other natural disasters 
combined. 
 
In these difficult economic times, Fire Prevention activities are among the first to be sacrificed when public 
safety agencies must implement cuts. The Vision 20/20 program is asking you to take a few moments to 
complete a short survey so that we can establish the initial impact these cuts in prevention programs are 
having on organizations across the United States.  
If you haven’t yet completed the survey, can you please take a take a few moments to help? 
Simply click https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/5YVL2VW  
This survey is completely anonymous and the collective results will be shared with the Vision 20/20 team 
as they work to coordinate efforts to improve fire prevention efforts across the nation. 
Through the efforts of some of our colleagues, the International Code Council has agreed to distribute the 
survey to their membership.  This will allow us to collect more rounded information and reduce any 
inadvertent bias. Accordingly, we are extending the closure date for the survey to provide the ICC 
members an opportunity to respond. 
Please complete your survey response by June 15, 2012.  I will be closing the survey to responses 
at 10:00 PM EST on that date. 




Vision 20/20 Steering Committee 
 
About Vision 20/20 
 
Vision 20/20 is a grassroots effort to help define and implement national strategies for fire prevention 
practices in the U.S. The goal of Vision 20/20 is a simple one - to marshal forces for the development and 
support of a national strategic agenda to prevent fire loss. The program is supported with funding from the 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Assistance to Fire Fighters Fire Prevention and Safety Grant 
program, and the Institution of Fire Engineers US Branch. For complete details on the Vision 20/20 








Third email (send out day or two before stated deadline) 
 
Subject Line: Deadline approaches for Survey on Impact of Cuts to Fire Prevention Programs. 
 
Dear Colleague, 
Friday, June 15 is the deadline for the Vision 20/20 program survey. If you haven’t had a chance to 
complete your responses, we hope that you can take a few moments now to do so. Your input is a 
valuable part of our work to strengthen fire prevention efforts across our country. 
To complete this short survey, simply click https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/5YVL2VW  
This survey is completely anonymous and the collective results will be shared with the Vision 20/20 team 
as they work to coordinate efforts to improve fire prevention efforts across the nation. 
Please feel free to share this message and invite other members of your organization to complete this 
survey.  
Please complete your survey response by close of business June 15, 2012. 
Thank you, 
 
Vision 20/20 Steering Committee 
 
About Vision 20/20 
 
Vision 20/20 is a grassroots effort to help define and implement national strategies for fire prevention 
practices in the U.S. The goal of Vision 20/20 is a simple one - to marshal forces for the development and 
support of a national strategic agenda to prevent fire loss. The program is supported with funding from the 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Assistance to Fire Fighters Fire Prevention and Safety Grant 
program, and the Institution of Fire Engineers US Branch. For complete details on the Vision 20/20 









Final email – send out day after initial deadline 
 




Responses were so overwhelming, we have extended the completion deadline for the Vision 20/20 
program survey to (Insert date – I would say approximately a week out – or the first Friday following.) If 
you haven’t already done so, it’s not too late to provide us important data as we work to improve fire 
prevention programs across the nation. But you must act quickly. 
 
To complete this short survey, simply click (insert hyperlink to survey here) 
This survey is completely anonymous and the collective results will be shared with the Vision 20/20 team 
as they work to coordinate efforts to improve fire prevention efforts across the nation. 
Please feel free to share this message and invite other members of your organization to complete this 
survey.  
Please complete your survey response by close of business (Insert deadline date here.) 
Thank you, 
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